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Information systems have always had great potential to disrupt industries and affect 
social welfare. This dissertation studies the societal implications of online lending 
platforms, which are enabled and supported by recent developments in two-sided online 
markets and automated underwriting technologies. These platforms underwrite borrowers 
automatically and match borrowers directly with investors willing to lend their capital by 
making borrowers’ credit information transparent to investors. Online lending has the 
potential to not only increase lending market efficiency due to its nature of 
disintermediation and automation but also provide access to capital to traditionally 
underserved individuals and small businesses. However, various concerns still exist about 
online lending on several aspects, e.g. the risk of involving individual investors, the risk of 
automated underwriting and investment decision making, and the ultimate outcomes of 
online lending. This dissertation includes three interrelated essays which investigate the 
outcomes of online lending platforms on both borrowers and investors. More specifically, 
the first one looks at the borrowers’ side and investigates how online lending influences 
bankruptcies of borrowers, the second one looks at the investors’ side and investigates how 
the use of algorithmic trading in online lending platforms influences investing 
opportunities of individual investors, and the third one looks at the whole online lending 
market and investigates how political ideology and political distance influence investors’ 
behaviors and market efficiency. This dissertation contributes to multiple IS research areas, 
including economics of online platforms, online behavioral bias, automated data-driven 
technologies, etc. This dissertation also provides insights to regulators on online lending 
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regulation and to practitioners on platform design. The specific research questions and 
main findings of each essay/chapter are summarized below.     
Essay 1: How Does Online Lending Influence Bankruptcy Filings? 
By providing quick and easy access to credit, online lending platforms may help borrowers 
overcome financial setbacks and/or refinance high-interest debt, thereby decreasing 
bankruptcy filings. On the other hand, these platforms may cause borrowers to overextend 
themselves financially, leading to a “debt trap” and increasing bankruptcy filings. To 
investigate the impact of online lending on bankruptcy filings, we leverage variation in when 
state regulators granted approval for a major online lending platform – Lending Club – to issue 
peer-to-peer loans. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that state approval of 
Lending Club leads to an increase in bankruptcy filings. A complementary instrumental 
variable analysis using loan-level data yields similar results. We find suggestive evidence that 
the ease of receiving a Lending Club loan causes some borrowers to overextend themselves 
financially, leading to bankruptcy. We also find that “strategic” borrowing – in which 
borrowers who are considering bankruptcy use a Lending Club loan to restructure their debt or 
to engage in last-minute consumption before they file – may play a role. Our results suggest 
that recent initiatives from online lending platforms to control how borrowers use loans, such 
as Lending Club’s Direct Pay program that sends loan funds directly to creditors, can help 
these platforms provide safe and affordable credit. Our study adds to the literature that 
examines how online platforms influence society and the economy; it contributes to the 
literature that examines how financial products, services, and regulations influence bankruptcy 
filings; and it has policy implications for online lending design and regulation. 
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Essay 2: How Does Algorithmic Trading Influence Investor Participation in Peer-to-
Peer Online Lending Markets? 
Algorithmic trading has reshaped equity markets and had significant effects on market 
performance. In this paper, we examine the effect of algorithmic trading in online peer-to-peer 
lending markets. As the “peer-to-peer” label suggests, these markets were originally designed 
to be accessible to individual investors. However, because algorithmic trading is typically used 
by institutional investors with substantial resources, advances in algorithmic trading threaten 
to shut individual investors out of the market. Ironically, this could exacerbate inequalities in 
the financial system that peer-to-peer lending markets were designed to help eliminate. To 
study the effects of algorithmic trading, we examine the effect of an API upgrade on 
Prosper.com that facilitated algorithmic trading. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we 
find that individual “manual” investors were crowded out of the most quickly-funded and 
typically best-performing loans after the API upgrade. However, the API upgrade may have 
increased the size of the market, thereby allowing individual investors to continue investing in 
the market, albeit for somewhat lower quality loans. Our study contributes to several emerging 
research areas, including online lending, algorithmic trading, data-driven decision making, and 
the effect of technology on social and financial inequality. 
Essay 3: Do Political Differences Decrease Market Efficiency? An Investigation in the 
Context of Online Lending 
We study whether political differences – which are becoming increasingly acute among 
Americans – inhibit market efficiency by examining whether investors in online lending 
markets are less likely to lend to borrowers whose political ideology (i.e., liberal or 
conservative) is likely to be different from their own. We leverage state-level legalization of 
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same-sex marriage as a natural experiment to investigate how investors in online lending 
markets respond to this signal of a state’s “liberalness”. Results of a difference-in-differences 
analysis show that: (1) investors make more bids (loan offers) to borrowers in states that 
legalize same-sex marriage in the days immediately after passage of the law; and (2) investors 
from politically similar states contribute more to this increase than do investors from politically 
dissimilar states. This suggests that political differences influence lending decisions in online 
lending markets, potentially preventing beneficial investor/borrower matches from being 
formed. To test the generalizability of these findings, we use all U.S. states and measure the 
number of bids from investors in each state to borrowers in each state. We use a gravity model 
to examine how political differences across states influence bidding behaviors. Results are 
consistent with the difference-in-differences analysis. Investors have a general preference for 
borrowers from liberal states, but this dissipates (and sometimes disappears) as the political 
distance between the investor and borrower states grows, particularly when the investor state 
is more conservative than the borrower state. We also investigate the mechanism driving the 
effects. We find evidence that investors’ preference for borrowers from liberal states is because 
investors view “liberalness” as a sign of low credit risk. But we also find evidence that the 
negative effect of political distance on investor / borrower matching is purely preference-based, 
perhaps reflecting an in-group bias. Given the fast growth of online lending as well as the rapid 
increase in political polarization, understanding the impact of political differences on market 
outcomes yields important theoretical and practical implications. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Information systems have always had great potential to disrupt industries and affect 
social welfare. This dissertation studies the societal implications of online lending 
platforms, which are enabled and supported by recent developments in two-sided online 
markets and automated underwriting technologies. Online lending is an emerging business 
model that directly matches borrowers and investors. Online lending platforms post the 
information of borrowers who are seeking for money online for investors to make lending 
decisions. Online lending platforms have been established as a mainstay source of 
alternative funding (the total dollar amount of loans issued grew from $1.99 billion in 2010 
to $15.91 billion in 2014.) and are expected to provide 8% of total unsecured consumer 
lending by 2020 (Demyanyk et al. 2017). As is often the case with new IT-enabled business 
models, online lending has potentially massive societal implications. Online lending might 
directly improve social welfare by expanding access to capital to previously underserved 
individuals and small businesses. It might also indirectly improve social welfare by 
reshaping the lending/credit industry and increasing lending market efficiency. However, 
empirical evidence about the outcomes of online lending is still understudied by 
researchers and unclear to regulators, which is why the U.S. Department of Treasury 
requested for information on online lending on 2015 and characterized the industry as 
“untested” in a follow-up white paper on 2016. Motivated by the great potential of online 
lending, this dissertation investigates the societal implications of online lending and 
explores for the mechanisms. 
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Different from traditional lenders, online lending platforms have combined two 
innovative features of modern developments in digital business models and information 
technologies. First, online lending utilizes the power of two-sided or peer-to-peer platforms 
and reduces transaction cost (service cost, searching cost, contract cost, etc.) by reducing 
information asymmetry and improving matching efficiency (See Figure 1-1).  
 
Figure 1-1. Loan listing from Lending Club 
Second, online lending platforms use information technologies and big-data enabled 
algorithms to automate lending procedures, including borrower information collection, 
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loan underwriting, loan issuance, and payment collection. These platforms also provide 
automated lending tools to their investors (See Figure 1-2). Automated lending not only 
reduces service cost but also provides capital to underserved populations who are 
previously restricted by thin credit profiles or inconvenient locations. 
 
Figure 1-2 Auto invest setting from Prosper.com 
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These two features make online lending a significant player in the finance industry, 
but the societal implications are far beyond the success of online lending platforms 
themselves. The most important implication is the large social welfare improvement. Since 
online lending provides digital platforms for borrowers and removes geographical 
restrictions, it can expand access to capital to previously underserved populations who are 
restricted geographically. What’s more, online lending platforms are using automated 
algorithms to underwrite/price borrowers, which is likely to lead to low operational cost 
and high-quality lending decisions. This feature enables online lending to serve individuals 
and small businesses who are previously restricted by thin credit profiles or bad credit 
indicators. Due to these two channels, it is widely believed that online lending has the 
potential to directly improve social welfare. Another potential implication is industry 
disruption as well as the indirect social welfare improvement brought in by incumbent 
lenders. Incumbent lenders, either big or small, are learning from or responding to the 
online lending threats. Big lenders have started to build in-house automated technologies 
to support their own lending business, including but not limited to consumer lending, small 
business lending, and mortgage. Small lenders have started to cooperate with online 
lending platforms by directing their consumers to these platforms or underwriting their 
consumers with the automated lending technologies provided by these platforms. These 
disruptions and improvements, which are enlightened and triggered by online lending 
business, are reshaping the whole lending industry by transforming how the lending market 
works. It is reasonable to expect that this transformation can not only increase lending 
market efficiency but also further improve social welfare.    
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Despite the aforementioned potentials of online lending, there is no guarantee that 
online lending works in the expected way or can fulfill these potentials. Concerns and 
critics coexist with these potentials from the first day of the introduction of online lending. 
These concerns cover a broad range of topics, including the risk of matching naïve 
investors with uncreditworthy borrowers, the risk of automated underwriting technologies 
and lending decision tools, borrower monitoring and default risks, etc. Some anecdotal 
evidence also keeps reminding researchers and regulators that online lending may go 
wrong for different reasons. The exciting potentials and the reasonable concerns create an 
important and urgent research topic for researchers, i.e. how online lending really works 
and what its societal implications would be. This dissertation focuses on empirical 
approaches to investigate the societal implications of online lending. Essentially, this is to 
examine how the two features of online lending, i.e. two-sided matching marketplace and 
automated lending technology, work in the online lending context and what the outcomes 
they might bring in.  
This dissertation is made up of three interrelated essays. Essay I focuses on an 
important indicator of financial health, i.e. bankruptcy filings, and investigates how online 
lending influences bankruptcy filings. This essay directly answers what economic/social 
outcomes online lending might bring in. Because the outcome of online lending is partially 
determined by whether investors can screen good borrowers from bad borrowers and 
whether investors can allocate their capital wisely, Essay II and III investigate how 
investors select borrowers. Due to the two features of online lending, two different 
approaches for lending have evolved across time. The peer-to-peer feature enables 
investors to manually evaluate borrowers, i.e. investors can make a decision based on all 
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the information of a borrower/listing, while the automated lending feature enables investors 
to rely on lending tools or algorithms to select borrowers, i.e. investors are supported or 
even totally replaced by lending tools in selecting investors. The former one is the 
dominating approach in the early time of online lending. As online lending markets have 
attracted more borrowers and investors, the investing side changes from manual lending to 
automated lending. Regarding to the automated lending approach, Essay II focuses on 
automated lending tools and studies how these tools influence lending performance and 
market efficiency. Regarding to the manual lending approach, Essay III focuses on one 
important but understudied decision factor--political ideology and political distance, and 
studies how this information influences investors lending behavior and market efficiency.  
This dissertation is motivated by the potential of emerging online lending platforms 
and investigates how these platforms work and what outcomes they might bring in. This 
dissertation provides not only managerial insights for practitioners and regulators but also 
theoretical implications for IS research. This dissertation adds to the growing IS literature 
of online lending and crowdfunding. The three essays contribute to multiple IS research 
areas, including economics of online platforms, dark side of IS, online behavioral bias, 
automated data-driven technologies, etc.   
 7 
CHAPTER 2. HOW DOES ONLINE LENDING INFLUENCE 
BANKRUPTCY FILINGS?  
 How do you begin a new chapter using this template? What must you do to get the 
page numbers to act correctly? Below are the steps for making a new chapter.  
2.1 Introduction 
 Online lending platforms match borrowers with investors willing to lend their 
capital. These platforms are sometimes referred to as peer-to-peer lending platforms 
because investors and borrowers are often individuals. Online lending platforms have the 
potential to expand access to credit to borrowers who are underserved by traditional credit 
sources such as banks as well as to provide better terms to all borrowers. Online lending is 
growing rapidly and represents as much as one-third of the U.S. market for personal loans.1 
Despite this, regulators are unsure about the impact of online lending and whether it should 
be encouraged. For example, the U.S. Department of Treasury issued a white paper in May 
2016 that characterized the industry as “untested” and called for greater regulation.2  
 To provide some insight into the impact of online lending, we study the effect of 
online lending on bankruptcy filings. Online lending could plausibly decrease or increase 
bankruptcy filings. The optimistic view (i.e., that online lending decreases bankruptcy) is 
that the increased access to credit that online lending provides will help borrowers handle 
unanticipated financial setbacks and stave off bankruptcy. For some borrowers, including 
those who are traditionally underserved, an online loan may help them remain financially 
solvent during times of financial need. The relatively low interest rate of online loans 
                                                 




(compared to credit cards) may also help borrowers refinance existing debt, thereby 
reducing their debt burden and helping them avoid bankruptcy. The pessimistic view (i.e., 
that online lending increases bankruptcy) is that online lending will cause borrowers to 
take on more debt than they can service, driving them into bankruptcy. This could occur if 
online loans are issued to unqualified borrowers who cannot repay the loans. It could also 
occur if the quickness and convenience of obtaining an online loan causes otherwise 
qualified borrowers to overextend themselves financially, leading them into a “debt trap” 
and subsequent bankruptcy. Overall, the effect of online lending platforms on bankruptcy 
filings is theoretically ambiguous and warrants empirical examination. 
 We focus our analysis on Lending Club, which is the largest online lending 
platform and is representative of other online lending platforms such as Prosper and 
Funding Circle. We use two complementary identification strategies to examine Lending 
Club’s impact on bankruptcy filings. First, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis 
in which we exploit variation in when state regulators granted approval for Lending Club 
to issue peer-to-peer loans. We find that Lending Club approval leads to an increase in 
bankruptcy filings. Second, we use micro-level loan data published by Lending Club to 
examine the relationship between lending activity and bankruptcy filings. We use an 
instrumental variables approach to improve the causal interpretation of our results. We find 
that a one standard deviation increase in Lending Club loans is associated with an 
approximately 3% increase in bankruptcy filings. We find suggestive evidence that the 
increase in bankruptcy filings is because some borrowers become overextended financially 
after receiving a Lending Club loan (as opposed to their being inherently uncreditworthy). 
Some of the increase in bankruptcy may also be due to strategic borrowing in which 
borrowers who are considering bankruptcy use a Lending Club loan to restructure their 
debt or to engage in last-minute consumption (e.g., taking a vacation) before they file. 
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 Our study contributes to the online lending literature as well as to the bankruptcy 
and household finance literature. First, as an increasing number of online lending 
platforms/technologies are created, it is important to study their effects on access to capital, 
funding allocation efficiency, and household financial stability (Burtch and Chan 2018; 
Butler et al. 2016; Kim and Hann 2018; Mollick and Robb 2016; Wei and Lin 2017). Our 
findings suggest that online lending platforms may have harmful effects and that design 
and/or regulatory changes may help these platforms provide safe and affordable credit. 
Indeed, near the end of our study period, Lending Club launched its Direct Pay program, 
which sends loan funds directly to the borrowers’ creditor(s). This type of program could 
address (at least partially) the effect that we document. Second, our study contributes to 
the bankruptcy and household finance literature by investigating how online lending 
influences bankruptcy. This adds to existing studies that have examined how financial 
products/services such as payday loans and credit cards as well as regulatory changes such 
as bankruptcy reform and interstate banking deregulation influence bankruptcy filings 
(Dick and Lehnert 2010; Hynes 2012).  
2.2 Background, Literature Review, and Motivation 
We first discuss the literatures on bankruptcy and online lending. We then discuss 
how online lending platforms might affect bankruptcy. 
2.2.1 Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy is a legal process used by individuals and businesses to resolve unpaid 
debts. In the United States, debtors can file under different chapters. Chapter 7 and Chapter 
13 filings are the most common (Dobbie and Song 2015). Under Chapter 7, debtors 
liquidate nonexempt assets (e.g., their house may be foreclosed upon) in exchange for the 
discharge of most debts and protection from collection actions such as lawsuits, wage 
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garnishment, and telephone calls. Under Chapter 13, debtors can avoid liquidating assets 
but must enter into a repayment plan for all or part of their debt.  
Reasons for and implications of bankruptcy. Different theories have been proposed 
to explain why debtors file for bankruptcy, including strategic motive theory and adverse 
events theory. Strategic motive theory argues that debtors are motivated by financial 
benefits to file bankruptcy. These benefits include discharging (some) debt and stopping 
collection activities of creditors, including collection letters/phone calls/visits, wage 
garnishment, and other court orders (Dawsey et al. 2013; Lefgren and Mclntyre 2009). The 
surge of bankruptcy filings prior to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (BAPCPA) in 2005 (which reduced the benefits of filing for bankruptcy for 
many) provides support for the strategic motive perspective (White 2009). Adverse events 
theory considers bankruptcy to be a consequence of growing financial distress, potentially 
driven by unemployment, increasing housing and medical costs, divorce, credit card debt, 
and/or unfair and abusive practices by lenders (Dick and Lehnert 2010). Several studies 
support this theory by showing that unemployment is a major contributing factor to 
bankruptcy (Himmelstein et al. 2005; Zhu 2011). Whatever the reasons for bankruptcy 
filings, the downsides of bankruptcy are substantial and discourage filing, including harm 
to the debtor’s credit score (that may take years to repair) and the cost of filing (both 
financially and in terms of social stigma). 
Programs, policies, etc. that affect bankruptcy. Given the negatives of filing 
bankruptcy, researchers have studied financial products, regulations, and market activities 
that might affect bankruptcy. One stream examines the effect of payday loans, credit cards, 
and online platforms. The effect of payday loans is inconclusive. There is evidence that 
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payday loans increase consumer bankruptcy filings and that Chapter 13 bankruptcies 
decrease after payday loan bans (Morgan et al. 2012). However, the legalization of payday 
loans has been shown to reduce bankruptcy filings in counties with large military 
populations (Hynes 2012). Research on the effect of credit cards suggests that expanded 
credit card debt contributed to an increase in bankruptcy from 1980 to 2004 (White 2007). 
This may be because the pool of consumers who were issued credit cards became riskier 
over time (Livshits et al. 2016). Research on the effect of online platforms is nascent (with 
our study being one of the first), although a recent study indicates that a medical 
crowdfunding platform (GiveForward) reduces bankruptcy by helping individuals cover 
unexpected medical costs (Burtch and Chan 2018). Another stream examines the effect of 
banking deregulation and bank mergers on bankruptcy. Research has shown that 
competition brought about by deregulation prompted banks to adopt sophisticated credit 
rating technology, which they used to expand lending to previously excluded (and typically 
riskier) households. This explained at least 10% of the rise in bankruptcy rates between 
1980 and 1994 (Dick and Lehnert 2010). Bank mergers have been shown to increase 
consumer bankruptcies because they destroy interpersonal, relational knowledge that 
lenders use to identify creditworthy borrowers and to shepherd them through financial 
difficulties (Allen et al. 2016). 
2.2.2 Online Lending Platforms 
Online lending platforms match borrowers with investors for personal or small 
business loans. Online lending is also referred to as peer-to-peer lending, loan-based 
crowdfunding, and marketplace lending (Morse 2015). To illustrate how online lending 
works, we describe the typical model pioneered by Lending Club. First, a borrower 
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requests a loan by providing personal information and the desired loan amount. Second, 
the online lending platform analyzes the borrower’s information to assess risk and to assign 
an interest rate. Third, lenders/investors choose which loans to fund, using their own 
capital. They decide the amount they want to lend and can invest as little as $25 in each 
loan. If enough investors want to lend money to the borrower, then s/he can get the loan. 
There is a growing body of research about online lending, including how it affects access 
to capital, how the design and operation of online lending platforms affect lending 
outcomes, and how investors behave. 
Access to capital. Because online lending is an alternative funding source compared 
to banks, it has the potential to democratize access to capital (Mollick and Robb 2016). 
Indeed, research has concluded that online lending has penetrated areas likely to benefit 
from increased access to capital, including those with highly concentrated (i.e. weakly 
competitive) banking markets, those that are losing bank branches, and those of low 
socioeconomic status (Jagtiani and Lemieux 2017; Kim and Hann 2017). Online lending 
may also help borrowers with good access to traditional capital secure loans with attractive 
terms. For example, online lending borrowers from areas with good access to bank finance 
seek loans with low interest rates and (perhaps as a result) are more likely to prepay 
(Alyakoob et al. 2017; Butler et al. 2016). 
Platform design, operation, and outcomes. Research has studied how the design and 
operation of online lending platforms affects lending outcomes. For example, underwriting 
for online loans is based on more information and is faster than traditional underwriting 
(Buchak et al. 2018; Jagtiani and Lemieux 2017). This allows more borrowers to receive 
credit at favorable terms; Jagtiani and Lemieux (2017) show that online lending technology 
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is more likely to classify a subprime borrower into a better loan grade compared to 
traditional lenders. It also allows loans to be issued more quickly. Other research has 
studied whether online lending platforms should assign interest rates to borrowers (i.e., the 
posted price regime) or allow investors to propose their own interest rates to borrowers 
(i.e., the auction regime). Wei and Lin (2017) found that the posted price regime yields 
more matches between borrowers and investors but also yields higher default rates. 
Investor behavior. Online lending investors rely on both traditional financial 
information and “soft” information to make lending decisions (Iyer et al. 2016). In addition 
to traditional factors such as credit scores, the decision process is influenced (and 
potentially biased) by several factors, including other investors’ decisions, loan 
descriptions, borrowers’ friendship networks, borrowers’ demographics (including gender, 
race, and overall “appearance”), and the distance (geographical and cultural) between 
investor and borrower (Burtch et al. 2014; Duarte et al. 2012; Galak et al. 2011; Greenberg 
and Molick 2017; Harkness 2016; Hildebrand et al. 2017; Lin et al. 2013; Lin and 
Viswanathan 2016; Pope and Sydnor 2011; Younkin and Kuppuswamy 2017; Zhang and 
Liu 2012). Sophisticated and less sophisticated investors often rely on different information 
when determining whom to fund, but their investment returns are often similar (Lin et al. 
2018; Mollick and Nanda 2016).  
2.2.3 How Online Lending Might Affect Bankruptcy 
There are multiple mechanisms through which online lending could affect 
bankruptcy filings (most of which we examine empirically in our analysis). These 
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mechanisms relate to the characteristics of online lending borrowers and how they use 
online loans. 
Characteristics of online lending borrowers. It is possible that many online loans are 
issued to high-risk borrowers who lack access to traditional capital. If these borrowers are 
inherently uncreditworthy and unable to repay the loan, then online lending should increase 
bankruptcy filings. This might occur if investors’ biases (such as those noted above) cause 
them to fund high-risk borrowers. On the other hand, online lending may provide the 
capital necessary for these borrowers to handle unanticipated financial setbacks and to 
remain solvent during times of financial need, which could decrease bankruptcy filings.  
Use of online loans. Regardless of whether a borrower is high-risk or not, how 
borrowers use online loans should influence bankruptcy filings. If borrowers use the loans 
to refinance high interest debt, then online lending would reduce their debt burden, leading 
to fewer bankruptcies. On the other hand, if borrowers use the loans to add to existing debt, 
then online lending would increase their debt burden, leading to more bankruptcies. To 
illustrate, consider the following example. Assume that person Z has an average credit risk 
profile and has $13,000 in credit card debt at a 20% interest rate. (According to the 2007 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project, median credit card debt was $13,279 for bankruptcy filers.) 
Assume that Z gets a $13,000 online loan with a 13% interest rate. If Z pays off his credit 
card debt with the online loan, then he will have $13,000 in debt at a 13% rate instead of 
at a 20% rate. This improves his financial situation, helping him avoid a potential 
bankruptcy. However, if Z does not pay off his credit card debt and instead uses the online 
loan for purchases/vacation/etc., then he will have $13,000 in credit card debt at a 20% rate 
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plus $13,000 in online loan debt at a 13% rate. This worsens his financial situation, 
potentially driving him into bankruptcy.  
A recent working paper (Chava and Paradkar 2018) based on proprietary credit 
bureau data suggests a related possibility. It shows that many borrowers use online loans 
to pay off credit card debt, as intended. Because this increases borrowers’ credit ratings, 
they receive – and often accept – additional offers of credit. Ironically, this often leads to 
greater aggregate credit card debt and subsequent default – and potentially to bankruptcy.  
Another possibility is that online lending attracts borrowers who are considering 
bankruptcy. The relative ease and speed of receiving an online loan might tempt these 
borrowers to take a loan and then declare bankruptcy shortly thereafter. For example, a 
borrower might use an online loan to pay off his/her car loan – thereby swapping secured 
debt for unsecured debt – and then file for bankruptcy.  This type of debt restructuring may 
be tempting, because it may protect a borrower's property (e.g., car) from immediate 
repossession after declaring bankruptcy.  Or, a borrower considering bankruptcy might use 
an online loan to engage in last-minute consumption, such as taking a vacation, before 
declaring bankruptcy. If this “strategic” borrowing occurs, then online lending would 
increase bankruptcy filings. 
Overall, it is unclear a priori whether online lending has a positive or negative effect 
on bankruptcy filings, or which mechanisms are responsible for any effect. This motivates 
our empirical examination. 
2.3 Empirical Setting and Overview of Empirical Strategy 
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The online lending platform we investigate is Lending Club. We chose this platform 
for three reasons: 1) it is the largest online lending platform, 2) it was approved to issue 
peer-to-peer loans in different states at different times, which provides a natural experiment 
that we leverage to examine its effect on bankruptcy filings, and 3) it publishes micro-level 
loan data. We conduct two complementary analyses. First, we leverage the staggered 
approval of Lending Club across states in a difference-in-differences (“DD”) analysis to 
examine its impact on bankruptcy. This strategy of exploiting staggered approval/entry has 
been implemented in several studies that investigate the impact of regulatory change and 
platform implementation (Bertrand et al. 2004; Burtch et al. 2016; Chan and Ghose 2014; 
Greenwood and Agarwal 2016). Second, we use Lending Club’s loan data to examine the 
relationship between the level of Lending Club loans and bankruptcy filings, using 
instrumental variables to improve the causal interpretation of our results. 
2.3.1 Difference-in-differences Analysis: Analyzing the Effect of Lending Club 
Regulatory Approval 
Overview of Approach 
Lending Club launched its platform in 2007. In April 2008, Lending Club entered a 
“quiet” period in which it suspended peer-to-peer lending until it registered with federal 
and state regulators as a licensed lender (or loan broker). During the quiet period, Lending 
Club funded some loans with its own money (instead of with investors’ money), but these 
loans were few (see Appendix A-1 for an illustration).  Lending Club pursued regulatory 
approval to resume peer-to-peer lending in all 50 states. By October 2008, it had received 
approval in 40 states plus the District of Columbia (DC). For 9 states, it received approval 
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at different times between 2010 and 2016. For 1 state (Iowa), it had not received approval 
as of November 2018.  Table 1 shows the quarter in which Lending Club received 
regulatory approval in each state. We gathered this information from Lending Club’s blog, 
from news about Lending Club, and by using Lending Club’s loan data to examine lending 
activity in each state over time. The variation in when states allowed Lending Club to 
resume peer-to-peer lending provides a natural experiment that we exploit to examine the 
impact of Lending Club on bankruptcy filings. 
Table 2-1 Lending Club Approval by State 
State Approval Quarter Approval Year (as coded for 
county-year analysis) 
Approval Quarter (as coded 
for state-quarter analysis) 
All states, except 
those listed below 
2008-Q4 Not included 2009-Q1 
Kansas 2010-Q4 2011 2011-Q1 
North Carolina 2010-Q4 2011 2011-Q1 
Indiana 2012-Q4 2013 2013-Q1 
Tennessee 2013-Q1 2013 2013-Q2 
Mississippi 2014-Q2 n/a; see text 2014-Q3 
Nebraska 2015-Q2 2015 2015-Q3 
North Dakota 2015-Q2 2015 2015-Q3 
Maine 2015-Q3 2016 2015-Q4 
Idaho 2016-Q1 2016 2016-Q2 
Iowa Not approved as of 
2018-Q4 
Not approved as of 2018-Q4 Not approved as of 2018-Q4 
We constructed two panel data sets with different units of analysis: (1) a county-year 
panel, and (2) a state-quarter panel. We chose 2006 as the initial year for our analysis 
because the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) took 
effect in October 2005. Many debtors rushed to file bankruptcy before this act took effect 
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because it introduced an income test that limited which borrowers could file Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. 
For the county-year analysis, we limit our analysis to counties in the states that 
approved Lending Club no earlier than 2010. We study the period from 2006 to 2014. 
During this period, counties within 4 states (Kansas, North Carolina, Indiana, Tennessee) 
were “treated” with Lending Club approval while counties within 5 “control” states 
(Nebraska, North Dakota, Maine, Idaho, Iowa) were not.3 Because bankruptcy filings and 
many of our control variables are only available at the county level on a yearly basis, we 
use a yearly panel. We estimate the effect of Lending Club’ approval using a difference-
in-differences approach, with the counties in the states in which Lending Club hadn’t yet 
been approved or was not approved serving as the counterfactuals for the counties in the 
states in which Lending Club was approved. We use this sample for the following reasons. 
First, we observe each county for at least 4 years before Lending Club approval. This helps 
us assess whether pre-existing trends in bankruptcy filings might confound the effect of 
Lending Club approval. (Our pre-treatment observation window is shorter for the other 40 
states.) Second, Lending Club was relatively well-established and likely to be known by 
prospective borrowers by 2010, when the first states in this analysis were treated. This 
increases the likelihood that Lending Club approval will have a detectable effect. Third, 
analysis at the county level allows us to control for county-level demographic and 
economic variables, thereby improving the precision of our estimate of Lending Club’s 
                                                 
3 We exclude Mississippi because its bankruptcy trends differ from the other states in this analysis. In the 9 
focal states, bankruptcy filings per capita declined year-over-year from 2010 to 2014. This is not true for 
Mississippi, which experienced a pronounced increase in bankruptcy filings in 2013. This suggests a 
possible policy change or economic shock – specific to Mississippi – that could confound our estimation of 
the effect of Lending Club. 
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impact. Fourth, analysis at the county level improves our identification because Lending 
Club was approved at the state (not county) level. Thus, even if unobserved state-level 
factors influence both Lending Club approval and bankruptcy filings (thereby creating 
endogeneity concerns), these factors may not apply at the county level.  
For the state-quarter analysis, we use data from all 50 states plus DC. This analysis 
complements the county-year analysis and addresses some of its shortcomings. First, it 
allows us to assess whether our results are idiosyncratic to the 9 states in the county-year 
panel. Second, because bankruptcy filings and control variables are available for each state 
(but not each county) on a quarterly basis, we can conduct this analysis by quarter rather 
than by year. This permits a more precise measure of when Lending Club was approved in 
each state. Third, we are able to extend the study period to 2015; we use 2014 as the final 
year in the county-year analysis in order to preserve a clear distinction between treated and 
control counties (see Table 2-1). 
In both the county-year and state-quarter analyses, all of the control states (except 
for Iowa) approved Lending Club by at least 2016 (see Table 2-1). This suggests that there 
may be no dramatic difference between the control and treated states in terms of their 
overall attitude to online lending, only differences in how long it took Lending Club to 
receive the necessary regulatory approvals. This increases the likelihood that the control 
states are valid counterfactuals for the treated states. 
Data and Variables 
Bankruptcy filings. The key dependent variable is bankruptcy filings per capita, 
which is the number of bankruptcy filings per 1,000 people in county i in year t (or in state 
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i in quarter t). We obtained bankruptcy filing data from the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts website. 4  The U.S. Courts data distinguishes between non-business and 
business bankruptcy. We include both in our study because individuals might use Lending 
Club loans to fund their businesses. The data also distinguishes between chapters of 
bankruptcy (e.g., Chapter 7, 13, etc.) In addition to bankruptcy filings per capita, we also 
use the raw number of bankruptcy filings and the natural log of the raw number (plus 1 to 
account for values of 0). These measures are widely used in bankruptcy studies (Burtch 
and Chan 2018; Dick and Lehnert 2010).  
Lending Club approval. The key independent variable is the Lending Club available 
dummy. For the county-year panel, this variable is 1 if Lending Club is available to 
borrowers in county i in year t and 0 otherwise. If Lending Club was approved during the 
first half of the year, then we consider it to be available that year and all subsequent years. 
If Lending Club was approved during the second half of the year, then we consider it to be 
unavailable that year but available all subsequent years. For robustness, we used an 
alternative coding rule (see below), which does not affect our results. For the state-quarter 
panel, we defined Lending Club as available in the first full quarter after Lending Club 
approval.  
Demographic and socioeconomic information. We include several demographic 
and socioeconomic control variables gathered from the U.S. Census and the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. These include population, demographic mix, unemployment rate, and 
                                                 
4 Because federal courts have jurisdiction over personal and business bankruptcy cases, the U.S. Courts 
data fully represent the bankruptcy activity of individuals and businesses in the U.S. Bankruptcy filing data 
are available from http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables.  
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median household income. This allows us to control for alternative explanations and 
improves the precision of our estimate of the effect of Lending Club.  
Table 2-2 Variables and Descriptive Statistics for the State-Quarter Sample 
Variable Source Min Max Mean Median St. Dev 
Bankruptcy variables 
Bankruptcy filings per capita U.S. Bankruptcy Courts 0.11 3.10 0.83 0.75 0.43 
Bankruptcy filings - raw U.S. Bankruptcy Courts 80 69359 5406 3403 6962 
Bankruptcy filings - natural log U.S. Bankruptcy Courts 4.39 11.15 7.90 8.13 1.32 
Lending Club variable 
Lending Club available (binary variable) Lending Club data, news reports 0 1 0.60 1 0.49 
Demographic control variables (from U.S. Census) 
Population (in millions) Population Estimates Program 0.52 39.14 6.08 4.33 6.82 
% age 60 & above American Community Survey 10.7 24.9 18.6 18.7 2.3 
% white American Community Survey 24.9 96.3 77.4 79.3 13.7 
Socioeconomic control variables (from U.S. Census; Unemployment rate from Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
Number of employed individuals (in 
millions) County Business Patterns 
0.21 14.36 2.24 1.50 2.46 
Average monthly earnings (in thousands) Quarterly Workforce Indicators 2.54 7.50 3.80 3.65 0.71 
Median household income (in thousands) Small Area Income and Poverty 
Estimates 
34.47 74.55 52.06 50.26 8.67 
Unemployment rate (percent) Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics 
2 15.4 6.5 6.2 2.3 
% below high school attainment American Community Survey 7.2 22.1 13.2 12.5 3.5 
% housing units rented American Community Survey 23.7 58.8 32.7 31.5 5.5 
% housing units with mortgage American Community Survey 31.8 54.8 44.5 44.8 4.7 
Each variable is available at both the county and state levels. Most are available 
quarterly. For those available only yearly, we use the yearly value to proxy for quarterly 
values in the state-quarter analysis. These variables, their sources, and descriptive statistics 
are listed in Table 2-2 (state-quarter) and Table 2-3 (county-year). Because the last three 
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control variables in Table 2-2 are not always reported for small counties, we include them 
only in the state-quarter analysis. The results of the state-quarter analysis are similar if we 
drop these variables. 
In the interest of transparency and so that others can replicate our results, we provide 
the data and regression commands for most of our analyses. See Appendix A-2 for details. 
Empirical Strategy 
Our baseline specification is (1). We describe the specification for the county-year 
analysis; the description is analogous for the state-quarter analysis. 
Yit = α + βLCit + Tt + Si + γXit + εit       (1) 
In (1), Yit is the number of bankruptcy filings per capita in county i in year t. LCit is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if Lending Club is available to borrowers in county i during 
year t and 0 otherwise. α is a constant term, Tt are year fixed effects, Si are county fixed 
effects, Xit are control variables, γ are associated coefficients, and εit is the error term, which 
is clustered at the county level (and alternatively at the state level, which does not affect 
our results). The year fixed effects account for general changes over time that affected 
bankruptcy filings, which were substantial during the study time period because of the 
Great Recession. The county fixed effects account for unobserved time-invariant 
characteristics of each county. The control variables help us better estimate the effect of 
Lending Club. The parameter of interest is β, which represents the average treatment effect 
of Lending Club approval on bankruptcy filings.  
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Ideally, our sample would include treated and control counties that had parallel 
bankruptcy trends prior to Lending Club’s approval in the treated counties. This would 
increase the likelihood that a change in bankruptcy filings in the treated counties following 
Lending Club approval was caused by Lending Club approval. Pre-treatment bankruptcy 
trends are parallel in the state-quarter analysis (as we will show below) but not in the 
county-year analysis. The left panel of Figure 2-1 shows that for the county-year analysis, 
the bankruptcy trends before 2011 (when the first treated state was treated) are not parallel. 
To account for this, we used coarsened exact matching (CEM) to build a matched sample 
for the county-year analysis in which the pre-treatment trends for treated and control 
counties are parallel. We matched treated and control counties based on their annual values 
of bankruptcy filings per capita and unemployment rate from 2006 to 2010, i.e., prior to 
Lending Club approval. We coarsened these variables into equally spaced bins and only 
matched treated and control counties within the same bins. We also matched on population 
(in 2006). The matching yielded 42 matched strata that each contained at least one treated 
and one control county. These strata contained 259 counties in total, which comprise the 
matched sample: 97 treated counties matched to 162 control counties (see Appendix A-3 
for the list). Because we observe each county for 9 years, this yielded a panel of 2,331 
observations. A characteristic of matching procedures, reflected in our study, is that a 
treated observation is sometimes matched to more than one control observation and vice 
versa. To accommodate this, the CEM algorithm generates weights for each county, which 
we use in our analysis (Iacus et al. 2012). (We also matched each treated county to a single 
control county, which affects our sample size but not our results.) We checked the balance 
between treated and control counties in the matched sample by running several regressions 
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of the form Yi = α + βTreatedi + εi. Yi is one of the matching variables (e.g., bankruptcy 
filings per capita in 2006, bankruptcy filings per capita in 2007, etc.) and Treatedi = 1 for 
treated counties and 0 for control counties. We included the 259 counties in the matched 
sample and used the weights generated by the CEM procedure. Appendix A-4 shows that 
we achieved good balance on not only the matching variables but also on variables not 
included in the matching procedure. Table 2-3 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
county-year matched sample.  
Table 2-3 Variables and Descriptive Statistics for the County-Year Matched Sample 
Variable Min Max Mean Median St. Dev 
Bankruptcy variables 
Bankruptcy filings per capita 0 8.11 2.23 2.09 1.14 
Bankruptcy filings - raw 0 2413 98.32 28 220.68 
Bankruptcy filings - natural log 0 7.79 3.48 3.37 1.46 
Lending Club variable 
Lending Club available (binary variable) 0 1 0.15 0 0.36 
Demographic control variables (from U.S. Census) 
Population (in thousands) 1.28 543.99 35.49 13.90 63.94 
% age 60 & above 9.81 36.95 23.92 23.87 5.19 
% whitea 42.62 99.11 94.35 96.26 6.15 
Socioeconomic control variables (from U.S. Census; Unemployment rate from Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
Number of employed individuals (in thousands) 0 318.69 13.62 3.85 31.42 
Average monthly earnings (in thousands) 1.61 6.30 2.79 2.72 0.54 
Median household income (in thousands) 25.25 97.94 46.00 45.13 7.71 
Unemployment rate (percent) 1.30 14.80 4.97 4.50 1.76 
Notes: Means and standard deviations are calculated using the CEM weights. 
a The mean and median are higher than might be expected because the unit of analysis is county-year. This 
means that a small county (which is likely to have high percentage of white people) contributes similarly 
(depending on the CEM weights) to the statistics as does a large county (which is less likely to have high 
percentage of white people). 
The right panel of Figure 2-1 shows that the pre-treatment bankruptcy trends for 
treated and control counties in the county-year matched sample are parallel; we provide 
more formal evidence of parallel pre-treatment trends below. Figure 2-1 also foreshadows 
our conclusion that Lending Club approval leads to more bankruptcies than would 
otherwise occur.  
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Figure 2-1 Trends in Bankruptcy Filing per Capita for the County-Year Analysis, 
Before and After Matching 
Leads/lags model. To examine more formally whether the treated and control 
counties (or states) follow parallel pre-treatment trends, we implemented a leads/lags 
model, shown in specification (2) (Autor 2003). This approach is widely used in studies 
that use a DD strategy (Chan and Ghose 2014; Greenwood and Agarwal 2016). As above, 
we describe the specification for the county-year analysis. The description is analogous for 
the state-quarter analysis, with one change noted below. 
Yit = α + ∑ 𝜌𝜏
−2
𝜏=−5 𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡+𝜏 + ∑ 𝜌𝜏
3
𝜏=0 𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡+𝜏 + Tt + Si + γXit + εit   (2) 
Specification (2) mirrors (1) except that we replace βLCit with ∑ 𝜌𝜏
−2
𝜏=−5 𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡+𝜏 + 
∑ 𝜌𝜏
3
𝜏=0 𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡+𝜏. LCit+τ is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations in year t if year t is 
τ years after Lending Club approval (or for τ < 0, −τ years before Lending Club approval). 
We withhold LCit−1 to avoid the “dummy variable trap”. For example, we coded Lending 
Club as being approved in North Carolina in 2011. Thus, for any county i in North Carolina, 
LCit−4 = 1 for the year 2007 observations and 0 otherwise, LCit+0 = 1 for the year 2011 
observations and 0 otherwise, LCit+1 = 1 for the year 2012 observations and 0 otherwise, 
etc. Because LCit+τ always equals 0 for the control counties, the coefficient (ρ−τ ) represents 
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τ years prior to Lending Club receiving approval in the treated counties. Because LCit−7 
and LCit−6 are rarely defined during our sample period, we collapse them into LCit−5 (results 
are robust if we estimate them separately). For the state-quarter analysis, we consider 5 
pre-treatment and 5 post-treatment quarters. For states in which we observe more than 5 
pre-treatment and/or post-treatment periods, we collapse the preceding and/or following 
quarters into the -5 and/or +5 time periods. 
Results. Table 2-4 shows the results of our baseline model (specification 1) for the 
county-year matched sample and the state-quarter sample with both bankruptcy filings per 
capita and bankruptcy filings - natural log as the dependent variables. Lending Club 
approval has a positive and significant impact on bankruptcy filings. The per capita model 
indicates that Lending Club approval increases bankruptcy filings by 0.179 per thousand 
people in the county-year matched sample and 0.057 per thousand people in the state-
quarter sample. This represents increases of 8.0% and 6.8%. The smaller effect size in the 
state-quarter analysis may be because this analysis contains treated observations from years 
in which Lending Club was very new (e.g., 2009 to 2010). Appendix A-5 reports the results 
of a Poisson model and a negative binominal model using bankruptcy filings – raw as the 
dependent variable. Results are similar. Across all models, the coefficient for 
unemployment rate is positive and significant, which is consistent with the bankruptcy 
literature that unemployment increases bankruptcy. The unreported time fixed effects also 
follow intuition: bankruptcy filings increased until 2009 and then decreased, likely due to 
the Great Recession.  
Table 2-5 shows the results from the leads/lags model (specification 2) for bankruptcy filings 
per capita. We find evidence of parallel pre-treatment trends for both the county-year and state-
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quarter samples. In both samples, the coefficients for Lending Club(−4) (i.e., LCit−4), Lending 
Club(−3), and Lending Club(−2) are insignificant (recall that the omitted “baseline” dummy 
variable is Lending Club(−1)). This indicates that there is little to no meaningful difference in 
bankruptcy trends between the treated and control counties in the 4 time periods before Lending 
Club approval. Although the coefficient for Lending Club(−5) is significant in the county-year 
analysis, this difference existed long before treatment and should therefore not confound our 
results. 
Table 2-4 Regressions Results for Bankruptcy Filings (Per Capita and Natural Log) 
for the County-Year Matched Sample and the State-Quarter Sample 
Sample County-year matched sample State-quarter sample 
Dependent variable Bankruptcy 
filings per capita 
Bankruptcy 
filings - natural 
log 
Bankruptcy 
filings per capita 
Bankruptcy 
filings - natural 
log 
Lending Club available 0.179 (0.059) *** 0.116 (0.028) *** 0.057 (0.031) * 0.108 (0.041) ** 
Population -0.000 (0.004)  0.006 (0.002) *** 0.036 (0.042)  0.027 (0.061)  
Number of employed individuals -0.004 (0.007)  0.007 (0.003) ** -0.184 (0.086) ** -0.152 (0.112)  
Average monthly earnings 0.143 (0.157)  0.001 (0.131)  0.085 (0.044) * 0.047 (0.060)  
Unemployment rate 0.139 (0.019) *** 0.044 (0.011) *** 0.080 (0.016) *** 0.045 (0.011) *** 
Median household income -0.015 (0.008) * -0.010 (0.004) ** 0.001 (0.009)  -0.015 (0.014)  
% age 60 & above 0.031 (0.024)  0.027 (0.014) * 0.001 (0.034)  -0.049 (0.048)  
% white 0.034 (0.041)  0.040 (0.027)  0.025 (0.021)  0.029 (0.018)  
% below high school attainment n/a  n/a     0.061 (0.032) * 0.084 (0.038) ** 
% housing units rented n/a  n/a     0.010 (0.023)  0.058 (0.033) * 
% housing units with mortgage n/a  n/a  0.031 (0.020)  0.030 (0.030)  
County (or state) fixed effects         
Year (or quarter) fixed effects         
n (counties/states) 259  259  51  51  
n (observations) 2,331  2,331  2,039  2,039  
R2 , including fixed effects 0.799  0.967  0.912  0.989  
Notes: Regressions weighted using the CEM weights in the county-year matched sample. Standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered by county for the county-year matched sample and by state for the state-
quarter sample. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
The county-year results show that the effect of Lending Club on bankruptcy filings 
only becomes significant in years 1, 2, and 3 after approval (i.e., only the coefficients for 
Lending Club(+1), Lending Club(+2), and Lending Club(+3) are significant). 
Furthermore, the effect grows in magnitude over time. The Lending Club(+3) coefficient 
is significantly larger than the Lending Club(+1) coefficient (p=0.033). This may be 
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because usage of Lending Club is small in the approval year and doesn’t become large 
enough to have a measurable effect on bankruptcy until a year or two after approval. We 
see a similar pattern in the state-quarter analysis, where the effect is not significant until 
the third quarter after approval. (Note that LendingClub(+3) refers to the third quarter – 
not year – after approval in the state-quarter panel.) In unreported analysis, we included 
dummy variables for LendingClub(+6) through LendingClub(+27) in the state-quarter 
panel. These coefficients are similar to that for LendingClub(+5) reported in Table 2-5, 
which suggests that the effect stabilizes. Appendix A-6 plots the lead and lag coefficients 
with their 95% confidence intervals. 
Table 2-5 Regressions Results for Bankruptcy Filings Per Capita for the County-
Year Matched Sample and the State-Quarter Sample: Leads/Lags Model 
Sample County-year matched sample State-quarter sample 
Dependent variable Bankruptcy filings per capita 
Lending Club(−5) 0.211 (0.104) ** 0.024 (0.027)  
Lending Club(−4) 0.156 (0.101)  0.009 (0.022)  
Lending Club(−3) 0.125 (0.089)  0.023 (0.024)  
Lending Club(−2) -0.090 (0.099)  0.002 (0.019)  
Lending Club(−1) omitted baseline period 
Lending Club(0) 0.148 (0.098)  0.017 (0.020)  
Lending Club(+1) 0.224 (0.087) ** 0.036 (0.025)  
Lending Club(+2) 0.279 (0.114) ** 0.037 (0.034)  
Lending Club(+3) 0.395 (0.113) *** 0.060 (0.028) ** 
Lending Club(+4) n/a  0.101 (0.035) *** 
Lending Club(+5) n/a  0.095 (0.033) *** 
Population 0.002 (0.004)  0.035 (0.042)  
Number of employed individuals -0.003 (0.007)  -0.190 (0.086) ** 
Average monthly earnings 0.159 (0.157)  0.088 (0.044) * 
Unemployment rate 0.149 (0.019) *** 0.079 (0.016) *** 
Median household income -0.017 (0.008) ** 0.001 (0.009)  
% age 60 & above 0.036 (0.042)  -0.002 (0.034)  
% white 0.026 (0.025)  0.026 (0.021)  
% below high school attainment n/a  0.061 (0.032) * 
% housing units rented n/a  0.006 (0.023)  
% housing units with mortgage n/a  0.030 (0.021)  
County (or state) fixed effects     
Year (or quarter) fixed effects     
n (counties/states) 259  51  
n (observations) 2,331  2,039  
R2 , including fixed effects 0.801  0.912  
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Notes: Regressions weighted using the CEM weights in the county-year matched sample. Standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered by county for the county-year matched sample and by state for the state-
quarter sample. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
We conducted several robustness checks, including: 1) using an alternative coding 
rule in which we considered Lending Club to be available throughout its approval year, 2) 
clustering the standard errors by state, 3) matching on raw and logged values of pre-
treatment bankruptcy filings (instead of on bankruptcy filings per capita), and 4) including 
additional control variables. Results remain robust. We also ran a placebo test in which we 
randomly assigned Lending Club availability within the county-year panel. This placement 
assignment yielded no significant effect. 
Falsification Test: Non-Business vs. Business Bankruptcy Filings 
To enhance the causal interpretation of our findings, we conducted a falsification test 
based on non-business vs. business bankruptcy filings. Given that the maximum amount 
of Lending Club loans during our study period was relatively small ($35,000), we 
hypothesize that Lending Club has a larger impact on the financial health – and bankruptcy 
prospects – of non-businesses than of businesses (for which larger amounts are likely 
necessary to prevent – or cause – bankruptcy). We reran specifications (1) and (2) with 
non-business bankruptcy filings per capita and business bankruptcy filings per capita as 
the dependent variables. In both the county-year matched sample and the state-quarter 
sample, we find parallel pre-treatment trends for both non-business and business 
bankruptcies (results available from authors). Table 2-6 shows that Lending Club approval 
has a significant effect on non-business bankruptcy filings but not on business bankruptcy 
filings, which is consistent with our hypothesis and supports our causal interpretation. We 
also applied seemingly unrelated regression to estimate the models for both dependent 
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variables simultaneously, which allowed us to verify that the Lending Club coefficient for 
non-business bankruptcies is significantly larger than the Lending Club coefficient for 
business bankruptcies. 
Table 2-6 Regressions Results for Bankruptcy Filings Per Capita for the County-
Year Matched Sample and the State-Quarter Sample: Non-Business vs. Business 
Bankruptcy 
Sample County-year matched sample State-quarter sample 








Lending Club available 0.182 (0.057) *** -0.003 (0.011)  0.053 (0.031) * 0.004 (0.003)  
Population -0.001 (0.004)  0.000 (0.001)  0.039 (0.040)  -0.003 (0.002)  
Number of employed individuals -0.004 (0.006)  -0.000 (0.001)  -0.190 (0.084) ** 0.006 (0.007)  
Average monthly earnings 0.130 (0.148)  0.013 (0.021)  0.088 (0.043) ** -0.003 (0.004)  
Unemployment rate 0.129 (0.019) *** 0.010 (0.004) ** 0.076 (0.015) *** 0.004 (0.001) *** 
Median household income -0.016 (0.007) ** 0.000 (0.003)  0.001 (0.009)  0.001 (0.001)  
% age 60 & above 0.025 (0.025)  0.007 (0.008)  -0.001 (0.033)  0.003 (0.004)  
% white 0.033 (0.040)  0.001 (0.007)  0.025 (0.020)  0.001 (0.001)  
% below high school attainment n/a  n/a  0.062 (0.031) * -0.001 (0.002)  
% housing units rented n/a  n/a  0.006 (0.021)  0.004 (0.004)  
% housing units with mortgage n/a  n/a  0.027 (0.020)  0.004 (0.003)  
County (or state) fixed effects         
Year (or quarter) fixed effects         
n (counties/states) 259  259  51  51  
n (observations) 2,331  2,331  2,039  2,039  
R2 , including fixed effects 0.806  0.113  0.913  0.679  
Notes: Regressions weighted using the CEM weights in the county-year matched sample. Standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered by county for the county-year matched sample and by state for the state-
quarter sample. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Potential Concurrent (and Confounding) Events 
Our analysis thus far indicates that bankruptcy filings increase after Lending Club 
approval. This could be due to the causal effect of Lending Club, but it could also be due 
to any other event or policy change that occurred in the treated states at the same time as 
Lending Club approval. We investigate this possibility both theoretically and empirically. 
Theoretically, we looked for state-level policy changes (particularly those related to 
bankruptcy exemptions and payday lending) that might have influenced bankruptcy filings 
during our time period. We could not find any major changes that coincided with Lending 
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Club approval in the treated states but not in the controls.5 Furthermore, we examined 
whether states granted Lending Club’s license as part of a broader set of 
regulations/policies that might explain the rise in bankruptcy filings. We found no evidence 
for this. One indication that Lending Club approval was distinct from other policy changes 
is that its competitor Prosper.com (which has a similar business model) received regulatory 
approval in all states except for Iowa, Maine, and North Dakota in 2009.6 
One feature of our setting that supports our causal interpretation is that Lending Club 
received approval at different times in the county-year analysis: 2011 for counties in 
Kansas and North Carolina and 2013 for counties in Indiana and Tennessee (see Table 2-1 
and Appendix A-2). Thus, if an unobserved change is responsible for the effect that we 
attribute to Lending Club, then the change would have to have occurred at (or around) these 
specific times in the treated states while not occurring in the control states. Although we 
believe this to be unlikely, we implemented two additional analyses to improve the 
evidence that the change in bankruptcy was caused by Lending Club approval rather than 
an unobserved event: 1) a difference-in-difference-in-differences analysis, and 2) 
subsample analyses.  
Difference-in-difference-in-differences. We exploited variation in the level of 
internet access across counties (and states) to conduct the difference-in-difference-in-
differences (“DDD”) analysis. As above, we describe this strategy using the county-year 
analysis; it applies to the state-quarter analysis in a similar way. Because Lending Club is 
                                                 
5 For example, we reviewed payday loan state statutes from 2011 to 2015 at 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/payday-lending-state-statutes.aspx. 
6 See Page 1 of 
https://www.prosper.com/Downloads/Legal/prosper10k123109%20(3.31.2010%20final).pdf.  
 32 
an online platform, its approval should have a greater effect on bankruptcy filings in treated 
counties in which internet access is widespread than in those in which internet access is 
limited. We examine this via the DDD model, the intuition for which is as follows. 
Consider two separate difference-in-differences (DD) analyses. The first, denoted DDI, 
calculates the difference-in-differences for treated and control counties i with widespread 
internet access (i.e., Ii = 1). The second, denoted DD~I, calculates the difference-in-
differences for treated and control counties i with limited internet access (Ii = 0). If Lending 
Club approval (or some other concurrent internet related event) increases bankruptcy, then 
we should see it primarily in DDI. If there is an unobserved, non-internet related factor that 
increases bankruptcy in treated states after treatment, then we should see it in both DDI and 
DD~I. Calculating DDI – DD~I, which is the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD), 
helps us separate the Lending Club factor from the unobserved factor. The DDD regression 
model appears as specification (3).  
Yit = α + βLCit + δ(LCit*Ii) + Tt + λ(Tt*Ii) + Si + γXit + ρ(Xit*Ii) + εit       (3) 
Specification (3) mirrors (1) except for the inclusion of Ii, Ii’s interactions with other 
variables, and associated coefficients (δ, λ, and ρ). The parameter of interest is δ, which 
represents the DDD estimate of the effect of Lending Club. We measured Ii for each county 
via its annual scores from the FCC’s Form 477 County Data on Internet Access Services. 
We set Ii = 1 for counties whose average score from 2011 to 2014 was above the median 
(which is 3.75) and set Ii = 0 otherwise.
7 Because we modeled Ii as a fixed characteristic of 
                                                 
7 We used this time period because 2011 was when Lending Club first became available to counties in our 
sample. We checked whether each county’s level of internet access was consistent before and after 2011 by 
creating another Ii dummy variable for the 2008-2010 period. For 205 of the 259 counties in our matched 
sample, the 2008-2010 and 2011-2014 dummy variables are the same. The correlation between these two 
dummy variables is 0.73.    
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county i, its main effect is absorbed by the county fixed effects. Results for specification 
(3) appear in Table 2-7. The Lending Club available coefficient represents the average 
effect of Lending Club in counties in which internet access is not widespread (i.e., Ii = 0). 
Adding this coefficient to the Lending Club available * Widespread internet access 
coefficient yields the average effect for counties with widespread internet access. Results 
indicate that Lending Club has an effect in counties with widespread internet access but 
not otherwise. This supports the casual interpretation of our results.  
Table 2-7 Regressions Results for Bankruptcy Filings Per Capita for the County-






Dependent variable Bankruptcy filings per capita 
Lending Club available 0.002 (0.092)  -0.022 (0.034)  
Lending Club available * widespread internet access 0.343 (0.115) *** 0.171 (0.068) ** 
Population 0.004 (0.014)  0.163 (0.060) *** 
Population * widespread internet access -0.002 (0.003)  0.083 (0.074)  
Number of employed individuals 0.058 (0.053)  -0.521 (0.124) *** 
Number of employed individuals * widespread internet access -0.004 (0.006)  -0.091 (0.057)  
Average monthly earnings -0.298 (0.249)  -0.096 (0.112)  
Average monthly earnings * widespread internet access 0.336 (0.107) *** 0.033 (0.029)  
Unemployment rate 0.134 (0.027) *** 0.060 (0.016) *** 
Unemployment rate * widespread internet access 0.157 (0.030) *** 0.074 (0.029) ** 
Median household income -0.012 (0.010)  0.014 (0.009)  
Median household income * widespread internet access -0.019 (0.011)  0.006 (0.016)  
% age 60 & above    0.033 (0.035)  -0.016 (0.026)  
% age 60 & above * widespread internet access    0.030 (0.025)  0.035 (0.058)  
% white  -0.002 (0.057)  0.014 (0.016)  
% white * widespread internet access   0.042 (0.062)  0.070 (0.035) * 
Additional state controls n/a    
Additional state controls * widespread internet access n/a    
County (or state) fixed effects     
Year (or quarter) fixed effects      
Year (or quarter) fixed effects * widespread internet access     
n (counties/states) 259  51  
n (observations) 2,331  2,039  
R2 , including fixed effects 0.801  0.922  
Notes: Regressions weighted using the CEM weights in the county-year matched sample. Standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered by county for the county-year matched sample and by state for the state-
quarter sample. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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  We applied the DDD strategy to the state-quarter sample by measuring state-level 
internet access as the proportion of households with a minimum upload speed of 376kbps 
and a minimum download speed of 3Mbps, the data for which are available from the FCC’s 
Form 477 State Data on Internet Access Services. We classified the 50 states plus DC as 
having either widespread internet access or not (via a median split) and ran specification 
(3) using the state-quarter sample. The results (see Table 2-7) indicate that Lending Club 
has an effect in states with widespread internet access but not otherwise.  
Subsample Analyses. For the county-year analysis, we reran our matching and focal 
DD models twice to correspond to the two periods in which Lending Club was approved 
in the treated states: 2011 for Kansas and North Carolina and 2013 for Indiana and 
Tennessee. The first analysis (referred to as the 2011 treatment analysis) spans 2006 to 
2014 and tests the effect of Lending Club approval in Kansas and North Carolina counties 
in 2011, using Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, and North Dakota counties as controls. The 
second analysis (referred to as the 2013 treatment analysis) spans 2006 to 2015 and tests 
the effect of Lending Club approval in Indiana and Tennessee counties in 2013, using 
Idaho, Iowa, and Maine counties as controls (we excluded Nebraska and North Dakota 
because they were treated in the first half of 2015). We used 2015 as the ending year for 
the 2013 treatment analysis so as to include three years of post-treatment observations, 
which is important because the effect of Lending Club may evolve over time. (We used 
2014 as the ending year in the 2011 treatment analysis so that we could keep Nebraska and 
North Dakota as controls.) We created separate matched samples for both analyses by 
matching treated and control counties on the values of bankruptcy filings per capita in the 
five years preceding treatment and on population (in 2006). This yielded 316 matched 
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counties for the 2011 analysis and 83 matched counties for the 2013 analysis. (We could 
not conduct a similar subsample analysis for the state-quarter sample because there are not 
enough states.) Figure 2-2 shows the trends of bankruptcy filings and provides visual 
evidence of parallel pre-treatment trends for both analyses. After treatment, the rate of 
bankruptcy filings decreases at a slower rate in treated counties than in control counties, 
suggesting that Lending Club approval increases bankruptcy filings. 
 
Figure 2-2 Bankruptcy Filing Per Capita Trends: Subsample Analysis 
Results of the leads/lags models for both analyses are shown in Table 2-8. The pre-
treatment trends are parallel, and Lending Club approval is associated with an increase in 
bankruptcy filings in both analyses. Thus, if an unobserved change – concurrent with 
Lending Club approval – is responsible for the increase in bankruptcy filings, then this 
change would have to have occurred in 2011 in Kansas and North Carolina (and not the 
control states) and in 2013 in Indiana and Tennessee (and not the control states). We believe 
this would be an unlikely coincidence, lending further support to our causal interpretation. 
Notice that the Lending Club(0) coefficient is positive and significant in the 2013 treatment 
analysis but not the 2011 treatment analysis. This may reflect increased awareness and use 
of Lending Club in 2013 vis-à-vis 2011. Indeed, Appendix A-1 shows a faster growth rate 
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Table 2-8 Regressions Results for Bankruptcy Filings Per Capita for the County-
Year Sample: 2011 Treatment for Kansas and North Carolina and 2013 Treatment 
for Indiana and Tennessee 
 2011 Treatment (Kansas and North 
Carolina: 2006-2014) 
2013 Treatment (Indiana and 
Tennessee: 2006-2015) 
Dependent variable Bankruptcy filings per capita 
Lending Club(−5) 0.295 (0.097) *** -0.030 (0.167)  
Lending Club(−4) 0.157 (0.101)  0.011 (0.203)  
Lending Club(−3) 0.103 (0.091)   -0.214 (0.258)  
Lending Club(−2) -0.028 (0.085)  -0.276 (0.194)  
Lending Club(−1) omitted baseline period 
Lending Club(0) 0.077 (0.084)  0.326 (0.154) ** 
Lending Club(+1) 0.209 (0.080) *** 0.399 (0.153) ** 
Lending Club(+2) 0.264 (0.088) *** 0.499 (0.194) ** 
Lending Club(+3) 0.307 (0.095) *** n/a  
Additional county controls                                               
County fixed effects                                               
Year fixed effects                                               
n (counties) 316                                            83  
n (observations) 2,844                                            830  
R2 , including fixed effects 0.751                                            0.882  
Notes: Regressions weighted using the CEM weights. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by 
county. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Effect of Similar Online Lending Platforms (e.g., Prosper.com) 
To extend our results, we examined the effect on bankruptcy filings of Prosper.com, 
which is an online lending platform similar to Lending Club. Like Lending Club, 
Prosper.com had to cease originating peer-to-peer loans temporarily to seek regulatory 
approval, after which they resumed origination. Unlike Lending Club, Prosper.com 
received regulatory approval from all states except Iowa, Maine and North Dakota in 2009. 
Thus, there is less variation in Prosper.com’s availability across counties and states, making 
it harder to identify its effect on bankruptcy. Nevertheless, we ran two analyses to analyze 
the effect of Prosper.com. First, we reran specification (1) on both samples (county-year 
and state-quarter) after adding a Prosper.com available dummy variable as a control. As 
shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2-9, the Lending Club available coefficient remains 
positive and significant. Because Prosper.com received approval before Lending Club in 
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Kansas, North Carolina, Indiana, and Tennessee (the treated states in the county-year 
analysis), the Lending Club available coefficient in column 1 can be interpreted as the 
additional impact of Lending Club approval. Second, we restricted our analysis to counties 
in the five states in which Lending Club had not been approved by the end of 2014, thereby 
allowing us to study the effect of Prosper.com approval without potential contamination 
by Lending Club approval. Prosper.com was approved in two of these states in 2009 (Idaho 
and Nebraska), but not in the other three (Iowa, Maine, and North Dakota) by the end of 
2014. Using data from 2006 to 2014, we reran specification (1) with Prosper.com 
availability in place of Lending Club availability. We used all counties from these states 
(the full sample) as well as a matched sample, using the matching process from above. 
Results are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2-9 and show that Prosper.com approval 
had a positive effect on bankruptcy filings. 
Table 2-9 Results of Regressions Examining the Effect of Prosper.com 
 Same as Focal Analyses 
 
Restricted to 5 states  










Dependent variable Bankruptcy filings per capita 
Lending Club available 0.124 (0.074) * 0.057 (0.030) * n/a  n/a  
Prosper.com available 0.113 (0.069)  0.021 (0.034)  0.309 (0.064) *** 0.262 (0.117) ** 
Population -0.001 (0.004)  0.037 (0.042)  0.001 (0.005)  -0.044 (0.042)  
Number of employed individuals -0.005 (0.007)  -0.189 (0.086) ** -0.031 (0.014) ** 0.034 (0.019) * 
Average monthly earnings 0.162 (0.153)  0.088 (0.044) * 0.131 (0.103)  0.089 (0.144)  
Unemployment rate 0.133 (0.019) *** 0.079 (0.016) *** 0.165 (0.030) *** 0.210 (0.047) *** 
Median household income -0.015 (0.008) * 0.002 (0.009)  -0.004 (0.008)  0.004 (0.013)  
% age 60 & above 0.030 (0.024)  0.001 (0.034)  0.001 (0.020)  0.013 (0.043)  
% white 0.025 (0.041)  0.025 (0.021)  0.001 (0.037)  -0.029 (0.073)  
Additional state controls         
County (or state) fixed effects         
Year (or quarter) fixed effects         
n (counties/states) 259  51  305  75  
n (observations) 2,331  2,039  2,745  675  
R2 , including fixed effects 0.800  0.912  0.685  0.665  
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Notes: Regressions weighted using the CEM weights in the county-year matched sample. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered by county for the county-year sample and by state for the state-quarter sample. *** 
p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
2.3.2 Instrumental Variables Analysis: Analyzing the Effect of Lending Club Loan 
Activity 
We extend our analysis by using micro-level loan data from Lending Club to 
examine the relationship between the number of Lending Club loans and the number of 
bankruptcies in a state.  
Data and Variables 
Lending Club publishes loan data via its web site 
(https://www.lendingclub.com/info/download-data.action). We downloaded the data from 
2007 to 2015 (n=877,440 loans) to mirror the time period of the difference-in-differences 
analysis (Lending Club was not operating in 2006). The data describe each borrower (e.g., 
state of residence, self-reported income and debt-to-income ratio, and FICO credit score) 
and loan (e.g., grade assigned by Lending Club, origination date, size (i.e., amount), 
principal amount paid, term (36- or 60-month), purpose, and last payment date). We coded 
each loan as “outstanding” or “default” in each quarter as follows. We coded mature loans 
(i.e., those whose terms had expired) that Lending Club marked as paid as “outstanding” 
(i.e., current) in each quarter from loan origination to payoff. We coded immature loans 
listed as current or late as “outstanding” in each quarter from loan origination to the 4th 
quarter of 2015 (when our data collection stopped). We coded loans that Lending Club 
marked as in default or charged off as “outstanding” in each quarter from loan origination 
to the last payment quarter and then “default” in the subsequent quarter. We counted the 
 39 
number of loans outstanding in state i in quarter t and merged them with the state-quarter 
panel. We conducted this analysis at the state-quarter level because Lending Club does not 
publish borrowers’ counties.  
Empirical Strategy 
Our baseline specification is shown below. 
Yit = α + βLoansOutstandingPerCapitait + Tt + Si + γXit + εit    (4) 
As in the difference-in-differences analysis, Yit is bankruptcy filings per capita. 
The key independent variable is Lending Club loans outstanding per capita in state i in 
quarter t. Tt are quarter fixed effects, Si are state fixed effects, Xit are control variables, 
and εit is the error term, which is clustered at the state level. β is the coefficient of interest. 
OLS estimation will yield a biased estimate of β due to endogeneity issues. Potential 
reasons for endogeneity include omitted variables that affect both the number of loans and 
bankruptcy filings and simultaneity (or reverse causality) by which bankruptcy filings 
influence the number of loans. To address this, we used instrumental variables and two-
stage least squares (2SLS). 
Selection of instrumental variables. We identified two instrumental variables. Each 
instrument relies on different sources of (plausibly) exogenous variation, and using both 
allows us to check the consistency of our results across instruments (Murray 2006). The 
first instrument is LC availability / maturity. This measures whether Lending Club was 
available to borrowers in state i in quarter t and, if so, the maturity of Lending Club in 
quarter t. LC availability / maturity is the product of Lending Club available and Time 
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since 2008-Q4 (squared). Lending Club available reflects whether Lending Club was 
available to borrowers in state i in quarter t; it is the key dummy variable used in the DD 
analysis. Time since 2008-Q4 (squared) is the square of the number of quarters between 
quarter t and the 4th quarter of 2008. This captures how Lending Club matured over time 
after it received regulatory approval from most states in 2008-Q4 (see Table 2-1). We used 
a squared term (rather than a linear term) to mirror the non-linear increase over time in 
Lending Club loans. LC availability / maturity should be correlated with loans outstanding 
per capita because states in which Lending Club is available to borrowers will have a larger 
number of loans than states in which Lending Club is not available, particularly as Lending 
Club becomes more mature. LC availability / maturity also captures within-state variation 
because loans outstanding per capita increases non-linearly for each treated state. The 
second instrument, debt-to-income policy change, is based on a policy change made by 
Lending Club in the 2nd quarter of 2012. Lending Club does not issue loans if an 
applicant’s debt-to-income (“DTI”) ratio exceeds a threshold. In the 2nd quarter of 2012, 
Lending Club raised this threshold from 30 to 35 (technically from 0.3 to 0.35). This change 
should be associated with an increase in loans outstanding per capita because it expands 
the pool of qualified borrowers. Debt-to-income policy change is the product of Lending 
Club available, Post DTI Policy Change (a dummy variable equal to 1 for all quarters from 
the 2nd quarter of 2012 forward), and Time since 2012-Q1 (squared). The first two 
variables ensure that debt-to-income policy change is 0 before the policy change and in 
states in which Lending Club was not available. The third variable causes the instrument 
to increase in magnitude each quarter the policy has been in place. This reflects the quarter-
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by-quarter accumulated growth in the pool of qualified borrowers, which should correlate 
with growth in loans in states in which Lending Club was available.  
Each instrument will be exogenous to bankruptcy filings if the factors that comprise 
it are exogenous. Because Time since 2008-Q4 (squared) and Time since 2012-Q1 
(squared) are deterministic, they are exogenous to bankruptcy filings, particularly because 
we include quarter fixed effects (which capture any time trend influencing bankruptcy 
filings). Post DTI Policy Change should be exogenous to bankruptcy filings in a state 
because it reflects a blanket policy change that Lending Club applied across all states, i.e., 
it does not explain which states had higher (or lower) bankruptcy levels. Of greater concern 
is whether Lending Club available is exogenous. The state-quarter DD analysis (which uses 
the same panel as the instrumental variables analysis) provides evidence that Lending Club 
available is exogenous to bankruptcy filings at the state level. This is because there is no 
significant difference in the pre-treatment trends in bankruptcy filings between treated and 
control states, as shown in Table 2-5. To further assess the exogeneity of Lending Club 
available, we used a Cox proportional hazards model to examine whether a state’s 
bankruptcy filings affect when Lending Club became available to borrowers. Table 2-10 
shows that neither the level nor the change rate of bankruptcy filings per capita have a 





Table 2-10 Proportional Hazards Model of When Lending Club Became Available 
to Borrowers 
 Lending Club approval  
Bankruptcy per capita (previous 1 
quarter) 
1.000 (0.232)        
Bankruptcy per capita (previous 1 
year) 
  1.006 (0.064)      
Bankruptcy per capita change rate 
(1 quarter change rate) 
    1.580 (0.912)     
Bankruptcy per capita change rate 
(1 year change rate) 
      0.512 (0.320)  
Population 1.179 (0.105) * 1.181 (0.103) * 1.165 (0.105) * 1.226 (0.138) * 
Number of employed individuals 0.643 (0.157) * 0.641 (0.154) * 0.664 (0.164) * 0.577 (0.178) * 
Average monthly earnings 1.262 (0.156) * 1.264 (0.153) * 1.233 (0.157) * 1.327 (0.192) * 
Unemployment rate 1.083 (0.077)  1.082 (0.076)  1.092 (0.073)  1.060 (0.083)  
Median household income 1.020 (0.016)  1.020 (0.016)  1.021 (0.015)  1.016 (0.016)  
% age 60 & above 0.978 (0.027)  0.978 (0.026)  0.974 (0.025)  0.973 (0.028)  
% white 0.997 (0.004)  0.997 (0.004)  0.996 (0.004)  0.997 (0.004)  
% below high school attainment 1.013 (0.026)  1.011 (0.025)  1.013 (0.027)  1.013 (0.027)  
% housing units rented 0.970 (0.025)  0.970 (0.025)  0.967 (0.024)  0.966 (0.023)  
% housing units with mortgage 0.972 (0.036)  0.971 (0.035)  0.972 (0.032)  0.968 (0.030)  
n (states) 51  51  51  51  
n (observations) 767  614  716  563  
Wald chi2 P value 0.423  0.427  0.234  0.454  
Log Likelihood -174.33  -174.32  -174.29  -174.22  
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by state. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
 
Results 
Appendix A-7 reports the first-stage results of the 2SLS regressions. The 
instruments are relevant and not weak. Table 2-11 lists statistics showing the strength of 
the instruments. 
Table 2-11 Instrument Relevance/Strength Statistics 
Instrumental First-stage 
Adjusted R2 
Partial R2 (attributable 
to instrument) 
F (significance of the 
instrument), with p-value 
LC availability / maturity 0.93 0.37 70.59 (p<0.01) 
Debt-to-income policy change 0.94 0.49 449.25 (p<0.01) 
Table 2-12 shows the second-stage results, along with the ordinary least squares 
results. The OLS coefficient for loans outstanding per capita, shown in the first column, is 
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negative and insignificant. The negative coefficient is likely because of a simultaneity / 
reverse causality issue: namely, that a high level of bankruptcy filings is likely to reduce 
the number of Lending Club loans because bankrupt individuals (or highly risky 
borrowers) will not qualify for loans. This highlights the need to use instrumental variables. 
The other columns show the 2SLS results when using each of the instruments individually 
(Columns 2 and 3) and jointly (Column 4). The 2SLS coefficients for loans outstanding 
per capita coefficients are positive, significant, and similar in magnitude across models. 
When using both instruments, we conduct a test of overidentifying restrictions (see Murray 
(2006) for details). We are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
exogenous (Hansen’s J statistic = 2.08, p=0.15), which supports the instruments’ validity. 
The 2SLS coefficient when using both instruments is 0.039 (p=0.059), which is the most 
conservative estimate. Using this coefficient, a one standard deviation increase in loans 
outstanding per capita (δ=0.67) is associated with a 0.026 increase in bankruptcy filings 
per capita. Because the mean of bankruptcy filings per capita is 0.833, this represents a 
3.1% increase. The coefficient also implies that an increase of 100 loans per capita in a 
quarter is associated with an increase of 3.9 bankruptcies per capita. This is a fairly large 






Table 2-12 2SLS Regressions for Bankruptcy Filings Per Capita: Second-Stage 
Results 
Dependent Variable Bankruptcy filings per capita 








Loans outstanding per capita -0.029 (0.040)  0.058 (0.029) ** 0.041 (0.021) * 0.039 (0.021) * 
Population 0.041 (0.041)  0.035 (0.041)  0.036 (0.040)  0.036 (0.040)  
Number of employed individuals -0.178 (0.090) * -0.198 (0.086) ** -0.194 (0.086) ** -0.193 (0.086) ** 
Average monthly earnings 0.032 (0.046) * 0.092 (0.044) ** 0.091 (0.044) ** 0.090 (0.044) ** 
Unemployment rate 0.081 (0.017) *** 0.080 (0.016) *** 0.080 (0.016) *** 0.080 (0.016) *** 
Median household income 0.003 (0.010)  -0.000 (0.009)  0.000 (0.009)  0.000 (0.009)  
% age 60 & above 0.004 (0.034)  -0.001 (0.035)  0.000 (0.034)  0.000 (0.034)  
% white 0.024 (0.020)  0.027 (0.021)  0.026 (0.021)  0.026 (0.021)  
% below high school attainment 0.061 (0.033) * 0.056 (0.031) * 0.057 (0.032) * 0.057 (0.032) * 
% housing units rented 0.018 (0.022)  0.007 (0.023)  0.009 (0.024)  0.009 (0.024)  
% housing units with mortgage 0.031 (0.020)  0.032 (0.021)  0.031 (0.021)  0.031 (0.021)  
State fixed effects         
Quarter fixed effects         
n (states) 51  51  51  51  
n (observations) 2,039  2,039  2,039  2,039  
R2  (centered) 0.78  0.77  0.77  0.77  
Hansen’s J statistic n/a  n/a  n/a  2.08 (p=0.15)  
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by state. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
We conducted several additional analyses and robustness checks. First, we reran the 
regressions using lagged values of loans outstanding per capita and the instruments. (For 
lags, we used the previous quarter, the previous 2 quarters, the previous 3 quarters, and the 
previous 4 quarters.) This reflects the possibility that the effect of Lending Club loans on 
bankruptcy filings does not show up immediately. These results are consistent, with the 
magnitude of the coefficients increasing slightly with lag length. Second, we confirmed 
that the results are robust after we removed potentially fraudulent loans that Lending Club 
allegedly loaned to itself to boost its loan volume statistics.8 Third, we confirmed that the 
results are robust when using alternative independent variables, including the natural log 
of loans per capita and the value of loans (instead of the number of loans).  
                                                 
8 We define fraudulent loans as those that are fully paid within two billing cycles. The ratio of fraudulent 
loans to total loans is 246 to 887,440. 
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2.3.3 Mechanisms for the Lending Club Effect 
As described in the Background, Literature Review, and Motivation section, there 
are several mechanisms that could explain the link between Lending Club approval and 
increased bankruptcy filings. One potential mechanism, referred to as the “credit risk” 
mechanism, is that Lending Club borrowers are high credit risks who do not have access 
to traditional capital. If so, then Lending Club loans could be going to people who are 
inherently uncreditworthy, thereby leading them into bankruptcy. A second potential 
mechanism is that Lending Club borrowers are normal credit risks who have access to 
traditional capital. However, the ease of getting a Lending Club loan may cause these 
borrowers to become over-extended financially, leading to bankruptcy. We refer to this as 
the “debt trap” mechanism. A third potential mechanism is that “strategic” borrowers who 
are considering bankruptcy use a Lending Club to restructure their debt (e.g., swapping 
secured debt for unsecured debt) or to engage in last-minute consumption (e.g., taking a 
vacation) before they file. We examine these three mechanisms empirically.  
We examined the credit risk mechanism by reviewing the FICO scores of Lending 
Club borrowers from the micro-level loan data. The mean FICO score range was 695 to 
699 (the median range was 690 to 694), which is similar to the mean FICO scores reported 
in credit bureau data (Jagtiani and Lemieux 2017). Jagtiani and Lemieux (2017) also find 
that based on observable credit features, borrowers get lower interest rates from Lending 
Club than from traditional lenders. Based on this, it does not appear that Lending Club 
attracts and issues loans to borrowers who are systematic credit risky. However, because 
FICO score is only one measure of creditworthiness, we examined the credit risk 
mechanism, along with the debt trap mechanism, further by exploiting differences between 
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Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Chapter 7 requires filers to have little to no 
disposable income, whereas Chapter 13 is available to filers who have disposable income 
left over after paying household expenses. If Lending Club approval primarily increases 
Chapter 7 filings, then its effect is likely to be concentrated among low-income people who 
might not be creditworthy, which would support the credit risk mechanism. On the other 
hand, if Lending Club approval primarily increases Chapter 13 filings, then its effect is 
likely concentrated among people who may otherwise have access to credit but who 
become over-extended after using Lending Club, which would support the debt trap 
mechanism. 
To explore this, we reran specification (1) using the natural log of Chapter 7 
bankruptcy filings per capita and Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings per capita as the dependent 
variables. Taking the natural log allows us to compare the percentage increases in Chapter 
7 and 13 bankruptcies attributable to Lending Club, which is important given that the base 
rates of these bankruptcies differ significantly. Table 2-13 shows that Lending Club has a 
larger effect on Chapter 13 bankruptcies. This suggests that it is more likely that Lending 
Club borrowers become overextended and fall into a debt trap as opposed to being inherent 
credit risks. The self-reported income of Lending Club borrowers (from the Lending Club 
loan data) provides further support for the debt trap mechanism. As shown in Appendix A-
8, Lending Club borrowers, including those who default on their loans, report substantially 
higher-than-average incomes.  
We further examined the debt trap mechanism by using the micro-level loan data to 
analyze what factors predict whether a Lending Club borrower will default on his/her loan 
(coded as Loan default = 1). In our first analysis, we included only mature loans. This 
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ensured that if a borrower defaulted during the term of the loan that we would observe it. 
We observe individual loan defaults, but we cannot observe individual bankruptcies (the 
bankruptcy data is only available in aggregate form). However, the two should be related, 
because borrowers who do not repay their loans are more likely to file for bankruptcy than 
borrowers who repay. Thus, we assume that factors that lead to loan default also lead to 
bankruptcy. The key independent variable in this analysis is debt expansion, which is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the purpose of the loan was to expand the 
borrower’s overall debt or to consolidate it (e.g., by using a Lending Club loan with a 10% 
interest rate to pay off credit card debt with a 22% interest rate). For each loan application, 
the borrower selects the purpose of the loan from a pre-defined list. Two choices indicate 
debt consolidation: “credit card” and “debt consolidation”. We coded debt expansion = 1 
for loans with a purpose other than these two; examples include home improvement, major 
purchase, and vacation. We included several other variables published by Lending Club as 
controls. We used a linear probability model to predict loan default, although results from 
a logistic regression are similar. The results are shown in Column 1 of Table 2-14. Control 
variables have the expected signs: debt-to-income ratio and loan amount are positively 
correlated with default, while FICO score is negatively correlated. The coefficient for debt 
expansion (β=0.014) is positive and significant. Because 13.2% of loans in the sample 
ultimately default (the quarterly default rate is approximately 1.1%), the debt expansion 
coefficient represents a 10.6% increase in the probability of default. In the second 
approach, we used a Cox proportional hazards model to assess what factors, including loan 
purpose, affect the “hazard” of a loan defaulting. Because hazard models accommodate 
right censoring, we used immature loans in this analysis. Column 2 of Table 2-14 shows 
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that debt expansion loans are more likely to default. Overall, these results indicate that 
Lending Club loans that increase a borrower’s overall debt are positively associated with 
default (and potentially bankruptcy). This provides additional support for the debt trap 
mechanism. 
Table 2-13 Regressions Results for Bankruptcy Filings: Chapter 7 vs Chapter 13 
Bankruptcies 
Sample County-year matched sample State-quarter sample 
Dependent Variable 
Bankruptcy Filings per Capita – Natural Log 
Chapter 7 Chapter 13 Chapter 7 Chapter 13 
Lending Club available 0.032 (0.030)  0.215 (0.041) *** 0.088 (0.042) ** 0.135 (0.045) *** 
Population 0.006 (0.003) ** 0.000 (0.003)  -0.003 (0.063)  0.163 (0.084) * 
Number of employed individuals 0.009 (0.004) ** 0.001 (0.005)  -0.155 (0.098)  -0.203 (0.158)  
Average monthly earnings 0.071 (0.136)  -0.078 (0.071)  0.046 (0.053)  0.085 (0.086)  
Unemployment rate 0.049 (0.012) *** 0.024 (0.017)  0.056 (0.010) *** 0.022 (0.014)  
Median household income -0.015 (0.006) ** 0.005 (0.006)  0.001 (0.017)  -0.046 (0.021) ** 
% age 60 & above 0.022 (0.017)  -0.005 (0.013)  -0.033 (0.054)  -0.045 (0.062)  
% white 0.027 (0.030)  0.027 (0.028)  0.025 (0.020)  0.015 (0.032)  
Additional state controls         
County (or state) fixed effects         
Year (or quarter) fixed effects         
n (counties/states) 259  259  51  51  
n (observations) 2,331  2,331  2,039  2,039  
R2 , including fixed effects 0.959  0.926  0.988  0.985  
Notes: Regressions weighted using the CEM weights in the county-year matched sample. Standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered by county for the county-year matched sample and by state for the state-
quarter sample. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
Table 2-14 Regressions Results for Loan Default: Loan-Level Analysis 
Dependent Variable Loan default 
Model Linear probability Hazard 
Debt expansion 0.014 (0.002) *** 1.169 (0.012) *** 
Debt to income ratio (pre-loan) 0.002 (0.000) *** 1.001 (0.000) *** 
Loan amount 0.0003 (0.0001) *** 1.012 (0.001) *** 
Annual borrower income -0.0002 (0.0000) *** 0.996 (0.001) *** 
36 month loan term (=1 if 36-month term and =0 if 60-month term) -0.064 (0.004) *** 1.364 (0.013) *** 
FICO score (low end of range) -0.0002 (0.0000) *** 0.988 (0.000) *** 
Loan grade dummy variables (A1-G5, assigned by Lending Club)   
Borrower’s state of residence dummy variables   
Month-year of loan origination dummy variables   
n (observations) 209,882 677,554 
R2 , including fixed effects 0.039 n/a 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by month of loan origination. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1.  
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We examined the “strategic” borrowing mechanism by analyzing when borrowers 
who default stopped repaying their loans. If borrowers use a Lending Club loan to pay off 
another (likely secured) loan or to engage in last-minute consumption with no intention of 
repaying the (unsecured) Lending Club loan, then they should stop paying the Lending 
Club loan relatively quickly. For each defaulted loan, we computed the number of months 
between loan origination and the last payment date. Figure 2-3 shows that for 
approximately 18% (6.5%) of loans that default, the borrowers ceased repayment after 6 
(3) months. This suggests that strategic borrowing may explain some of the effect of 
Lending Club on bankruptcy filings. The finding that Lending Club has a larger effect on 
Chapter 13 vs. Chapter 7 bankruptcies also supports the strategic borrowing mechanism. 
This is because Chapter 13 allows debtors to avoid liquidating assets, such as those a 
strategic borrower would theoretically pay off via a Lending Club loan. 
 
Note: The numbers listed at the top of the data columns are cumulative percentages. 
Figure 2-3 Histogram of how many months borrowers repay loans that end in 
default 
Other, indirect mechanisms may also contribute to the effect. One possibility is that 
traditional lenders respond to competition from Lending Club loans by issuing riskier loans (in 
order to maintain consistent loan volumes) that result in borrowers’ bankruptcy (Wolfe and Yoo 
2018). Similar risky behavior – and increased bankruptcies – occurred when competition among 
banks increased after deregulation (Dick and Lehnert 2010; see the Literature Review section). We 
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analysis – that an increase of 100 loans per capita in a quarter is associated with an increase of 3.9 
bankruptcies per capita – can be explained by the direct mechanisms discussed above. If every loan 
that defaulted because of the debt trap or strategic borrower mechanisms resulted in a bankruptcy, 
then the default rate would need to be 3.9% per quarter to account for the effect size. The default 
rate of loans published in the micro-data is only 1.1% per quarter. One potential explanation for 
this gap is that the published Lending Club loan data systematically undercounts the number of 
Lending Club loans. This occurs because Lending Club also operates loan programs outside of its 
standard marketplace (e.g., see Lending Club’s 2015 10-K). We compared the total amount loaned 
from 2007 to 2015 as reported in Lending Club’s 2015 10-K 
(https://ir.lendingclub.com/Cache/33047201.pdf, p.3) to the total amount of loans published in the 
micro-data. The total amount in the micro-data accounts for approximately 81% of the total amount 
in the 10-K; thus, our measure of loans outstanding per capita is undercounted. If the non-published 
loans yield the same outcomes (on average) as the published loans, then our coefficient (and effect 
size) will be inflated. To examine this, we reran specification (4) after multiplying loans 
outstanding per capita by 1.23 (i.e. 100/81). This narrows the gap by reducing the loans 
outstanding per capita coefficient from 0.039 to 0.031 (p<0.10).9 Another potential explanation for 
the gap is that some bankruptcies may occur without a corresponding loan default. For example, 
borrowers who file Chapter 13 bankruptcy (and most of the effect we document is specific to 
Chapter 13; see above) may continue paying off their Lending Club loan as part of their repayment 
plan. 10% of mature loans not listed as charged off have a principal amount paid that is less than 
the loan amount. This suggests that these borrowers had a revised payment plan, potentially as part 
of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Despite these explanations, the direct mechanisms are unlikely to explain 
                                                 
9 A more formal way to see this relationship is via the simple regression coefficient formula: 𝛽 =
∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
𝑛
1 (𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?)/ ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
2𝑛
1 . If x is really 2x, such that (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?) is really (2𝑥𝑖 − 2?̅?), then β will be 
half as large. 
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all of the effect. This suggests that part of the Lending Club effect is due to indirect mechanisms 
such as change in traditional lenders’ practices in response to competition from Lending Club loans. 
2.4 Discussion and Implications 
Using different identification strategies, data samples, and levels of analysis, we 
consistently find a positive relationship between online lending and bankruptcy filings. 
Although we cannot fully characterize the reason for this effect, our analysis suggests the 
following. The difference-in-differences analysis, particularly the leads/lags analysis 
reported in Table 2-5, indicates that Lending Club approval has both short-term and long-
term effects. The short-term effect may be due (in part) to strategic borrowing in which 
borrowers who were considering bankruptcy before receiving a Lending Club loan use the 
loan to restructure their debt or to engage in last-minute consumption before they file. The 
long-term effect is likely due (in part) to both the strategic borrowing and debt trap 
mechanisms, given that it takes time for the debt trap mechanism to operate: borrowers 
must receive a Lending Club loan, have the additional debt burden drive them to 
bankruptcy, and then file bankruptcy. Indirect mechanisms, such as competitive responses 
to Lending Club loans, also appear to play a role.  
The strategic borrowing mechanism represents adverse selection. This is because 
there is information asymmetry between strategic borrowers and investors before the loan 
is issued: the borrowers know that they have no intention to repay the Lending Club loan 
(making them “adverse”) but withhold this information from investors. There is also a 
possibility of moral hazard, in the sense that borrowers may decide after they receive the 
loan that there are minimal consequences if they choose to declare bankruptcy rather than 
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to repay the loan. However, we find this unlikely, because there are consequences to 
declaring bankruptcy. Furthermore, we believe that most borrowers (other than strategic 
borrowers) are sincere in their intention to repay, but that some are unable to, perhaps due 
to unforeseen circumstances or because they misjudged their financial status. 
The effect of online lending on bankruptcy filings can be mitigated by policy changes 
by online lending platforms; indeed, Lending Club has recently made several such changes. 
For example, in 2017, Lending Club removed the riskiest loans (grades F and G) from its 
platform, citing their high delinquency rates, and it launched a hardship program to help 
struggling borrowers. Also, Lending Club introduced its Direct Pay program shortly after 
our study period.  This program sends a portion of a loan directly to the borrower’s 
creditor(s), which essentially requires that the borrower use the loan (or at least a portion 
thereof) for debt consolidation instead of debt expansion. Programs like this, particularly 
if implemented for borrowers most likely to default, could diminish or potentially eliminate 
the effect that we document. Studying the effect of these programs is a promising avenue 
for future research. Increased education about financial management, which could be 
provided by online lending platforms to borrowers during the loan application process, may 
also help. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Online lending platforms have great potential to improve individuals’ financial 
health and security by providing easy access to affordable credit. However, they could also 
lure borrowers into a debt trap that leads to bankruptcy. We exploit variation in when states 
granted approval for Lending Club to issue peer-to-peer loans to examine Lending Club’s 
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effect on bankruptcy filings. We conduct a difference-in-differences analysis at both the 
state-quarter and county-year levels. We also conduct an instrumental variables analysis to 
examine the relationship between the number of Lending Club loans and bankruptcy 
filings. We consistently find that Lending Club increases bankruptcy filings. We identify 
possible mechanisms for the effect, including: 1) the ease of receiving a Lending Club loan 
lures borrowers into a debt trap that results in bankruptcy, and 2) “strategic” borrowers 
who are considering bankruptcy use Lending Club loans to restructure their debt or to 
engage in last-minute consumption before filing.  
Our study contributes to both the online platforms literature and the bankruptcy 
literature. Online platforms are growing quickly, and regulators and researchers are unsure 
of their impacts on society and the economy. Our findings point to a potential dark side of 
online lending platforms: increased bankruptcy. To be clear, we are not arguing that online 
lending platforms are “bad” for the economy or for society. They likely have positive 
effects that we do not explore. Instead, we identify a specific issue that could potentially 
be addressed via platform design or regulation. Indeed, recent initiatives by Lending Club 
may address the issue, at least in part. 
Our study has limitations. First, we cannot be sure that our results apply to all online 
lending platforms, although Lending Club is the largest platform and our results also appear 
to hold for Prosper.com. Second, our results may be specific to the time period of our 
sample, which is a common limitation of empirical studies. It is possible that recent online 
loans are less (or more) likely to contribute to bankruptcy. Third, we are unable to 
empirically examine indirect mechanisms by which Lending Club may affect bankruptcy, 
such as changes in traditional banks’ lending practices caused by increased competition. 
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This represents an opportunity for future research. Fourth, because Lending Club does not 
identify individual borrowers, we cannot connect individual Lending Club borrowers to 
bankruptcy records. Instead, we rely on aggregate data (at the county and state levels) to 
identify the impact of Lending Club. This lack of individual-level data is common in 
studies such as ours that investigate the societal impacts of online platforms (Burtch et al. 
2016; Chan and Ghose 2014; Greenwood and Agarwal 2015; Greenwood and Wattal 2017; 
Seamans and Zhu 2014). Future research can leverage individual-level data (if available) 
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CHAPTER 3. HOW DOES ALGORITHMIC TRADING 
INFLUENCE INVESTOR PARTICIPATION IN PEER-TO-PEER 
ONLINE LENDING MARKETS? 
3.1 Introduction 
Decisions that were previously made by humans are increasingly being made by 
information systems. One example is algorithmic trading, which we examine in this study. 
Algorithmic trading, which can be loosely defined as “the use of computer systems to 
execute trading strategies” (Weller 2018), has reshaped equity markets and had significant 
implications for market performance (Menkveld 2016). Algorithmic trading also raises 
questions about fairness, given that some market participants do not have the expertise or 
sophistication to use the technology. This may create an uneven playing field in which 
sophisticated investors who engage in algorithmic trading crowd out unsophisticated 
investors who do not. 
We investigate the implications of algorithmic trading in the context of peer-to-peer 
lending. In peer-to-peer lending, borrowers seeking loans create listings on web sites such 
as Prosper.com and LendingClub. Investors choose which of these borrowers to fund based 
on these listings. If a borrower’s listing attracts enough investors, then s/he can receive the 
loan. Peer-to-peer lending is an interesting context for our analysis for two reasons. First, 
as reflected by the “peer-to-peer” label, online lending markets were originally designed to 
connect individual (and presumably non-sophisticated) investors with borrowers. The 
original model was that these individual investors would access the web site manually to 
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review listings and identify which of their “peers” they wanted to lend to. This model is 
changing as institutional investors fund an increasing percentage of online loans, largely 
via algorithms that select the loans automatically (and very quickly). This threatens to 
upend the traditional model upon which online lending originally flourished. Second, this 
context allows us to extend prior research on the effects of algorithmic trading. In most 
contexts in which algorithmic trading has been studied (e.g., the stock market), the same 
assets (e.g., stocks) may be bought and sold multiple times. This means that there are 
always opportunities for non-sophisticated investors to purchase or sell assets. This is not 
true of online loans. Once these loans are funded by an investor(s), they are no longer 
available to other investors. Thus, it is possible that algorithmic trading could allow 
sophisticated investors to capture the entire online lending market. Further, the ultimate 
impact of algorithmic trading in these markets is unclear. “Manual” investors argue that 
they are crowded out of the market because they cannot match the speed advantage of the 
algorithmic investors. Algorithmic investors argue that the algorithms help satisfy 
borrowers’ needs more quickly and efficiently, which leads to market growth and more 
opportunity for all investors, including manual investors.  
We use data from Prosper.com to study the effects of algorithmic trading. Because 
we cannot directly observe which investors use algorithmic trading technologies, we study 
the effect of a policy change that facilitated algorithmic trading. On March 11, 2013, 
Prosper.com released a major upgrade to its API (Application Programming Interface). The 
new API made it easier to algorithmically select loans to fund by providing more data fields 
and improving response time. If the API helped institutional investors “crowd out” manual 
investors via algorithmic trading strategies, then we should see the followings after the 
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release of the new API: high-quality loans being funded very quickly (too quickly to be 
funded manually) and by a relatively small number of investors who loan large amounts. 
Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find precisely that. This suggests that manual 
investors are being “crowded” out of the market by algorithmic trading. However, there is 
some evidence that algorithmic trading has led to market growth, such that opportunities 
remain for manual investors, although these are typically for lower quality loans as 
measured by default risk and yield. 
3.2 Literature Review and Theoretical Foundation 
3.2.1 Investor Decision Making in Online Peer-to-Peer Lending Markets 
Manual investors tend to rely on both traditional financial information and “soft” 
information to make investment decisions (Iyer et al. 2016). In addition to traditional 
financial information, the decision making process is influenced (and biased sometimes) 
by several factors, including peer decisions, borrowers’ friendship networks, loan 
descriptions, geographical distance, cultural distance, political distance, and borrowers’ 
appearance, gender, and race (Burtch et al. 2014; Galak et al. 2011; Greenberg and Molick 
2017; Harkness 2016; Hildebrand et al. 2017; Lin et al. 2013; Lin and Viswanathan 2016; 
Liu et al. 2015; Pope and Sydnor 2011; Wang and Overby 2018; Younkin and 
Kuppuswamy 2017; Zhang and Liu 2012). Some recent studies distinguish sophisticated 
investors from manual investors and find that they rely on different information to screen 
loans or projects, but their investing performance is not necessarily different (Lin et al. 
2018; Mollick and Nanda 2016; Vallee and Zeng 2018). Although there is some evidence 
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that sophisticated investors might evaluate borrowers differently, it is unclear how this 
difference affects market opportunities for different types of investors. 
3.2.2 Algorithmic Trading in Equity Markets 
Algorithmic trading refers to “the use of computer systems to execute trading 
strategies” (Weller 2018) or “any form of trading using sophisticated algorithms 
(programmed systems) to automate all or some part of the trade cycle” (Treleaven et al. 
2013). Algorithmic traders may be both faster-acting and better-informed than manual 
traders (Menkveld 2016). Algorithmic traders can act faster because their trades are 
executed automatically based on decision rules, and they may be better informed because 
trades are based on statistical models fed by rich market data. Algorithmic trading improves 
price efficiency, reduces price discovery and information acquisition, and increases market 
liquidity (Hendershott et al. 2011; Weller 2018). These findings stem largely from stock 
markets where algorithmic investors can provide liquidity by buying and selling stocks 
without necessarily eliminating opportunities for manual investors to also buy and sell. 
However, it is unclear what the impact of algorithmic trading would be in a market where 
algorithmic investors compete with manual investors for a fixed set of assets, such as for 
loans in the peer-to-peer lending context. Accordingly, we investigate the implications of 
algorithmic trading on an understudied outcome, i.e. investors’ participation. 
3.2.3 How Algorithmic Lending Might Influence Investor Participation 
The basic components of algorithmic trading are automation and information 
(Menkveld 2016). The automation component means that most or all of the trade is 
executed by automated systems and technologies. In the context of online lending, 
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automation enables investors to automate their investment decisions rather than manually 
logging into the platform, picking loans, and placing orders. Therefore, automation should 
speed up funding time, which becomes our first hypothesis: algorithmic trading can 
decrease loan funding time. The information component means that investors use 
models/algorithms to analyze information to evaluate and select borrowers. Because it is 
widely expected that data-driven statistical models can improve decision efficiency and 
accuracy, we hypothesize that algorithmic trading can improve investment performance, 
i.e. the performance of loans selected by algorithms should be higher. Combining H1 and 
H2, it is reasonable to expect that manual investors would be crowded out of the best, most 
quickly-funded loans. We thus propose the third hypothesis: algorithmic trading decreases 
the number of investors of “flash” loans, which we use to denote the top 20% of loans in 
terms of funding time, from fastest to slowest. 
Besides a direct impact, algorithmic trading might also indirectly influence the whole 
market. This might occur if algorithmic trading decreases funding time and increases 
decision efficiency. Decreased funding time might retain/attract more borrowers to online 
lending platforms. Increased decision efficiency (either real or perceived) might increase 
investors’ confidence and motivate them to fund more borrowers, especially those risky 
borrowers in whom they otherwise won’t invest. These two effects could lead to a larger 
market size, which is our fourth hypothesis. Because H3 suggests less investor participation 
while H4 suggests more, there is no prior theoretical expectation for the overall impact of 
algorithmic trading on investor participation. Therefore, we propose our final hypothesis 
in a non-directional way, saying algorithmic trading might either increase or decrease 
investor participation. Table 3-1 summarizes these five hypotheses. 
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Table 3-1 Research Hypotheses 
H1 Algorithmic trading reduces loan funding time. 
H2 Algorithmic trading increases lending performance. 
H3  Algorithmic trading reduces number of investors.  
H4 Algorithmic trading increases market size. 
H5 Algorithmic trading increases or decreases the overall investor participation.  
3.3 Empirical Setting and Data  
3.3.1 Empirical Setting  
The focal online lending platform that we study is Prosper.com. Prosper.com 
operates in the following way (since 2011): (1) borrowers submit their loan requests and 
personal financial information to Prosper.com; (2) Prosper.com underwrites the requests 
(to set the interest rate) and posts the loan requests (i.e., “listings”); (3) investors choose 
which borrowers to fund and how much to fund; and (4) borrowers receive their loans if 
they attract enough investment (either 70% or 100% of the requested amount, depending 
on borrower’s choice). Initially, step 3 was conducted manually by investors. Currently, 
much of step 3 is conducted via algorithmic trading in which sophisticated investors use 
data provided by Prosper.com (perhaps combined with other data) to automatically select 
and fund loans.   
3.3.2 Data and Variables  
We gathered a dataset of 63,706 loans funded through Prosper.com from 2011 to 
2013. We created several variables to describe each loan. Funding time is the difference 
between when the loan was first posted and when it was funded. We created two measures 
of investor concentration per loan: Number of investors is the number of investors per loan, 
and average funding amount is the average amount that each investor invested in the loan. 
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We measured each loan’s performance via compound annual growth rate (CAGR) and 
internal rate of return (IRR) as well as whether the borrower defaulted on the loan (default 
status).  We use the following as control variables: loan interest rate, amount borrowed, 
monthly payment, and several variables about the borrower, including monthly income, 
debt-to-income ratio (including the loan), months employed, number of credit inquires in 
the last 6 months, and open credit lines. Table 3-2 provides descriptive statistics of this 
dataset.   
Table 3-2 Descriptive Statistics of Loan Dataset 
Variable Units Min Max Mean Median Std. Dev 
Loan Funding Variables 
Funding time (in hours) Continuous 0.00 355.26 48.48 2.18 80.92 
Funding time (in logged seconds) Continuous 1.39 14.06 8.55 8.97 4.06 
Number of investors Count 1 779 66.66 34 90.06 
Average funding amount per investor Continuous 32.26 35,000 3,227.27 153.85 5,902.76 
Amount borrowed Continuous 2,000 35,000 9,045.99 7,500 6,147.36 
Interest rate Continuous 0.050 0.330 0.202 0.198 0.072 
Loan Performance Variables 
Compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) 
Continuous -1 0.660 0.023 0.057 0.141 
Internal rate of return (IRR) Continuous -1 0.702 0.050 0.091 0.185 
Default status 1 if defaulted 0 1 0.204 0 0.403 
Loan Credit Variables 
FICO score Continuous 600 835 697 690 38.751 
Monthly payment (in $1,000) Continuous 0.041 2.252 0.294 0.252 0.183 
Borrower stated monthly income (in 
$1,000) 
Continuous 0 1,750 5.921 5 9.161 
Debt-to-income ratio Continuous 0 2 0.401 0.240 0.512 
Months employed Count 0 755 104.433 75 97.415 
Inquires in last 6 months Count 0 37 0.981 1 1.427 
Open credit lines Count 0 49 9.426 9 4.912 
Notes: This dataset contains 63,706 loans that are (1) eventually issued and (2) listed on Prosper 
platform from 2011 to 2013. Debt-to-income ratio is capped at 2.  
We also gathered a complementary dataset of all listings that appeared on 
Prosper.com during the same period. Not all listings become funded loans. Listings may 
expire (if a listing fails to pass the funding threshold), be cancelled by Prosper.com (if a 
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listing is incomplete or contains incorrect information), or be withdrawn (if the borrower 
withdraws the loan application due to personal reasons). This dataset allows us examine 
changes in the size of the market. Table 3-3 provides descriptive statistics of this dataset. 
Table 3-3 Descriptive Statistics of Listing Dataset 
Variable Units Min Max Mean Median Std. Dev 
Loan Funding Variables 
Funding time (in hours) Continuous 0 358.91 66.51 4.20 106.00 
Funding time (in logged seconds) Continuous 0 14.07 9.62 8.91 4.08 
Listing amount  Continuous 2,000 35,000 9,488.54 8,000 6,345.67 
Interest rate Continuous 0.050 0.330 0.204 0.201 0.073 
Percent funded Between [0, 1] 0 1 0.849 1 0.331 
Passing funding threshold 1 if yes  0 1 0.824 1 0.381 
Loan Credit Variables 
FICO score Continuous 600 835 700 690 40.901 
Monthly payment (in $1,000) Continuous 0.041 2.260 0.309 0.269 0.190 
Borrower stated monthly income (in 
$1,000) 
Continuous 0 5,416.66 6.515 5 28.796 
Debt-to-income ratio Continuous 0 2 0.416 0.23 0.546 
Months employed Count 0 1,271 102.577 73 99.822 
Inquires in last 6 months Count 0 29 1.057 1 1.512 
Open credit lines Count 0 49 9.108 8 4.954 
Notes: This dataset contains 113,500 listings that have appeared on Prosper platform between 
2011 and 2013. 11,607 listings are withdrawn by borrowers, 5,793 listings expire, 30,772 listings 
are canceled by Prosper, and the rest 65,328 listings are funded and issued. Due to the availability 
of loan performance data, 63,706 out of 65,328 loans are recorded in the loan dataset. Debt-to-
income ratio is capped at 2. 
3.4 Empirical Strategy, Analysis, and Results  
Because we cannot directly observe investors’ use of algorithmic trading 
technologies, we study the effect of a major upgrade to Prosper’s API on March 11, 2013 
that facilitated algorithmic trading.10 This upgrade yielded three key improvements. First, 
the data structure exposed by the API became more user-friendly, such that investors could 
use the API more easily. In addition, the API became faster and more responsive. Second, 
                                                 
10 See http://web.archive.org/web/20130315105454/http:/blog.prosper.com:80/2013/03/11/prosper-
announces-new-api-for-lenders/ and https://www.nsrinvest.com/prospers-new-restful-api/ for more details. 
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approximately 460 new data elements were made available through the API, thereby 
permitting more sophisticated loan-selection models. Third, the API allowed investors to 
use third-party tools, thereby providing more options for investors to use API. 
3.4.1 Model Free Evidence  
We first investigated the funding time of loans across time. We classified funded 
loans into three categories based on how fast they got funded: top 20% (“flash” loans), the 
middle 60%, and the bottom 20% (“leftover” loans). Panels A, B, and C of Figure 3-1 show 
the median funding time of each group day by day from January 1, 2013 to March 31, 
2013. A notable pattern is that funding time of “flash” loans drops significantly after the 
new API was released on March 11, but the funding time of “leftover” loans is almost 
unchanged. Panel D of Figure 3-1 shows the percentage of loans that get funded within 60 
seconds, 10 minutes, and 1 hour across time. By the end of March 2013, about 10% of 
loans are funded in 60 seconds and 30% of loans are funded in 10 minutes. This suggests 
that these loans are being funded algorithmically, given that manual investors are unlikely 
to be able to fund loans this quickly.   
We next investigated investor concentration in loans over time. Panel A of Figure 
3-2 shows the median number of investors per loan of each group from January 1, 2013 to 
March 31, 2013 while Panels B, C, and D of Figure 3-2 show the median average funding 
amount per investor per loan. After the new API was released on March 11, fewer investors 
share in “flash” loans or in the middle 60% of loans. This suggests that these loans are 
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Figure 3-2 Funding Time and Investor Concentration 
3.4.2 Empirical Strategy  
To better identify the effect of the API upgrade, we use a difference-in-differences 
strategy, which is widely used in studies about platform implementation, policy change or 
technology change (Bertrand et al. 2004; Greenwood and Agarwal 2016; Wang and Overby 
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2017). As shown in the model-free analysis, the “leftover” loans (i.e., those funded last) 
were largely unaffected by the API upgrade. We believe that this is because these loans are 
typically funded by manual investors who are not influenced by the API upgrade (because 
they don’t use the API). Thus, we use “leftover” loans as the control group. Conversely, 
the “flash” loans appear to be affected by the API upgrade, and we consider them to be the 
treated group. The difference-in-differences approach allows us to separate the effect of 
any general supply or demand shock or macro-economic trend (which should affect both 
“flash” and “leftover” loans) from the effect of the API upgrade (which should not affect 
“leftover” loans). We use the middle 60% of loans as a secondary treatment group. 
Including them allows us to check the proposed mechanism, because we expect them to be 
affected in the same direction as the “flash” loans but with a smaller magnitude. 
To avoid conflating our analysis with other policy changes made by Prosper.com 
(such as its introduction of the “whole loan” program in April 2013), we restricted our 
analysis to the days close to the March 11, 2013 treatment date. At the month level, we 
define February 2013 as the pre-treatment period while March 2013 as the post-treatment 
period. At the day level, we define 1st-24th February 2013 as the pre-treatment period and 
11th-31st March 2013 as the post-treatment period; we left a 14-day gap to avoid 
overlapping listings. Flash (i.e. top 20%), middle 60%, and leftover (i.e. bottom 20%) are 
defined based on funding time ranking within each month when analysis is at monthly level 
and within each day when analysis is at daily level. The basic DID model is shown in 
specification (1). 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑖 +
𝛾2𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                     (1) 
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𝑌𝑖𝑡 indicates the outcome variables including funding time, number of investors, 
average funding amount per investor and loan performance measures such as CAGR, IRR, 
and default. Due to the skewed distribution and the between-group variation of funding 
time, number of investors, and average funding amount per investor, we use the natural log 
of each as the dependent variable. 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 indicates whether loan i belongs to the top 
20% in terms of funding time (“flash” loans), the middle 60%, or the bottom 20% 
(“leftover” loans). When estimating the model, we use the “leftover” loans as the baseline 
group. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡  is defined as 1 if a loan was listed after the treatment and 0 
otherwise. 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the interaction of  𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡. 𝑋𝑖 controls for 
other factors that might influence the dependent variables (see Tables 3-2 and 3-3).  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 
are time fixed effects; they are used only in the daily analysis (note that they are collinear 
with 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 in the monthly analysis). 
Specification (1) is designed to test hypotheses 1 to 3, which are about the direct 
impacts of algorithmic trading on loan outcomes. We test hypothesis 4 via conditional 
correlations rather than a DID model, given that we lack a control group.  
             𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                               (2) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡  is an indicator of listing success, measured as whether the listing passes the 
funding threshold (passing funding threshold) and the actual funding percentage (funding 
percentage). This model simply tests whether listings are more likely to become loans after 
the API upgrade. This allows us to test whether the API upgrade increases the number of 
available loans, thereby increasing the market size. We consider alternative explanations 
for market growth (e.g., increased number of investors) via robustness checks. We find that 
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the API upgrade also changes the “taste” of investors, which is not likely to be a 
consequence of increased investor money. 
3.4.3 Main Results 
The results of our tests of H1 to H3 are shown in Tables 4 and 5. They are estimated 
based on specification (1). H1 is supported at both the monthly and daily levels. Columns 
1 and 4 of Table 3-4 show that after the API upgrade, “flash” loans get funded much faster. 
The coefficient for the “flash” loan group after the API treatment is -3.179 and significant. 
This reduces the funding time of “flash” loans by 95.8% (𝑒−3.179-1); the corresponding 
reduction for middle 60% loans is 62.7% (𝑒−0.985-1). Considering the mean funding time 
for “flash” loans is 4,032 seconds pre-treatment, the effect amounts to eliminating 3,862 
seconds. H3 is also supported at both the monthly and daily levels. Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 
in Table 3-4 show that after the API upgrade, both “flash” loans and middle 60% loans 
have fewer investors and a larger average funding amount per investor. For “flash” loans, 
the number of investors decreases by 93.7% (𝑒−2.760-1) and the average funding amount 
per investor increases by 1603% (𝑒2.835-1). Considering the mean number of investors is 
40 pre-treatment, the decrease implies that approximately 37 investors are crowded out of 
“flash” loans after the API upgrade. Middle 60% loans also experience a 34.2% decrease 





Table 3-4 DID Analysis on Funding Time and Investor Concentration 
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Loan Term Fixed 
Effects 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Loan Grade Fixed 
Effects 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Time fixed effects    √ √ √ 
# of Observations 2,581 2,581 2,581 1,979 1,979 1,979 
R2 0.8109 0.8049 0.8045 0.7426 0.7027 0.7040 
F 3150.46 538.83 388.44 NA NA NA 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. For columns (1)-(3), robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. For columns (4)-(6), standard errors in parentheses are clustered at daily level. 
Monthly analysis groups loans based on funding time ranking within each month while daily 
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analysis groups loans based on funding time ranking within each day. All results are consistent 
without control variables. Results on number of investors and average funding amount are 
consistent when raw values are used.    
Table 3-5 shows the results of our tests of H2. Because algorithmic investors might 
have different loan preferences than manual investors (e.g. algorithmic investors might 
invest in only loans of grade C, D, E, and HR while manual investors might invest in only 
loans of grade AA, A, B, C, and D), we test H2 by examining both absolute performance 
(columns 1-3) and within loan grade performance (columns 4-6). We find weak to no 
evidence for H2. The API upgrade doesn’t significantly affect the performance difference 
between “flash” loans and “leftover” loans. As shown below, this is likely because “flash” 
loans have always outperformed “leftover” loans: the API upgrade did not increase this 
performance gap. 
Table 3-6 shows the results of our tests of H4, which were estimated from 
specification (2). This analysis is based on the listing dataset rather than the loan dataset 
used for testing H1 to H3. The coefficients for Post treatment are always positive and 
significant, indicating that after the API upgrade more loans are funded. Considering the 
pre-treatment means of funding percentage and passing funding threshold are 0.871 and 
0.847, the 0.029 coefficient in column 1 represents a 3.3% increase in funding percentage 
while the 0.034 coefficient in column 2 represents a 4.0% increase in funding likelihood. 
This suggests that the API upgrade corresponds to an increase in market size (holding the 
number of loan supply fixed). It is possible that other events (besides the API upgrade) that 
occurred at a similar time as the API upgrade might explain this finding. However, the 
relatively narrow time window that we use helps to make this less likely. 
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Table 3-5 DID Analysis on Lending Performance (at Monthly Level) 
Model 
Specification 
Absolute Performance  Within Loan Grade Performance  
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Loan Term Fixed 
Effects 
  √ √ √ √ 
Loan Grade Fixed 
Effects 
  √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations 2,626 2,626 2,626 2,581 2,581 2,581 
R2 0.0029 0.0032 0.0504 0.0173 0.0187 0.0580 
F 1.74 1.84 16.53 3.17 2.86 11.85 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
a=0.119. The results are still mixed at daily level.   
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A naïve check of the market size corroborates this conclusion. The number of 
funded loans increases from 1,034 in February 2013 to 1,592 in March 2013 (a 54.0% 
increase) when the number of listings increases from 1,789 to 2,564 (a 43.3% increase). 
Table 3-6 Before/After Treatment Analysis on Funding Percentage 





































































































Loan Term Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ 
Loan Grade Fixed 
Effects 
√ √ √ √ 
# of Observations 4,248 4,248 3,254 3,254 
Adjusted R2 0.0206 0.0311 0.0237 0.0355 
F 5.97 8.57 5.38 7.66 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. For columns (1)-(2), robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. For columns (3)-(4), standard errors in parentheses are clustered at daily level. 
3.4.4 Robustness Checks and Additional Analysis  
The previous results suggest that algorithmic trading reduces loan funding time, 
increases investor concentration, and increases the market size. Although the DID design 
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can rule out the influence of trends that affect all loan groups equally, it is still possible that 
there are some confounding events that influence these groups differently. One major 
concern is the inflow of large amounts of investor money, which might yield similar results 
as those that we find. To rule out this alternative explanation, we analyzed two events in 
which large amount of investor money became available in the market. First, in May 2011, 
a large institutional investor made a $150 million investment commitment to Prosper.  
Second, in February 2013, investors in Michigan were allowed to invest in Prosper loans.  
We viewed each of these events as treatments that affected the Prosper investment pool 
and replicated our DID analysis using the months around each treatment. The results are 
shown in Table 3-7. Columns 1-3 in Table 7 show that the treatment effects are similar to 
those that reported in Table 4 (except for the funding time of “flash” loans). However, the 
magnitude is far smaller: for “flash” loans, there is no significant change in funding time, 
a 15.0% decrease in number of investors, and a 17.6% increase in average funding amount 
per investor. The corresponding magnitudes from Table 4 are 95.8%, 93.7%, and 1603%. 
Therefore, even if the API upgrade happened to coincide with a huge inflow of investor 
money, our effect is unlikely to be explained solely by the inflow of investor money. 







Table 3-7 Impacts of the Inflow of Large Amounts of Investor Money 
Model Sample 
May 2011: Institutional Investor 
Makes $150 Million Commitment  
February 2013: Investors From 


































































Loan group: Flash 















































































































































Loan Term Fixed 
Effects 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Loan Grade Fixed 
Effects 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations 2,818 2,818 2,818 1,102 1,102 1,102 
R2 0.7034 0.6546 0.3485 0.8130 0.7217 0.4612 
F 265.01 326.83 77.59 269.98 135.56 20.04 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. This 
analysis is conducted at monthly level.  
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Regarding investment performance, we find no support that algorithmic trading 
improves investment performance. To explore this, we conducted an additional analysis. It 
is possible that “flash” loans have always outperformed “leftover” loans, and this 
performance difference is not enlarged by the API upgrade. In Columns 1-3 in Table 3-8 
we simply compare the performance of “flash” loans, middle 60% loans, and “leftover” 
loans in the year 2013. “Flash” loans (as well as middle 60% loans) outperform “leftover” 
loans: they have a 26.8% (0.009/0.038) advantage in CAGR, a 23.1% (0.015/0.065) 
advantage in IRR, and an 11.1% (0.028/0.252) advantage in default rate (i.e. lower default 
rate). When funding time is used as the key independent variable in columns 4-6, the results 
are the same: slower funding time predicts poorer performance. Given these findings, we 
conclude that the API upgrade doesn’t bring in an additional performance advantage for 
“flash” loans compared to “leftover” loans (at least not in the short term around the API 
upgrade). 
Table 3-8 Funding Time, Algorithmic Trading, and Lending Performance 
Model Sample Year 2013 Fully Funded Loans with Loan Term of 36-Months    
Outcome Variable CAGR IRR Default  CAGR IRR Default  
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in seconds)  




















Loan Grade Fixed 
Effects 
  √   √ 
Time Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations 20,183 20,183 20,183 20,182 20,183 20,183 
R2 0.0034 0.0051 0.0355 0.0035 0.0050 0.0354 
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Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at month 
level. All models don’t include credit information (to check absolute performance). The results 
are similar when 60-month loans are included. 
3.4.5 Implications for Investor Participation 
Our results indicate that algorithmic trading crowds out manual investors from “flash” 
loans and middle 60% loans but also increases the market size. Thus, it is not clear whether 
the absolute number of loans available to manual investors increases or decreases. 
Unfortunately, we cannot observe the total investment amount from manual investors. 
Instead, we create two proxy indicators for “crowd” loans, i.e., loans funded by manual 
investors. In the first approach, we define a loan as a “crowd” loan when the average 
funding amount per investor is less than $100. We then count both the number of “crowd” 
loans and the percentage of “crowd” loans per day before and after the API upgrade. Panel 
A of Figure 3-3 shows the result. The second approach (the results of which are shown in 
Panel B of Figure 3-3) is similar, except that we define a loan as a “crowd” loan if the 
number of investors exceeds 100. With both measures, the number of “crowd” loans 
increases after the API upgrade, but the percentage of “crowd” loans decreases. This 
suggests that even though manual investors are being crowded out of some loans, market 
growth allows them to continue to invest in the market. 
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Panel A: “Crowd” Loans under Definition 1              Panel B: “Crowd” Loans under Definition 2    
       
Figure 3-3 Total Number and Share of “Crowd” Loans 
Although the quantity of loans available to manual investors may not suffer from 
algorithmic trading, the quality of loans might suffer. Because manual investors are 
crowded out of “flash” loans and middle 60% loans, and because “flash” loans and middle 
60% loans always outperform “leftover” loans, it is reasonable to expect that loans 
available to manual investors are inferior. We test this directly in Table 3-9. In columns 1-
3, the number of investors is the key independent variable while in columns 4-6 the crowd 
loan dummy variable (using definition 1 from above) is the key independent variable. 
Under both approaches the “crowd” loans available to manual investors almost always 
perform worse than loans funded by fewer investors. Based on the results in column 2, 
compared with a loan funded by 1 investor, a loan funded by 101 investors has a lower IRR 
with a 0.008 (0.00008*100) rate difference, indicating a 14.5% (0.008/0.055) performance 
decline. Column 4 shows a similar result, implying a 19.2% (0.01/0.052) performance 
decline. In addition, “crowd” loans experience an additional performance decline after the 
API upgrade, although the decline is not always significant.  
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Table 3-9 Performance of “Crowd” Loans 
Model 
Specification 
Number of Investor as Key 
Independent Variable    
“Crowd” Loan Dummy as Key 
Independent Variable 
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Loan Term Fixed 
Effects 
  √   √ 
Loan Grade Fixed 
Effects 
  √   √ 
Time Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations 29,657 29,657 29,657 29,657 29,657 29,657 
R2 0.0035 0.0043 0.0540 0.0035 0.0040 0.0539 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at month 
level. Credit controls are excluded to check overall performance. 
To summarize the overall implications of algorithmic lending on investor participation, 
we compare four basic statistics of “flash” loans, middle 60% loans, and “leftover” loans 
before and after the API upgrade. In Figure 3-4, the x-axis represents the natural log of 
funding time in seconds and the y-axis represents the number of investors. Circle size is 
proportional to the number of funded loans and a darker color indicates better loan 
performance. Arrows show the changes triggered by algorithmic trading. Loosely 
speaking, deep-pocket investors are more likely to be algorithmic investors, so they can 
funds loans in a faster and smarter way. As a result, they fund the majority of “flash” loans 
and middle 60% loans, which typically perform better than “leftover” loans. Individual 
investors are more likely to be manual investors who are crowded out of “flash” and middle 
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60% loans by algorithmic investors. Although manual investors may still be able to fully 
allocate their money, they can only select from “leftover” loans, which harms their 
investment performance. In a nutshell, algorithmic trading creates a new lending 
environment: algorithmic investors are likely to achieve high returns at the expense of 
manual investors, who are likely to receive lower (although perhaps still acceptable) 
returns. 
 
Figure 3-4 Pattern Change of Investor Participation (Pre and Post API Upgrade) 
3.5 Conclusion  
Algorithmic trading has great potential to affect investor participation in online 
lending markets, although the effect is unclear a priori. Leveraging a policy change likely 
to facilitate algorithmic trading (viz., an API upgrade), we identify the impacts of 
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market size. We find that algorithmic trading significantly reduces the funding time of 
loans. As a result, manual investors are crowded out of the most quickly-funded and best 
performing loans. However, manual investors are able to continue investing in the market, 
given that algorithmic trading appears to increase the market size. However, manual 
investors are restricted to “leftover” loans, which normally perform worse than other loans. 
Our findings reveal several promises of algorithmic trading, but they also suggest that 
algorithmic trading may exacerbate inequality among market participants. Indeed, 
Prosper.com has launched initiatives to make automated trading tools more accessible to 
all investors as well as limiting API functionality to reduce the advantages enjoyed by 
institutional investors. We explored the impact of these initiatives and found that both 
appear to “level the playing field”. This study contributes to several emerging research 
areas, including online lending, algorithmic trading, data-driven decision making, and 
more broadly the economics of artificial intelligence. This study also explores means to 
alleviate the “disparate impact” of algorithmic trading on less sophisticated investors. 
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CHAPTER 4. DO POLITICAL DIFFERENCES DECREASE 
MARKET EFFICIENCY? AN INVESTIGATION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF ONLINE LENDING  
4.1 Introduction 
The United States is becoming increasingly polarized politically. In many cases, 
those with opposing political ideologies can’t even agree on basic facts. This has several 
negative effects, including a downturn in civil discourse and an increase in political 
conflict. It may also have negative implications for markets. We pose the following 
research question: do political differences harm market efficiency by preventing 
transactions that might otherwise occur? We study this in the context of online lending. 
We investigate whether political differences inhibit market efficiency by examining 
whether investors in online lending markets are less likely to lend to borrowers whose 
political ideology is likely to be different from their own. Although prior research has 
examined how political differences across countries influence international trade, there is 
little research on how political differences between individuals may influence their 
economic transactions.  
We use data from the first peer-to-peer online lending market in the United States: 
Prosper.com. This market matches borrowers seeking loans to investors willing to fund 
them. We approximate the political ideology of investors and borrowers by using state-
level measures of political ideology drawn from the political science literature (Berry et al. 
1998; 2010). We use two complementary empirical approaches to examine our research 
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question. First, we use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to study how investors 
respond to legalization of same-sex marriage in California, Connecticut, and New York. 
We examine how investors react to this signal of a state’s (liberal) political ideology, 
including how this varies based on the investors’ likely political ideology. Second, we 
estimate a gravity model – using data from all 50 U.S. states – to examine which factors, 
including likely differences in political ideology, influence whether investors in state i fund 
borrowers in state j. Both sets of analysis yield two findings. First, investors are more likely 
to fund borrowers in liberal states than in conservative states. This appears to be because 
investors view a state’s liberalness as a proxy for the creditworthiness of borrowers in that 
state. Second, investors prefer to fund borrowers in states whose political ideology is likely 
to match their own. Lending activity between states with similar political ideologies is as 
much as 6.4% higher than that between states on polar ends of the ideological spectrum. 
This appears to reflect investor preferences for borrowers of their own “type”, i.e., a type 
of in-group bias. Of these two effects, the “political distance” effect often overwhelms the 
general preference for borrowers in liberal states. This suggests that differences in political 
ideology decrease market efficiency by preventing matches between investors and 
borrowers that might otherwise be beneficial.  
A key challenge for our analysis is measuring the political ideology of borrowers 
and investors using Prosper.com. As noted above, we use state-level measures as a proxy 
in some of our analyses. A potential concern is that the state-level measure may not match 
the ideology of an individual in that state. We address this in multiple ways, which we 
discuss fully in the “Potential Measurement Error” section below. These include: 1) 
estimating models that do not rely on a state-level measure of political ideology (e.g., the 
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main DID model); 2) showing that our use of a state-level measure of borrower ideology 
is likely to mirror what investors do, given that investors can observe the ideology of the 
borrower’s state but not that of the borrower himself; 3) implementing robustness checks 
in which the potential measurement error is minimized, and 4) showing that using group 
measures to proxy for individual measures is common in research in this stream (e.g., Blum 
and Goldfarb 2006, Burtch et al. 2014, Dajud 2013, Decker and Lim 2009, Hortacsu et al. 
2009, Morrow et al. 1998, Siegel et al. 2013). 
Our study contributes to research on factors that create frictions and that inhibit 
efficient transactions in markets. The potential of online markets to eliminate traditional 
market frictions is an important and enduring research stream in the Information Systems 
field. Because online markets eliminate transportation costs for digital goods and reduce 
information search costs for all goods, these markets should experience fewer frictions and 
be highly efficient (Hortacsu et al. 2009). This is potentially true for online lending 
markets, because loan information (including a borrower’s credit rating and other financial 
information) is provided online and the loan transaction can be conducted (almost) fully 
digitally. However, studies show that several frictions persist in online markets, including 
those stemming from geographic and cultural distance (Burtch et al. 2014; Agrawal et al. 
2015; Lin and Viswanathan 2016; Senney 2016). We contribute to this research stream by 
showing that political distance represents another friction, along with insights into why. 
Our findings also have practical implications. Given that many online markets are 
essentially two-sided markets that rely on matching to facilitate transactions/activities, 
understanding factors that inhibit matching is critical for the design and operation of these 
markets (Einav et al. 2016; Wei and Lin 2017). Because we show that political differences 
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impact matching, designers of online lending (and other online) markets might experiment 
with different information revelation policies. One potential policy is to reduce 
information, in order to make it difficult for investors to condition their decisions on signals 
of borrowers’ political ideology. Another policy is to increase information, in order to 
“drown out” potential signals of political ideology with information more relevant to online 
lending transactions. 
4.2 Background, Literature Review, and Motivation 
4.2.1 Political Ideology and Political Distance 
Political ideology is “an interrelated set of moral and political attitudes that possess 
cognitive, affective, and motivational components” (Jost 2006, p. 653). It is usually 
characterized along a continuum between liberalism and conservatism. At the individual 
level, liberals and conservatives embrace different core beliefs and central values that 
manifest not only in political events but also in everyday behaviours and underlying desires 
(Jost 2006; Feldman and Johnson 2014). For example, conservatives are more rigid, close-
minded, organized, and uncertainty averse than are liberals (Jost 2006). Conservatives 
generally have a stronger need than do liberals to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, and threat 
(Jost and Amodio 2012). At the state level, liberal states have policies that involve greater 
government regulation and welfare provision than do conservative states (Caughey and 
Warshaw 2016). Liberal states tend to have minimal restrictions on abortion, ban the death 
penalty, regulate guns more tightly, offer generous welfare benefits, and have progressive 
tax systems (Caughey and Warshaw 2016). Jost (2006) summarized the most meaningful 
and enduring differences between liberal and conservative ideologies as: (1) attitudes 
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toward inequality, and (2) attitudes toward social change versus tradition. Political distance 
represents the difference in political ideology between two individuals, groups, states, 
countries, etc. 
Research has shown that political ideology and political distance influence 
interactions among individuals, firms, countries, etc. in often profound ways. For example, 
Twitter users are more likely to connect and communicate (e.g. retweet and comment) with 
others who have similar political ideologies (Barbera et al. 2015; Boutyline and Willer 
2017). Mutual fund managers are more likely to allocate assets to firms managed by people 
who share their political affiliations, which is mainly due to in-group favoritism rather than 
possible offline connections or familiarity (Wintoki and Xi 2017). Similar political 
ideology between top management and independent directors is negatively associated with 
performance, likely because this alignment creates high empathy and leads to less 
monitoring (Lee et al. 2014). Political distance also creates frictions in international trade 
and foreign direct investment (Morrow et al. 1998; Siegel et al. 2013). Countries with 
dissimilar political systems trade less than countries with similar systems (Decker and Lim 
2009; Dajud 2013). Possible explanations are that political distance increases the cost of 
negotiating trade agreements and/or that consumers prefer products from politically similar 
countries (Dajud 2013).  
These studies provide valuable insights about the effect of political distance as well 
as the underlying mechanisms. However, many of these mechanisms (reduced monitoring, 
low negotiating costs, offline connections, etc.) are unlikely to operate in online markets. 
Therefore, it is important to study whether – and in what ways – political distance affects 
online transactions, with online lending serving as our empirical context. 
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4.2.2 Behavioral Biases and Market Efficiency  
If political distance influences online lending behaviors, it might represent a type 
of behavioral bias. Online market participants have displayed several types of behavioral 
bias. For example, African Americans are consistently discriminated against in online e-
commerce markets, online accommodation markets, and online lending markets (Pope and 
Sydnor 2011; Doleac and Stein 2013; Edelman et al. 2017). Furthermore, males are less 
preferred than females in crowdfunding markets (Greenberg and Mollick 2017). These 
biases can harm market efficiency by preventing the formation of matches that would 
benefit both parties.  
Behavioral bias can operate unconditionally or conditionally. Unconditional bias 
occurs when members of a given race or gender are universally discriminated against, even 
by those of the same race or gender. Conditional bias occurs when the nature of bias is 
determined/moderated by the relationship between two parties. For example, conditional 
bias might occur if members of a given race or gender are discriminated against, but only 
by members of a different race or gender. One type of conditional bias is in-group bias, 
which occurs when people are biased against others outside of their group, which may be 
defined by geography, culture, political beliefs, etc. One well-established type of in-group 
bias is home bias, which occurs when traders in geographically distributed markets trade 
with those who are geographically nearby. Research on home bias has shown that 
institutional investors prefer same-state private equity, employers prefer same-country 
workers, and individual investors prefer same-state borrowers (Hochberg and Rauh 2013; 
Lin and Viswanathan 2016; Galperin and Greppi 2017). Another form of in-group bias 
relates to culture. Research has shown that lenders tend not to lend money to borrowers in 
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countries with different cultural values (Burtch et al. 2014). In this study, we examine 
whether political ideology represents another form of in-group bias, whereby online 
lending investors prefer borrowers with ideologies likely to be similar to theirs. 
4.2.3 Investors’ Decision Making in Online Lending  
Online lending investors rely on both traditional credit information and “soft” 
information to make lending decisions (Iyer et al. 2016). In addition to traditional factors, 
such as credit scores, income, debt-to-income ratio, the decision making process is 
influenced (and potentially biased) by several factors, including other investors’ decisions, 
loan descriptions, borrowers’ friendship networks, and borrowers’ demographics 
(including gender, race, and overall “appearance”) (Duarte et al. 2012; Galak et al. 2011; 
Greenberg and Molick 2017; Harkness 2016; Hildebrand et al. 2017; Lin et al. 2013; Pope 
and Sydnor 2011; Younkin and Kuppuswamy 2017; Zhang and Liu 2012). Some of these 
factors may not be correlated with loan default rate or expected yield, but investors still 
consider them. In addition to characteristics of borrowers, relationships between investors 
and borrowers also influence investors’ decisions. Lin and Viswanathan (2016) find that 
investors prefer borrowers from their state, and Burtch et al. (2014) reach a similar finding 
with respect to cultural values, as noted above.    
4.2.4 Why Political Ideology and Political Distance Might Influence Online Lending  
In online lending markets, investors choose which borrowers to fund. This decision 
is likely to be based on multiple pieces of information provided by the online lending 
platform, including a borrower’s credit profile and the borrower’s reason for seeking the 
loan. Investors are also likely to infer information about borrowers that is not provided by 
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the platform. One way that investors are likely to do this is by using a borrower’s state of 
residence, which is the only location information provided by Prosper.com during the time 
frame of our analysis. For example, investors may infer that a borrower is likely to be 
conservative if s/he lives in Alabama (which is consistently regarded as a conservative 
state) and likely to be liberal if s/he lives in Massachusetts (which is consistently regarded 
as a liberal state). We believe that these inferences are likely because a state’s political 
ideology is often one of its most visible characteristics to outsiders due to media coverage 
of state and national elections. For example, average Americans are more likely to know 
that Vermont is a fairly liberal state than to know that it has below average GDP per capita. 
We posit that investors consider a borrower’s (inferred) political ideology when making 
lending decisions, which is plausible because most Americans “think, feel, and behave in 
ideologically meaningful and interpretable terms” (Jost 2006). A key goal of our paper is 
to test whether investors behave in a way that is consistent with this hypothesis. 
There are two theoretical mechanism by which political ideology might influence 
investors’ decisions. The first, which we label the rationality-based mechanism, is that 
political ideology proxies for other characteristics of a borrower that affect his/her ability 
or intention to repay the loan. The second, which we label the preference-based 
mechanism, is that investors simply prefer borrowers of a given political ideology for 
reasons unrelated to their ability or intention to repay. We discuss each in turn. 
If present, the rationality-based mechanism would operate as follows. Assume that 
investors believe that liberal borrowers are better at managing debt (which signals their 
ability to repay) and/or are more trustworthy (which signals their intention to repay) 
compared to conservative borrowers. In this case, investors will prefer liberal borrowers 
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because they rationally expect that they will get a positive return on their loan, not because 
they prefer liberal borrowers for their own sake. This would yield an overarching 
preference for liberal borrowers from both liberal and conservative investors, i.e., political 
differences would not matter in investors’ decisions. (By the same logic, investors could 
believe that conservatives are better at managing debt and/or more trustworthy compared 
to liberal borrowers, leading to an overarching preference for conservative borrowers.) It 
is also possible that investors do not view a borrower’s likely political ideology as an 
unconditional signal of his/her creditworthiness, but rather view it conditionally based on 
the investor’s own political ideology. For example, it may be that liberal investors view 
liberal borrowers as being highly creditworthy, while conservative investors view 
conservative borrowers the same way. If investors have these beliefs, then they would tend 
to fund borrowers whose political ideology was likely to be similar to their own. In this 
case, political differences would matter in investors’ decisions. We posit that one way that 
investors will infer a borrower’s political ideology is by his/her state of residence. This is 
consistent with statistical discrimination theory (Phelps 1972; Fang and Moro 2011), which 
states that when a decision-maker lacks information about an individual (in this case, an 
individual borrower’s political ideology), s/he will rationally substitute group averages (in 
this case, the political ideology of the borrower’s state). 
The preference-based mechanism would operate differently. In this case, liberal 
investors would still prefer liberal borrowers, and conservative investors would still prefer 
conservative borrowers. However, these preferences would not be based on the belief that 
political ideology signals a borrower’s creditworthiness. Instead, liberal investors might 
simply prefer to support liberal borrowers because they are similar to them, because they 
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are likely to share their worldview, because they like them or wish to support them, etc. 
(Hirshleifer 2015). The same logic may be true for conservative investors and conservative 
borrowers. This type of in-group political preference has been documented in several 
contexts. The magnitude of this in-group preference may be different for liberal and 
conservative investors. This is because liberals and conservatives exhibit different levels 
of tolerance for those that are different, with liberals typically being viewed as more 
tolerant (Boutyline and Willer 2017). Thus, it is important to examine whether liberal and 
conservative investors respond to political difference in the same way. 
Both the preference-based and the rationality-based mechanisms could generate in-
group favoritism, but for different reasons. In our empirical analysis below, we examine 
not only whether investors prefer borrowers who are likely to share their political ideology 
(i.e., who are within their “group”), but also which of the mechanisms appears to drive the 
effect.     
4.3 Setting, Data, and Empirical Strategy  
4.3.1 Empirical Context and Data  
The online lending market that we analyze is Prosper.com, which is the first peer-
to-peer online lending platform in the United States. We use data from 2008 to 2011. 
During this time period, Prosper.com was essentially a peer-to-peer market in which 
investors lent funds to borrowers. (More recently, Prosper.com has attracted many 
institutional investors whose decision-making processes may differ from those of 
individual investors.) Borrowers seeking a loan use Prosper.com’s online platform to create 
a listing, which shows the requested loan amount along with the borrower’s credit 
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information (including credit grade, debt-to-income ratio, etc.) and state of residence. 
Investors search for and select borrowers to whom they want to lend money. If an investor 
is interested in funding a borrower, s/he places a bid, which can be as low as $25 and as 
high as the entire loan amount. If a borrower’s listing attracts enough bids, then the loan 
will be issued. Prosper.com used an auction system until the end of 2010 and a posted price 
system since then. Under the auction system, only investors with accepted bids own a 
portion of the loan. Under the posted price system, each investor who places a bid owns a 
portion of the loan. 
During the study period, Prosper.com published investor and borrower data 
(including their states of residence), listing data, and bid data, including which investor 
bids on which listings. We select years 2008, 2010, and 2011 for our analysis; each 
represents a distinct period for Prosper.com. We omit 2009 because Prosper.com was not 
operational for part of the year after the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
intervened to require Prosper.com to register with the SEC and with each state as a lender 
or loan broker. 2008 is the last full year of Prosper.com’s operation before the SEC 
intervened. 2010 is the first full year after registration and the last year it used the auction 
system. 2011 is the first full year after switching from the auction system to the posted 
price system.  
We supplement this Prosper.com dataset with data on state-level political ideology 
from Berry et al. (1998; 2010), who calculate a political ideology score for each state 
annually from 1960 to 2017 (see https://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/). 
Berry et al.’s measure is “the mean position on a liberal-conservative continuum of the 
active electorate in a state” (Berry et al. 1998, p. 327). Political ideology ranges from 0 to 
 97 
100, with higher values indicating a more liberal leaning. We measure political distance as 
the absolute difference between the political ideology of the borrower’s state and the 
political ideology of the investor’s state. For example, if the political ideology of the 
investor’s state is 60 and the political ideology of the borrower’s state is 50, then political 
distance is 10. We use state-level political ideology as a proxy for the political ideology of 
individual borrowers and investors. This introduces potential measurement error into our 
models, although perhaps not as much as it may first appear. We discuss this in-depth in 
the “Potential Measurement Error” section below. 
We also collect demographic and economic data from the U.S. Census and other 
public data sources. We use this to construct variables such as the geographic and economic 
distance between investor and borrower states. We measure geographic distance as the 
great circle distance between the investor’s and borrower’s state capitals. We measure 
economic distance as the absolute value of the difference between the real GDPs per capita 
of the investor’s and borrower’s states. 
4.3.2 Empirical Strategy, Models and Results  
We use three complementary approaches to study how political ideology and 
political distance influence online lending: 1) model free analysis, 2) a difference-in-
differences approach that leverages quasi-natural experiments, and 3) a state-dyad gravity 
model. Using multiple approaches increases our confidence in the findings, as each 
approach addresses weaknesses of the other approaches. The first approach provides an 
overall picture of the correlation between online lending activities and political ideology, 
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the second approach focuses on causal inference and identification, and the third approach 
addresses the generalizability of the findings.   
Model Free Analysis. We begin with model-free analysis (Figure 1) to investigate 
whether investors prefer borrowers who are likely to share their political ideology. For this 
analysis, we use the data from 2008, although analysis using the 2010 and 2011 data yields 
similar results. Each bubble in Figure 4-1 depicts a state j, with the size of the bubble 
reflecting the number of bids placed in 2008 by investors from state j. State j’s position on 
the x-axis reflects its political ideology in 2008. (States’ political ideology measures shift 
over time; see https://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/ for measures through 
2017.) State j’s position on the y-axis reflects the estimated political ideology of the 
borrowers funded by state j’s investors (estimated borrower ideology). We measure this as 
the weighted average of the borrower states’ political ideology, with the weights 
determined by the number of bids from investors in state j to borrowers in state i. For 
example, assume that investors in state j issued 300 bids to borrowers in state A (with 
political ideology = 70) and 100 bids to borrowers in state B (with political ideology = 30). 
This would yield an estimated borrower ideology of 60 for investor state j 
((300*70+100*30)/400=60). The upward-sloping dotted line shows the trend line between 
a state’s political ideology and its estimated borrower ideology, which is weighted by the 
number of bids placed by investors from state j. (The unweighted trend line is similar.) The 
dashed horizontal line in Figure 4-1 shows estimated borrower ideology if we assume that 
investors from a state j fund borrowers at random. We calculated this by computing the 
weighted average of all states’ political ideology, with the weights determined by the 
number of borrower listings per state.  
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The model-free analysis suggests two findings that we explore more formally 
below. First, investors prefer to fund borrowers from (relatively) liberal states: all states 
(except for Kansas) appear above the dashed horizontal line, which can be thought of as 
the baseline if investors funded borrowers randomly. We explore below whether this is due 
to a general preference for “liberalness” or whether “liberalness” is a proxy for 
creditworthiness. Second, investors in liberal states tend to prefer borrowers in liberal states 
(including their own state), with the analogous holding for investors in conservative states, 
as can be seen by the upward-sloping trend line. Because all investors have access to the 
same pool of borrowers, this suggests that political distance affects investors’ decision-
making. However, it is possible that political distance is merely a proxy for some other 




Figure Notes: Each bubble depicts a state j, with the bubble’s size reflecting the number of bids 
issued by investors from state j in 2008. The x-axis depicts state j’s political ideology in 2008. 
The y-axis depicts estimated borrower ideology, which is the weighted average of the political 
ideology of the states of the borrowers that investors from state j invested in. The trend line shows 
that state j’s political ideology and its estimated borrower ideology are positively correlated. The 
dashed horizontal line depicts a state’s estimated borrower ideology if the investors from that 
state funded borrowers randomly. 
Figure 4-1 Investor Bidding Behavior by State in 2008 
Difference-in-differences Model. To explore the causal effect of political ideology 
on investor behavior, we would ideally assign borrowers’ political ideology randomly and 
measure how this affects investor behavior. Unfortunately, such an experiment is not 
feasible. Another approach is to see how investors react to changes in political ideology 
over time. This is also difficult because political ideology is relatively constant and slow 







































































































Political Ideology for Each State j (in 2008)
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consideration for investors is not a borrower’s political ideology per se, but rather the 
investors’ perception of a borrower’s political ideology. Thus, if we could identify an 
event(s) that shifted investors’ perceptions of borrowers’ ideology in an exogenous way, 
then we could identify the effect of borrowers’ political ideology on investor behavior. We 
identified state-level legalization of same-sex marriage as a suitable event for the following 
reasons. First, it provides a clear signal of a state’s relatively liberal political ideology, 
given that support for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights is typically a liberal 
cause (Lewis and Gossett 2008) and because a state’s policy typically reflects its ideology 
(Brady and Sniderman 1985). Second, a state’s legalization of same-sex marriage was (and 
remains) controversial and newsworthy, such that people across the United States are likely 
to notice (and therefore react to) the legalization event. There were three same-sex marriage 
legalization events during our study period: in California on May 15th 2008, in Connecticut 
on October 10th 2008, and in New York on June 24th 2011.11  
Our basic strategy is to test whether borrowers in states that were “treated” by 
legalization of same-sex marriage receive more bids than do borrowers in “control” states 
that were not treated. If so, then this would suggest that investors prefer borrowers they 
perceive as being more liberal. To see why this is the case, recall that investors do not have 
information about individual borrowers’ political ideology. Instead, they likely infer this 
based on the borrowers’ state of residence, as suggested by statistical discrimination theory 
(as noted above). Investors are likely to view borrowers in “treated” states as liberal, given 
                                                 
11 The state Supreme Courts for California and Connecticut ruled that same-sex couples had a right to 
marry on  
May 15, 2008 and October 10, 2008 (Liptak 2008; McFadden 2008). The New York state legislature voted 
to legalize same-sex marriage on June 24, 2011 (Confessore and Barbaro 2011). 
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the liberal signal that same-sex marriage legalization represents. We also examine how the 
treatment effect varies based on investors’ likely political ideology. For example, if 
investors from liberal states respond positively to legalization while investors from 
conservative states respond negatively, then that would suggest that investors prefer 
borrowers who are likely to share their political ideology.  
We conducted a separate DID analysis for each of the 3 legalization events. Due to 
data availability (discussed below), we use the California event as the primary analysis, the 
Connecticut event as a secondary analysis, and the New York event as a tertiary analysis. 
We constructed our analysis sample as follows. First, because each borrower listing was 
available on Prosper.com for 7 days during our study period, we collected all borrower 
listings that were posted exactly 3 days before the event. For example, there were 484 
borrowers listings posted on May 12, 2008, which is 3 days before the California event. Of 
these 484 listings, 56 were for borrowers from California (the “treated” listings) and 428 
were for borrowers from other states (the “control” states). This allowed us to examine bids 
placed both 3 days before and 3 days after the legalization event for both treated and control 
listings. If the legalization event caused listings to receive more (or fewer) bids, then we 
should see an increase (or decrease) in bids for the treated listings relative to the control 
listings after the legalization event. Second, active investors on Prosper.com consider 
multiple listings when deciding which to bid on. To examine how the legalization event 
affected their behavior, we limited our analysis to bids placed by investors who were active 
on Prosper.com during the 7-day window. We defined an investor to be “active” if s/he 
placed at least one bid (on any listing) both before and after the legalization event. We 
counted the number of bids for each listing on each day from active investors in each state. 
 103 
This yields a panel with investor state-listing-day as the unit of analysis. Specification (1) 
is our basic DID model.  
                                 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡 + 𝐷𝑦𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗 +  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                    (1) 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the number of bids from investors in state i to listing j on day t. This means 
that for each listing j on day t we have 50 observations, one for each investor state. The 
key explanatory variable is 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡, which is set to 1 for listing-days in the state that 
legalized same-sex marriage after the law was passed and 0 otherwise. 𝐷𝑦𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗 are investor 
state-listing dyad fixed effects; all time-invariant factors (i.e., features of investor states, 
features of listings such as the borrower’s profile and loan request, and features of state-
listing dyads) are captured by these fixed effects. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 are fixed effects for each day in 
the 7-day window; these control for unobserved daily shocks common to all listings that 
influence the number of bids. We ran the analysis on the full sample and also on a matched 
sample. Using Coarsened Exact Matching (Iacus et al. 2011), we matched on the bids 
received by control and treated listings on each day before the treatment as well as on 
listing features, including loan amount requested, the borrower’s debt-to-income ratio, 
interest rate, monthly payment, and whether the listing had an image. Descriptive statistics 
for each legalization event are reported in Table 4-1 for both the full and matched samples. 
As shown in Table 1, there are 56 treated listings in California (i.e., 56 listings were posted 
3 days before the California legalization event), 4 treated listings in Connecticut, and 1 
treated listing in New York. The low number of treated listings is why we consider 
Connecticut and New York analyses to be secondary and tertiary, as noted above. 
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Table 4-1 Descriptive Statistics of the Samples Used in the DID Analysis 
Legalization Event California Event Connecticut Event New York Event 
Event Date May 15, 2008 Oct. 10, 2008 June 24, 2011 
Full or Matched Sample Full Matched Full Matched Full Matched 
Number of Listings 484 299 314 113 19 4 
Number of Treated Listings 56 41 4 4 1 1 
Number of State-Listing Dyads 24,200 14,950 15,700 5,650 950 200 
Average Daily Bids 0.040 0.020 0.040 0.005 0.065 0.066 














Average Political Distance 15.95 15.65 16.01 15.77 13.64 14.93 
DID Model Results. We first show the basic DID model results from specification 
(1) in Table 4-2. For all 3 legalization events, the treatment effect is positive and significant 
for both the full and matched samples. We focus on the California analysis, given that the 
number of treated listings is small for the Connecticut (n=4) and New York analyses (n=1). 
Using the matched sample for California, the estimated treatment effect of the same-sex 
marriage legalization event is 0.019. To gauge the magnitude of this effect, we calculated 
the mean number of bids for the control listings after the legalization event. This value is 
0.021, such that the treatment represents a 90% increase. Another way to think about this 
is that treated listings received 0.019 more bids from investors in each state i in each day t 
on or after treatment than do control listings. When averaged across all 50 states and all 4 
days on or after treatment, this suggests that treated listings received approximately 4 more 
bids (i.e., 0.019 * 50 states * 4 days) than did control listings (specifically, approximately 
8 bids vs. approximately 4 bids). Also, because several listings receive 0 bids, we restricted 
the matched sample to only those listings that received at least 1 bid before the legalization 
event (n=14 listings, yielding n=4,900 state-listing-day observations). For this subset, the 
mean number of bids for the controls after legalization is 0.143 and the treatment effect is 
0.129 (p=0.05), which is a 90% increase. When averaged across all 50 states and all 4 days 
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on or after treatment, this suggests that treated listings in the sub-sample received 
approximately 26 more bids than did control listings (or approximately 54 bids vs. 28 bids). 
Table 4-2 Results of the DID Analysis 
Event/Treatment California Event Connecticut Event New York Event 















Time Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
State-Listing Dyad Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations (State-Listing-
Days) 
169,400 104,650 109,900 39,550 6,650 1,400 
# of Groups (State-Listings) 24,200 14,950 15,700 5,650 950 200 
Mean # of Bids for Control Listings 
After Legalization Event 
0.040 0.020 0.040 0.005 0.065 0.066 
Adjusted R2 0.4298 0.4792 0.3331 0.0189 0.2329 0.1427 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-listing level. 
For DID analysis to be valid, the control and treated listings must follow parallel 
trends in terms of the number of bids they received before the treatment. We use the 
leads/lags model shown in specification (2) to check this.  






+  𝐷𝑦𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡  
+  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                                            (2) 
Specification (2) mirrors (1) except that we replace 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡  with 
∑ 𝛽𝜏𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡+𝜏
−2
𝜏=−3 + ∑ 𝛽𝜏𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡+𝜏
3
𝜏=0 . 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡+𝜏 is a dummy variable equal to 
1 for treated observations if day t is τ days after the legalization event (or for τ < 0, −τ days 
before the event). The 𝛽𝜏 coefficients measure whether there is a difference in the number 
of bids on treated and control listings on the days before legalization, the legalization date, 
and the days after legalization; we use the −1 period as the baseline to avoid the “dummy 
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variable trap”. If treated and control listings follow pre-treatment parallel trends, then 𝛽−3 
and 𝛽−2 will be insignificant.  
Table 4-3 shows that pre-treatment trends are often not parallel when using the full 
samples. This illustrates the importance of the matched samples, in which pre-treatment 
trends appear to be parallel: 𝛽−3  and 𝛽−2  are insignificant. Accordingly, we focus our 
analysis on these results. For the California analysis (which we consider as focal as noted 
above), the effect appears to grow larger each day, as evidenced by the increasing 
magnitude of the coefficients for Treated (0) through Treated (3). This may be because it 
takes a few days for investors to assimilate and act on the news.  
Table 4-3 Results of the DID Analysis, Including Lead and Lag Terms 
Event/Treatment California Event Connecticut Event New York State Event 
















































































Time Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
State-Listing Dyad Fixed 
Effects 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations (State-
Listing-Days) 
169,400 104,650 109,900 39,550 6,650 1,400 
# of Groups (State-Listings) 24,200 14,950 15,700 5,650 950 200 
Adjusted R2 0.4298 0.4792 0.3331 0.0219 0.2377 0.1612 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-listing level. 
We next explore treatment effect heterogeneity. If investors prefer borrowers whose 
ideology is likely to mirror theirs, then we should see a stronger treatment effect for 
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investors from states whose political ideology is similar to that of the treated state (i.e., 
California, Connecticut, or New York). To test this, we classify investors into five groups 
(much more liberal, somewhat more liberal, similar, more conservative, much more 
conservative) based on the difference between their state’s political ideology and the 
treated state’s political ideology. For the California analysis, we defined these groups as 
follows, where CA = California’s political ideology and σ = the standard deviation of state 
political ideology: 1) much more liberal (investor state’s ideology is within [CA+1.5σ, 
100]), 2) more liberal [CA+0.5σ, CA+1.5σ), 3) similar [CA−0.5σ, CA+0.5σ), 4) more 
conservative [CA−1.5σ, CA−0.5σ), and 5) much more conservative [0, CA−1.5σ).12 Using 
the matched samples, we reran specification (1) after interacting the 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡 dummy 
variable with dummy variables for four of the five groups; we withheld the interaction term 
for the “similar” group to use it as a baseline and to avoid the dummy variable trap. Results 
are reported in Columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 4-4. The coefficient for 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡 is positive 
and significant, indicating that investors from states with a similar political ideology as the 
treated state respond positively to the liberal signal. The coefficients for the interaction 
terms measure the differential effect based on whether the investors’ state is more liberal 
or more conservative. All of these coefficients are negative, and those for the “much more 
conservative” group are significant for the California and Connecticut analysis. This 
indicates that investors from states with different political ideologies react less positively 
(or not at all) to the legalization event. In other words, political distance appears to matter: 
                                                 
12 We adjusted the group definitions for Connecticut and New York, given that there are few states with 
more a liberal political ideology (and many with a more conservative ideology). Let CT = Connecticut’s 
political ideology and σ = the standard deviation of state political ideology. The group definitions are: 1) 
much more liberal (investor state’s ideology is within [CT+1.5σ, 100]), 2) more liberal [CT+0.5σ, 
CT+1.5σ), 3) similar [CT−1σ, CT+0.5σ), 4) more conservative [CT−3σ, CT−1σ), and 5) much more 
conservative [0, CT−3σ). We used the same group definitions for Connecticut. 
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it often cancels out the main effect.13 This suggests that the positive average treatment 
effect reported in Table 4-2 comes mainly from investors from politically similar states. 
For robustness, we also used a linear interaction term (instead of the five dummy variables) 
and found similar results (see Appendix B-2). This limits the risk that our results are an 
artifact of how we defined the categories. 
Table 4-4 Results of the DID Analysis, Including Treatment Effect Heterogeneity 
Based on Political Difference 
Measure of Political Ideology Focal Measure 
Alternative Measure: Obama 
Advantage 
Event/Treatment California Connecticut New York California Connecticut New York 




n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 


















































Time Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
State-Listing Dyad Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations (State-Listing-Days) 104,650 39,550 1,400 104,650 39,550 1,400 
# of Groups (State-Listings) 14,950 5,650 200 14,950 5,650 200 
Adjusted R2 0.4793 0.0190 0.1407 0.4793 0.0195 0.1409 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state-listing level. There 
are few states that are more liberal than Connecticut and New York, leading to “n/a” for some results. 
We use Obama Advantage as an alternative measurement of political difference 
and report the results in Columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 4-4. Obama Advantage is the 
percentage of voters in each state who voted for Barack Obama (Democratic candidate) 
minus the percentage who voted for John McCain (Republican candidate) in the 2008 
presidential election. Generally speaking, a high value of Obama Advantage indicates a 
                                                 
13 Notice that the effect for each of the investor state groups is reflected by the sum of the 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡 
coefficient and the relevant interaction term. 
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liberal leaning. We created investor groups (much more liberal, more liberal, etc.) using 
the same approach as for our focal measure. These results are similar to those obtained 
with our focal measure, although the coefficients for the interaction terms are more often 
significant. 
It is possible that another event occurred at the same time as the treated states 
legalized same-sex marriage and that this (confounding) event could generate the effect 
that we see. This is unlikely for several reasons. First, such an event (or set of events) would 
need to occur in three different states at three different times – namely 5/15/08 in 
California, 10/10/08 in Connecticut, and 6/24/11 in New York – but nowhere else and not 
at any other time. This would be an improbable coincidence. Second, any confounding 
event would need to explain not only the main treatment effect but also why it varies based 
on likely political differences between investors and borrowers. This would also be 
improbable. Third, we searched for other key events that occurred on the legalization event 
date in each state that might confound our results. In each case, the legalization event was 
prominently displayed while no other (potentially confounding) event was.  
Gravity Model. The DID model helps us identify the causal impacts of political 
ideology and political distance on investor behavior. However, generalizability is a concern 
because all three events in the DID analysis cover short time periods and include a small 
group of investors and listings. To explore the more general and longer-term impacts, we 
use a gravity model to assess the factors that influence the number of bids placed by 
investors in state i to borrowers in state j across multiple years. Gravity models are widely 
used in international trade, foreign direct investment, and migration studies to investigate 
the impact of geographic distance and other types of distance on trade or migration patterns 
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(McCallum 1995; Wolf 2000; Anderson and Wincoop 2003; Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
2006). Gravity models have also been used to study transaction patterns in online markets 
(Hortacsu et al. 2009; Burtch et al. 2014). For our setting, we use the following model:   
ln𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ln𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  + ln𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑗𝑡  + ln𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 
ln𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡  + 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  + 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡   +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                                                                                               
(3) 
The dependent variable in gravity models is typically a measure of transaction 
volume between two locations. Our key dependent variable is ln𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 , which is the 
natural log of the number of bids from investors in state i to borrowers in state j in year t. 
For each year, this yields 2,500 observations (i.e., 50 states crossed with 50 states). The 
main independent variables in gravity models are measures of the mass/size of the two 
locations and measures of distance between them. As our “mass” variables, we use 
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡, which is the natural log of the number of investors in state i in year t and 
𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑗𝑡, which is the natural log of the number of listings from borrowers in state j in 
year t. We include well-established “distance” variables, including 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗  and 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 . We control for several other 
factors likely to influence the number of bids for each state dyad. We control for the quality 
of listings in the borrowers’ state by including 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡, which are state-level 
averages for borrowers’ Credit Score, Debt-to-Income (DTI) Ratio, and Estimated Monthly 
Payment. We control for the potential lending power of investors by including 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡, which includes Median Household Income. The independent 
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variables of primary interest are included in 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 . These include Political Difference 
(which is the investor state’s political ideology minus the borrower state’s ideology), 
Political Distance (the absolute value of Political Difference), and Borrower State Political 
Ideology. As is typical with gravity models, we do not include state fixed effects because 
the distance measures (geographic, economic, and political) are sometimes perfectly 
determined when state fixed effects are included. Including state fixed effects would also 
“absorb” the impact of state political ideology. Table 4-5 provides summary statistics for 
the 2008 data used in the gravity model. Statistics for the 2010 and 2011 data are available 
upon request. 
Table 4-5 Descriptive Statistics for 2008 Data Used in the Gravity Model 
Variables Obs. Mean Median S.D. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
Number of Bids from Investor State to Borrower State 2,500 1,043 265 3,129 0 90,401 
Key Independent Variables 
Political Distance 2,500 17.84 15.05 13.28 0 63.51 
Borrower State Political Ideology 2,500 61.74 60.64 15.73 28.40 91.90 
Political Difference 2,500      
Other Independent Variables 
Number of Investors 2,500 780 408 1,063 59 6,604 
Number of Listings 2,500 2,365 1,310 2,782 0 16,278 
Geographic Distance (Miles) 2,500 1,187 985 895 0 5,110 
Economic Distance ($) 2,500 9,458 7,554 7,660 0 36,054 
Average Credit Score 2,450 607.0 607.0 7.216 591.2 621.3 
Average DTI Ratio 2,450 0.403 0.400 0.054 0.289 0.561 
Average Monthly Payment 2,450 269.4 269.2 23.70 225.3 325.1 
Investor State Median Household Income ($) 2,500 51,966 50,170 8,425 37,528 70,482 
Gravity Model Estimation and Main Results. We conduct cross-sectional, year-
by-year analysis as our primary approach and use panel model estimation as a robustness 
check. We apply both PPML (Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood) and OLS estimation 
methods as suggested by previous studies (Anderson and Wincoop 2003; Santos Silva and 
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Tenreyro 2006). Specification (3) is written in the format for OLS estimation, which is 
conventional for gravity models. However, when PPML is used, the raw number of bids 
rather than the natural log of bids serves as the dependent variable. In general, OLS results 
are consistent with PPML results; some OLS results are omitted due to space limitations.  
The first set of regressions (results shown in Table 4-6) test whether political 
distance provides additional explanatory power beyond commonly used distance variables. 
We begin by running the regressions without the Political Distance variable. The third and 
fourth columns show the results with Political Distance. A likelihood ratio test shows that 
adding Political Distance results in a statistically significant improvement in model fit 
(Column 3 > Column 2 > Column 1), meaning that Political Distance adds explanatory 
power. The impact of political distance is negative and significant.  
Table 4-6 Results of the Gravity Model: Influence of Political Distance 
Sample Year 2008 2008 2008 2008 



































































# of Observations 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 
Pseudo Log-likelihood -76675.748 -76600.674 -76354.334  
Adjusted R2    0.9581 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Because political distance can be interpreted as a percentage measure, the 
coefficients in Columns 3 and 4 indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in political 
distance leads to 0.1% decrease in total number of received bids. For states with extreme 
political ideologies, the impact can be as high as 6.4%. 
In our next set of regressions, we add political ideology of the borrower state, i.e. 
Borrower Political Ideology, into the model. This allows us to check for any overarching 
preference for political ideology. We also assess whether the impact of political distance is 
symmetric by distinguishing whether investor states are more liberal than borrower states. 
We do this by including Political Difference in the model rather than Political Distance. A 
negative value means that the investors’ state is more conservative than the borrowers’ 
state. Then, we represent Political Difference via a set of dummy variables for different 
ranges. The ranges are: 1) much more liberal (investor state’s ideology is 30 to 100 points 
higher than the borrower state’s ideology, 2) more liberal [10, 30), 3) similar [−10, 10), 4) 
more conservative [−30, −10), and 5) much more conservative [−100, −30). The “similar” 
group serves as the omitted baseline in our regressions. One benefit of using dummy 
variables is that it allows us to examine a potential non-linear effect. Table 4-7 shows the 
results. For robustness, we also used a linear interaction term (instead of the five dummy 
variables) and found similar results (see Appendix B-2 for details). 
The coefficient for Borrower Political Ideology is positive and significant (in 5 of 
6 models), indicating that investors tend to prefer borrowers in liberal states. Using the 
result from column 1, a one percent increase in Borrower Political Ideology leads to a 0.2% 
increase in bids. The standard deviation of Borrower Political Ideology in 2008 is 15.73. 
Thus, a 0.2% effect implies that a two standard deviation increase in political ideology 
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yields approximately 6.3% more bids. The coefficients for Political Difference in [−100, 
−30) (i.e., the investor state is much more conservative than the borrower state) are 
generally negative and significant: 5 of 6 coefficients are negative (with 4 significant). The 
coefficients for Political Difference in [−30, −10) are similar: 6 of 6 coefficients are 
negative (with 4 significant). This indicates that conservative investors prefer not to lend 
to borrowers in states that are comparatively more liberal. In this case, the “political 
difference effect” often overwhelms the general preference for borrowers from liberal 
states. The coefficients for Political Difference in [30, 100] (i.e., the investor state is much 
more liberal than the borrower state) are inconsistent: 3 coefficients are positive (with 1 
significant), and 3 coefficients are negative (with 2 significant). The coefficients for 
Political Difference in [10, 30) (i.e., the investor state is more liberal than the borrower 
state) are generally positive but typically insignificant: 5 of 6 coefficients are positive (with 
2 significant). Overall, it appears that investors from liberal states are less influenced by 
political distance than are investors from conservative states. Thus, the effect of political 
distance appears to be asymmetric. 
Results Summary. The model free analysis, DID models, and gravity models 
consistently show that borrowers attract more bids from politically similar investors than 
from politically dissimilar investors. The gravity model results also suggest that 
comparatively liberal investors care less about political distance than comparatively 




Table 4-7 Results of the Gravity Model: Influence of Political Ideology and Political 
Difference 
Sample Year 2008 2010 2011 2008 2010 2011 
Estimation Method PPML PPML PPML OLS OLS OLS 
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PoliticalDifference in [-10, 10):  
Investor State Similar 
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PoliticalDifference in [-30, -10):  
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Adjusted R2    0.9590 0.9175 0.9403 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
4.4 Robustness Checks and Potential Measurement Error  
4.4.1 DID Model Robustness Checks  
Here, we present several robustness checks to provide more evidence for the 
validity of our DID models. First, it is possible that listings in the treated states generally 
receive more bids at the end of their first listing week than do listings in the control states, 
perhaps because treated states have special characteristics, such as high average incomes 
 116 
or higher media visibility. To examine this alternative explanation, we used alternative 
treatment dates for each treated state. We reconstructed our “California” data set so that it 
was centered around New York’s treatment date (i.e., we assumed that California was 
treated on the day that New York was treated), created a matched sample (as above), and 
reran the analysis. We did the analogous using Connecticut’s treatment date for California 
as well as randomizing the New York and Connecticut treatment dates. If the alternative 
explanation is correct, then we should see a positive treatment effect, regardless of when 
we assume treatment to occur. Results are shown in Table 4-8. None of the coefficients of 
the “alternative date” treatment effects is significant, indicating that this alternative 
explanation is unlikely. 
Table 4-8 Results of the DID Analysis, using Alternative Treatment Dates 





State Assumed to be Treated Connecticut New York California New York California 










Time Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ √ 
State-Listing Dyad Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations (State-Listing-Days) 5,600 47,250 81,550 38,850 700 
# of Groups (State-Listings) 800 6,750 11,650 5,550 100 
Adjusted R2 0.0047 0.0629 0.1011 0.1580 0.3048 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-listing level. Because 
there were no listings from Connecticut on New York’s treatment date, there is no “New York’s Treatment Date” / 
“Connecticut” column. We use matched samples for each analysis.  
Another concern is that legalization of same-sex marriage likely increases 
investors’ awareness of the treated states. In other words, it is possible that investors 
increase their bids in the treated states simply because the treated state is “top of mind” and 
not because it has issued a signal of its liberalness. The treatment heterogeneity shown in 
Table 4-4 suggests that this is unlikely. If the effect is purely due to awareness, then we 
should not see investor states in different groups respond differently to legalization. We 
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also test this “awareness effect” alternative mechanism by testing the treatment effect of 
the occurrence of national sports events that are likely to increase awareness of a state 
without sending an ideological signal. We used three events: 1) the final game of the NFL 
playoffs between the New York Giants and the New England Patriots on Feb. 3, 2008; 2) 
the final game of the NHL playoffs between the Detroit Red Wings and the Pittsburgh 
Penguins on June 4, 2008, and 3) the final game of the NBA playoffs between the Boston 
Celtics and the Los Angeles Lakers on June 17, 2008. If our findings are due to a general 
awareness effect, then these events should generate a positive and significant treatment 
effect for listings in the states whose teams were participating (i.e., New York and 
Massachusetts for the Super Bowl, Michigan and Pennsylvania for the NHL playoffs, and 
Massachusetts and California for the NBA playoffs). 
We use the basic DID specification and report the results in Table 4-9. We confirm 
that the control and treated listings follow pre-treatment parallel trends via the leads/lags 
specification. The treatment effects of these sport events are not significant. This suggests 
that our main treatment effect is unlikely to be driven by a general awareness effect.  
Table 4-9 Results of the DID Analysis using National Sport Events 









Time Fixed Effects √ √ √ 
State-Listing Dyad Fixed Effects √ √ √ 
# of Observations (State-Listing-Days) 66,150 78,050 66,150 
# of Groups (State-Listings) 9,450 11,150 9,450 
Adjusted R2 0.1224 0.1205 0.1116 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-listing level. 
We conducted other robustness checks, including checking whether our results are 
driven by home bias. If investors prefer to fund borrowers in their same state purely due to 
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home bias, then this could explain our finding that the effect is largest when investors and 
borrowers share similar political ideologies (see Table 4-4). We replicated the treatment 
effect heterogeneity analysis for California in 2008 (shown in Table 4-4) after excluding: 
a) observations involving California investors, and b) observations involving all same-state 
pairs. The results are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table B-1 (see the appendix) and are 
similar to those shown in Table 4-4. Other robustness checks include focusing on large 
states only, using bid amount (instead of bid count) as the dependent variable, and using 
count models instead of OLS. Findings (available upon request) are similar. 
4.4.2 Gravity Model Robustness Checks  
As discussed above, our working theory is that investors infer borrowers’ political 
ideology based on their state of residence and that this influences who they choose to fund. 
However, it is possible that political ideology and political distance are proxies for other 
social or economic factors. If so, then our gravity model results might be (incorrectly) 
attributing the effects of those factors to the political measures. We examined this by 
adding to the gravity model (specification 3) other social and economic factors that 
investors might perceive as affecting the creditworthiness of borrowers, all gathered from 
the U.S. Census. For each borrower state, we included 5 demographic variables (percentage 
of white citizens, percentage of male citizens, percentage of citizens over sixty age, 
percentage of divorced or separated citizens, and percentage of citizens in poverty) and 5 
economic/social variables (unemployment rate, percentage of citizens with at least high 
school attainment, credit card delinquency rate, median household income, and monthly 
salary).  
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Table 4-10 Results of the Gravity Model with Additional Demographic and 
Economic Control Variables 
Model Specification Gravity Model with Additional 
Borrower State Variables 
Gravity Model with Additional 
Distance Variables 
Sample Year 2008 2010 2011 2008 2010 2011 
Estimation Method PPML PPML PPML  PPML PPML PPML  
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Other Control Variables Appearing in 
Tables 6 and 7  
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations 2,450 2,300 2,350 2,450 2,350 2,350 
Pseudo Log-likelihood -56,525 -25,599 -22,764 -74,968 -28,905 -24,227 
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We also used these variables to compute additional distance measures between 
investor and borrower states, in case these might explain the impact that we attribute to 
political distance. These include percentage of white distance, percentage of male distance, 
unemployment rate distance, less than high school attainment distance, and median 
household income distance. Results are shown in Table 4-10 and are similar to our focal 
results. This suggests that investors consider the political measures above and beyond these 
other factors. 
We also conducted other robustness checks. A common concern of gravity models 
is that all dyads are weighted equally, even if some dyads are much more impactful than 
others. Another concern is that including same-state pair leads may cause the impact of 
political distance to be upwardly biased. To address these concerns, we reran the gravity 
model: 1) after weighting each dyad by the product of the number of investors and the 
number of listings, 2) after retaining only dyads in which both the number of investors and 
borrowers exceed 100, and 3) after excluding same-state dyads. The results are reported in 
Appendix Table B-3 and are similar to our focal results. As other robustness checks, we 
used a linear interaction term for the effect of political distance and estimated a panel data 
model instead of the cross-sectional models by year. The results are available upon request 
and are largely consistent with our focal results. 
4.4.3 Potential Measurement Error  
One concern about our analysis is whether our measurement of political ideology 
is accurate enough, given that we use state-level measures. We begin this discussion by 
pointing out when this potential measurement error issue is not a concern. First, the main 
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effect uncovered in the DID analysis does not rely on state-level measures of political 
ideology. Instead, it shows how investors respond to a liberal signal issued by a borrower’s 
state. Second, using state-level political ideology to approximate borrowers’ individual 
political ideology is likely to be an accurate reflection of what investors do. This is because 
Prosper.com did not provide information on borrowers’ political ideology during the time 
period of our analysis. Instead, investors likely infer borrowers’ ideology based on their 
state of residence, as suggested by statistical discrimination theory and the political science 
literature (Phelps 1972; Erikson et al. 1987; Fang and Moro 2011). This literature suggests 
that decision-makers who lack information about an individual (in this case, the borrower’s 
political ideology) will instead use the group average (in this case, the political ideology of 
the borrower’s state). Thus, our model likely reflects the decision-making process that 
investors use. 
Measurement error is more likely to be a problem when we use state-level measures 
to approximate investors’ political ideology. For example, because we rely on state-level 
measures of investors’ political ideology in the DID model when we explore treatment 
effect heterogeneity based on political distance, these results could be impacted by 
measurement error. The gravity models also have this characteristic. We address this in 
several ways. First, we aggregate data to the state level for analysis, which can “wash out” 
measurement error across individuals (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p. 899). In other words, 
although one investor might be more liberal than average for his state, another is likely to 
be more conservative. Thus, aggregating to the state level allows us to approximate the 
behavior of an average investor from each state. Second, measurement error only leads to 
inconsistent estimates if the error term is correlated with the (potentially) mismeasured 
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variable (Wooldridge 2002, p. 305). It is not clear if this is an issue in our models. Third, 
we use alternative measures of political ideology such as Obama Advantage in our models 
and find similar results, which shows that our findings are not generated by measurement 
error specific to our focal measure. In unreported analysis, we also measured political 
ideology using state government ideology and state political policy ideology, gathered 
from and found similar results (available upon request). Fourth, it is common practice in 
studies investigating political distance and/or cultural distance to use aggregate-level (e.g., 
state, country, etc.) measures (e.g., Blum and Goldfarb 2006, Burtch et al. 2014, Dajud 
2013, Decker and Lim 2009, Hortacsu et al. 2009, Morrow et al. 1998, Siegel et al. 2013). 
For example, Burtch et al. (2014) showed that cultural differences between countries 
significantly reduced lending actions between individuals in those countries. They assumed 
that their country-level measure of cultural values was a valid proxy for the cultural values 
of individuals in those countries, despite that most countries are multicultural. We make a 
similar assumption, although our measurement is more granular (state-level vs. country-
level). 
We also conduct several supplemental analyses to further explore the possibility of 
measurement error. Our first approach is to identify those states for which state-level 
political ideology was most likely to match individual-level political ideology. We do this 
by calculating the Obama Advantage for each county in each state, assuming that county-
level ideology is a closer match for individual-level ideology than is state-level ideology. 
(Our focal measure of political ideology is not available at the county level.) We then 
compute the standard deviation of the county-level Obama Advantage variables for each 
state. We rerun both the DID model and the gravity model after excluding the 5 (and 10) 
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investor states with the highest standard deviation, because these states are those for which 
state-level ideology is least likely to match individual-level ideology. Column 1 in Table 
4-11 (4-12) reproduces the results from Column 1 in Table 4-4 (4-7) and serves as a 
baseline. Columns 2-3 in Tables 4-11 and 4-12 report the results after removing the investor 
states with the highest standard deviation of Obama Advantage. The main findings are 
consistent across models. 
Table 4-11 DID Model Results After Excluding States with the Highest Standard 
Deviations of Obama Advantage 
Model Specification Matched Sample 
with All States 
Matched Sample 




Legalization Event California, 2008 California, 2008 California, 2008 






































Time Fixed Effects √ √ √ 
State-Listing Dyad Fixed Effects √ √ √ 
# of Observations (State-Listing-
Days) 
104,650 94,185 83,720 
# of Groups (State-Listings) 14,950 13,455 11,960 
Adjusted R2 0.4793 0.4871 0.3482 








Table 4-12 Gravity Model Results After Excluding States with the Highest Standard 
Deviations of Obama Advantage 




Sample Year 2008 2008 2008 
Estimation Method PPML PPML PPML 
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PoliticalDifference in [-10, 10): Investor State Similar Omitted Baseline 
PoliticalDifference in [-30, -10):  







PoliticalDifference in [-100, -30):  













# of Observations 2,450 2,205 1,960 
Pseudo Log-likelihood -75,878.482 -68,127.800 -
53,792.386 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Our second approach is to directly use county-level ideology instead of state-level 
ideology in our analysis. Nearly 10-15% of investors in our sample report their city of 
residence, from which we determined their county of residence. This yielded 843 investor 
counties. For this subset of investors, we reran the gravity model using investor-
county/borrower-state dyads (instead of investor-state/borrower-state dyads). We created 
the political difference measures using the Obama Advantage measure, because our focal 
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measure is not available at the county level. Results are shown in Table 4-13. Because the 
scale of the Obama Advantage measure differs from that of our focal measure, we redefined 
the groups for political difference (much more liberal, more liberal, etc.). Columns 3 and 
4 show the results after excluding small counties (defined as bottom 25% counties in terms 
of the number of voters) and after excluding same-state dyads (technically, dyads in which 
the investor-county is within the borrower-state). Results are similar to our focal analysis, 
with two exceptions. First, not only is the “much more conservative” coefficient negative 
and significant (as in our focal analysis), but so also is the “much more liberal” coefficient. 
However, the effect size appears larger for the “much more conservative” group (although 
the two confidence intervals overlap slightly), suggesting that the effect is asymmetric: 
specifically, political distance appears to deter investors the most when they are far more 
conservative than borrowers. Second, the borrower political ideology coefficient remains 









Table 4-13 Gravity Model Analysis: Investor-County/Borrower-State Dyads 
Sample Year 2008  2008  2008  2008 


















Political Distance -0.002** 
(0.001) 
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PoliticalDifference in [-20, 20):  
Investor State Similar 
 Baseline Baseline Baseline 
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Other Gravity Model Controls √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations 38,073 38,073 30,919 37,300 
# of Counties 843 843 634 843 
Pseudo Log-likelihood -132,902 -133,035 -120,933 -128,101 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
4.5 Exploration of Underlying Mechanisms  
As discussed in the “Background, Literature Review and Motivation” section, our 
results may reflect investors’ rationality or their preferences/tastes. The results would 
reflect rationality if investors believed political ideology to be a signal of borrowers’ credit 
risk; otherwise, they would reflect preferences. We used a treatment effect heterogeneity 
analysis, based on the credit risk of the borrower, to examine this.  
The intuition for this analysis is as follows. Consider two pools of borrowers, both 
of whom are a mix of liberals and conservatives: one with relatively low credit risk 
uncertainty and one with relatively high credit risk uncertainty. Consider an investor who 
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tends to fund liberals. If the investor funds liberals because they share his political ideology 
(preference-based mechanism), then this would be evident in both pools. However, if the 
investor funds liberals not simply because he likes them but because he believes liberalness 
to be a signal that a borrower is an acceptable credit risk (rationality-based mechanism), 
then this would be evident only in the second pool. We used the DID analysis to examine 
which of these mechanisms was more likely. Using the matched sample for the California 
legalization event, we created a “low risk” and a “high risk” group of listings. The low risk 
group consists of listings with a requested loan amount below $5,000 and a borrower’s 
debt-to-income (DTI) ratio below 0.26; the high risk group is analogous. Because these are 
the same thresholds we used when matching listings for the matched sample, each group 
is well-balanced and satisfies the pre-treatment parallel trends assumption.  
We reran the DID analyses for each group. The results of the main DID 
specification are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4-14. The results of the DID 
specification with treatment effect heterogeneity based on political differences are shown 
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4-14. The overall treatment effect is only apparent for the high 
risk group, which supports the rationality-based mechanism. (The coefficients for the two 
groups are statistically different, with that for the high risk group approximately 30x 
larger.) Figure 4-2 plots the estimated effect sizes for each political difference group (much 
more liberal, more liberal, etc.) for the low and high risk listing groups (the effect size for 
each political difference group is the sum of the Treated coefficient and the coefficient for 
the relevant interaction term). The heterogeneity pattern is similar for both groups, which 
provides evidence that the preference-based mechanism may be at work. However, the 
effect sizes for the low risk group are close to 0 (note that scale of the right-hand y-axis in 
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Figure 4-2 is 1/10th that of the left-hand y-axis), which provides further evidence for the 
rationality-based mechanism. 
Table 4-14 Underlying Mechanism Analysis based on DID Models (California 
Legalization Event) 
Model Specification Basic DID DID with Treatment Effect 
Heterogeneity 
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Treated * Investor State More 
Conservative 




Treated * Investor State Much More 
Conservative 




Time Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ 
State-Listing Dyad Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations (State-Listing-Days) 38,150 28,350 38,150 28,350 
# of Groups (State-Listings) 5,450 4,050 5,450 4,050 
Adjusted R2 0.0318 0.5302 0.0326 0.5307 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-listing level. 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Estimated Effect Sizes By Political Difference Group for the Low and High 
Risk Listing Groups 
We conducted a similar analysis using the gravity model. We interacted borrower 



















normalized to aid interpretation) and reran the gravity model, using the 2008 data. Column 
1 of Table 4-15 reproduces the results from Table 4-7, column 2 includes the borrower 
credit score interaction term, and column 3 includes the borrower DTI ratio interaction 
term. As credit score increases and/or as DTI ratio decreases, the impact of political 
ideology lessens. This suggests that investors pay less attention to borrowers’ likely 
political ideology when credit risk is relatively low. This is consistent with the above result 
from the DID analysis and provides further evidence for the rationality-based mechanism. 
We also interacted political distance with borrower credit score and borrower DTI 
ratio. Columns 4-6 of Table 4-15 show the results. Although the signs of the interaction 
term coefficients suggest that political distance matters less when credit scores are high 
and DTI ratios are low (which is consistent with the rationality-based mechanism), these 
coefficients are not significant (which provides evidence of the preference-based 
mechanism). This is consistent with the DID results reported in Table 4-14.  
Overall, we conclude that both mechanisms play a role. We find a general 
preference for liberal investors in both the DID and gravity model analyses. This appears 
to be driven by a belief that liberalness signals low credit risk (i.e., the rationality-based 
mechanism). We also find that political distance affects investors’ decisions, particularly 
when the investor is likely to be more conservative than the investor. This appears to be 
driven by a general preference for borrowers with similar political ideology (i.e., the 




Table 4-15 Underlying Mechanism Analysis based on Gravity Models 
Model Specification Gravity Model, Including Political 
Ideology and Difference  
Gravity Model, Including Political 
Distance 






   
Borrower Political Ideology 
* Credit Score 
 -0.0024*** 
(0.0007) 
    
Borrower Political Ideology 
* DTI Ratio 
  0.0010*** 
(0.0004) 
   






Political Distance * Credit 
Score 
    0.0003 
(0.0009) 
 
Political Distance * DTI 
Ratio 
     -0.0004 
(0.0005) 
PoliticalDifference in [30, 
100]:  








   
PoliticalDifference in [10, 
30):  







   
PoliticalDifference in [-10, 
10): Investor State Similar 
baseline baseline baseline    
PoliticalDifference in [-30, -
10):  








   
PoliticalDifference in [-100, 
-30):  








   
Other Gravity Model 
Controls 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 
Pseudo Log-likelihood -75878.482 -75129.2 -75633.822 -76354.334 -76341.441 -76330.318 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. a: p value = 
0.118. 
4.6 Conclusion 
 Political differences are becoming increasingly stark in contemporary society, 
leading to a downturn in civil discourse. This paper demonstrates that political ideology 
and political difference also play an important role in how markets operate, with a specific 
focus on online lending markets. Although online lending markets eliminate geographic 
frictions and improve information transparency, investors still show significant behavioral 
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biases. We collect data from Prosper.com and apply multiple models to investigate the 
impact of political ideology and political difference. We find that investors on average 
prefer liberal borrowers to conservative borrowers, which is likely due to that investors 
consider liberalness as an indicator of creditworthy. We also find that investors tend to 
prefer borrowers whose political ideology is likely to be similar to theirs. Additional 
analyses show that this reluctance to fund borrowers of differing political ideology is due 
to simple preference and/or bias. This suggests that some beneficial matches between 
borrowers and investors are not being made because of the negative effect of political 
difference, thereby reducing the market’s efficiency. 
Our finding that political difference serves as a barrier to online lending 
transactions is consistent with other types of in-group bias. In general, borrowers are more 
likely to attract investors from states with similar political ideology than investors from 
states with different political ideology. In other words, political distance deters online 
investment. We rule out alternative explanations related to race, gender, unemployment, 
education, and income. Future research can provide deeper look at the mechanisms. 
Our study has implications that suggest opportunities for future research. The first 
implication is about platform design. For example, is it possible to remove hints about 
political ideology on online markets? Although we don’t analyze the pros and cons of 
eliminating the political information, this might be interesting for platform designers. 
Another implication is about data analytics tools and automated investing algorithms given 
investors increasingly rely on these tools and algorithms to invest. Although the initial 
purpose of providing these tools might not be to reduce decision bias or discrimination, 
these tools and algorithms have the potential to get rid of many types of bias, including but 
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not limited to political bias. Investigating the impact of automated tools on well-known 
behavioral biases is a promising research topic.  
The findings from the DID models are largely consistent with the model-free 
evidence. A state’s signal of liberalness attracts bids from investors in states whose political 
ideology is similar. Investors in states with dissimilar political ideology respond less 
positively (or not at all) to the signal. This indicates that political distance deters online 
lending. 
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR CHAPTER 2  
Appendix A-1: of Lending Club Loans Over Time in the Treated and Control States Used 
in the County-Year Analysis 
 
 
Loan data from https://www.lendingclub.com/info/download-data.action. We determine the 
approval quarter for Kansas, North Carolina, Indiana, and Tennessee based on the HTML time 




06.action, and https://www.lendingclub.com/public/lending-club-press-2013-02-07.action . 
 Appendix A-2: List of Counties in the County-Year Matched Sample 
** Please see text for description of the matching procedure, why the matches are valid for our 
analysis, and how observations from each county are weighted in our analysis. Although some of 
the matches are between counties in states that seem dissimilar (e.g., a county in North Carolina 
matched to one in Maine), Appendix A-4 illustrates that matched counties are quite similar in 




Treated Counties Matched Control Counties 
1 Crawford (Kansas); Lane (Kansas); 
Ness (Kansas); Riley (Kansas); 
Seward (Kansas); Smith (Kansas); 
Stanton (Kansas) 
Ida (Iowa); Kossuth (Iowa); Mitchell (Iowa); 
Winneshiek (Iowa); Greeley (Nebraska); Barnes (North 
Dakota); Benson (North Dakota); Bottineau (North 
Dakota); Dunn (North Dakota) 
2 Ellis (Kansas); Gove (Kansas) Latah (Idaho); Chickasaw (Iowa); Floyd (Iowa); 
Hancock (Maine); Knox (Maine); Lincoln (Maine) 
3 Alleghany (North Carolina) Boundary (Idaho); Idaho (Idaho) 
4 Rawlins (Kansas) Dickey (North Dakota) 
5 Graham (Kansas); Wichita (Kansas); 
Camden (North Carolina); Watauga 
(North Carolina) 
Palo Alto (Iowa); Pierce (North Dakota) 
6 Allen (Kansas); Carteret (North 
Carolina); Transylvania (North 
Carolina) 
Custer (Idaho); Grundy (Iowa); Sagadahoc (Maine); 
Boyd (Nebraska); Dixon (Nebraska); Knox (Nebraska); 































































































































7 Currituck (North Carolina) Ransom (North Dakota) 
8 Logan (Kansas); Osborne (Kansas); 
Phillips (Kansas); Wallace (Kansas) 
Sioux (Nebraska); McLean (North Dakota); Oliver 
(North Dakota) 
9 Cherokee (Kansas); Finney (Kansas); 
Labette (Kansas) 
Caribou (Idaho); Adams (Iowa); Bremer (Iowa); Butler 
(Iowa); Cherokee (Iowa); O’Brien (Iowa); Dawes 
(Nebraska); Eddy (North Dakota) 
10 Cheyenne (Kansas); Mitchell 
(Kansas) 
Crawford (Iowa); Delaware (Iowa); Franklin (Iowa); 
Osceola (Iowa); LaMoure (North Dakota); Ward (North 
Dakota) 
11 Haskell (Kansas) Cassia (Idaho); Audubon (Iowa); Clayton (Iowa); 
Dickinson (Iowa); Emmet (Iowa); Pocahontas (Iowa); 
Pierce (Nebraska); Sheridan (Nebraska); Ramsey (North 
Dakota) 
12 Daviess (Indiana); Bourbon (Kansas) Cerro Gordo (Iowa); Davis (Iowa); Greene (Iowa); 
Guthrie (Iowa); Iowa (Iowa); Page (Iowa); Ringgold 
(Iowa); Washington (Iowa); Winnebago (Iowa); Wright 
(Iowa); Kennebec (Maine); Penobscot (Maine); Waldo 
(Maine); Merrick (Nebraska); Morton (North Dakota) 
13 New Hanover (North Carolina) York (Maine) 
14 Russell (Kansas); Trego (Kansas) Adair (Iowa); Jackson (Iowa) 
15 Decatur (Kansas); Ford (Kansas); 
Rooks (Kansas) 
Tama (Iowa); Richland (North Dakota) 
16 Norton (Kansas) Humboldt (Iowa) 
17 Comanche (Kansas); Nemaha 
(Kansas) 
Jones (Iowa); Wells (North Dakota) 
18 Kearny (Kansas) Benton (Iowa); Calhoun (Iowa) 
19 Barton (Kansas); Cloud (Kansas); 
Coffey (Kansas); Ellsworth 
(Kansas); Geary (Kansas); Grant 
(Kansas); Marshall (Kansas); Meade 
(Kansas); Pratt (Kansas); Chatham 
(North Carolina) 
Elmore (Idaho); Black Hawk (Iowa); Buchanan (Iowa); 
Cedar (Iowa); Fayette (Iowa); Montgomery (Iowa); 
Plymouth (Iowa); Sac (Iowa); Shelby (Iowa); Burleigh 
(North Dakota); Grand Forks (North Dakota); Pembina 
(North Dakota); Stutsman (North Dakota); Traill (North 
Dakota); Walsh (North Dakota) 
20 Clay (Kansas) Emmons (North Dakota) 
21 Anderson (Kansas); Elk (Kansas); 
Greenwood (Kansas); Harvey 
(Kansas); McPherson (Kansas); 
Woodson (Kansas); Henderson 
(North Carolina) 
Minidoka (Idaho); Appanoose (Iowa); Cass (Iowa); 
Clinton (Iowa); Dallas (Iowa); Decatur (Iowa); 
Dubuque (Iowa); Lucas (Iowa); Mahaska (Iowa); 
Marshall (Iowa); Van Buren (Iowa); Woodbury (Iowa); 
Madison (Nebraska) 
22 Buncombe (North Carolina) Linn (Iowa) 
23 Williamson (Tennessee) Bannock (Idaho); Nez Perce (Idaho); Twin Falls 
(Idaho); Keokuk (Iowa); Mills (Iowa); Adams 
(Nebraska); Box Butte (Nebraska); Seward (Nebraska); 
Stanton (Nebraska) 
24 Stewart (Tennessee) Clearwater (Idaho) 
25 Kingman (Kansas) Henry (Iowa); Otoe (Nebraska) 
26 Martin (Indiana) Marion (Iowa); Dawson (Nebraska); Hall (Nebraska); 
Saunders (Nebraska) 
27 Brown (Kansas); Ottawa (Kansas) Nelson (North Dakota) 
28 Atchison (Kansas); Cowley 
(Kansas); Dickinson (Kansas); Saline 
(Kansas); Moore (Tennessee) 
Fremont (Iowa); Harrison (Iowa); Louisa (Iowa); 
Webster (Iowa); Clay (Nebraska) 
29 Lyon (Kansas); Sumner (Kansas) Scott (Iowa) 
30 Monroe (Indiana); Tippecanoe 
(Indiana) 
Clarke (Iowa); Muscatine (Iowa); Wayne (Iowa) 
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31 Dubois (Indiana); Leavenworth 
(Kansas); Lincoln (Tennessee); 
Washington (Tennessee) 
Bingham (Idaho); Boone (Iowa); Madison (Iowa); 
Wapello (Iowa); Warren (Iowa); Scotts Bluff 
(Nebraska) 
32 Marion (Kansas) Fremont (Idaho); Clay (Iowa) 
33 Sampson (North Carolina) Monroe (Iowa); Poweshiek (Iowa) 
34 Pottawatomie (Kansas) Union (Iowa); Pawnee (Nebraska) 
35 Posey (Indiana) Jefferson (Iowa) 
36 Wayne (North Carolina) Monona (Iowa) 
37 Bartholomew (Indiana); Butler 
(Kansas); Miami (Kansas); 
Wabaunsee (Kansas); Montgomery 
(Tennessee) 
Des Moines (Iowa); Cass (Nebraska); Johnson 
(Nebraska); Sarpy (Nebraska); Washington (Nebraska) 
38 Johnston (North Carolina) Payette (Idaho) 
39 Sedgwick (Kansas) Polk (Iowa); Douglas (Nebraska) 
40 Harper (Kansas); Jefferson (Kansas); 
Reno (Kansas) 
Pottawattamie (Iowa); Saline (Nebraska) 
41 Knox (Indiana); Franklin (Kansas) Jefferson (Nebraska) 
42 Switzerland (Indiana) Dodge (Nebraska) 
 
Appendix A-3: Balance between Treated and Control Counties in the County-Year Matched 
Sample  
 
Variable α: Mean of control counties 
(robust std. error) 
β: Mean difference between treated and 
control counties (robust std. error) 
Variables used in the matching procedure 
Bankruptcy filings per capita (2006) 1.597 (0.073) *** 0.122 (0.102)  
Bankruptcy filings per capita (2007) 2.119 (0.105) *** -0.035 (0.145)  
Bankruptcy filings per capita (2008) 2.469 (0.114) *** 0.002 (0.158)  
Bankruptcy filings per capita (2009) 3.061 (0.131) *** -0.061 (0.187)  
Bankruptcy filings per capita (2010) 2.905 (0.129) *** 0.045 (0.184)  
Unemployment rate (2006) 3.887 (0.084) *** 0.052 (0.117)  
Unemployment rate (2007) 3.798 (0.084) *** -0.001 (0.110)  
Unemployment rate (2008) 4.272 (0.105) *** 0.048 (0.149)  
Unemployment rate (2009) 6.162 (0.178) *** 0.285 (0.279)  
Unemployment rate (2010) 5.853 (0.165) *** 0.956 (0.269) *** 
Population (2006) 32.108 (5.435) *** 5.534 (8.378)  
Variables not used in the matching procedure 
Average monthly earnings 2.649 (0.047) *** -0.063 (0.065)  
Median household income 44.279 (0.604) *** -0.895 (0.966)  
Number of employed individuals 13.361 (2.861) *** 0.757 (4.122)  
% age 60 & above 23.716 (0.483) *** -1.358 (0.750) * 
% white 95.542 (0.513) *** -2.252 (0.853) *** 
Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. α and β derived from regressing the variable in the left-hand column 
on Treated, which equals 1 for treated counties and 0 otherwise. α is the intercept and β is the coefficient 
for Treated. Each regression was weighted by the CEM weights (see text). 
 
The first section of Appendix A-4 shows that the procedure generated good balance on the 
matching variables. The only significant difference between the treated and control counties is for 
unemployment rate in 2010. We do not believe this harms our identification because we control 
for unemployment rate in the regressions directly.14 We also examined the balance between 
                                                 
14 We also created a new county-year matched sample, using stricter matching for the unemployment rate 
(2010) variable. In this sample, we achieved balance on all matching variables, although we have fewer 
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treated and control counties for variables that are not included in the matching procedure. For 
these regressions, we included all observations in the 2006-2010 pre-treatment period (n = 259 
counties * 5 years = 1,295), clustered the standard errors by county, and used the CEM weights. 
The second section of Appendix A-4 shows that our matching procedure yields no statistically 
distinguishable differences between treated and control counties for number of employed 
individuals, average monthly earnings, and median household income and only small differences 
for % age 60 & above and % white. We control for each of these variables directly in our 
regressions, which accounts for any remaining imbalance in them. 
 
Appendix A-4: Regressions Results for Bankruptcy Filings (Raw Count) for the County-Year 
Matched Sample 
 
 Poisson regression Negative Binomial regression 
Variable Baseline model Full model Baseline model Full model 
Lending Club available 0.130 (0.031) *** 0.097 (0.026) *** 0.126 (0.016) *** 0.084 (0.016) *** 
Population   0.003 (0.001) **   0.003 (0.001) *** 
Number of employed individuals   -0.000 (0.002)    0.000 (0.001)  
Average monthly earnings   -0.047 (0.088)    -0.112 (0.048) ** 
Unemployment rate   0.032 (0.014) **   0.035 (0.006) *** 
Median household income   -0.006 (0.003) **   -0.006 (0.002) *** 
% age 60 & above   0.015 (0.022)    0.030 (0.008) *** 
% white   0.033 (0.024)    0.037 (0.008) *** 
Year 2006 omitted baseline period 
Year 2007 0.290 (0.019) *** 0.306 (0.025) *** 0.271 (0.018) *** 0.298 (0.019) *** 
Year 2008 0.467 (0.023) *** 0.474 (0.032) *** 0.447 (0.017) *** 0.467 (0.023) *** 
Year 2009 0.666 (0.029) *** 0.576 (0.054) *** 0.661 (0.017) *** 0.580 (0.029) *** 
Year 2010 0.674 (0.028) *** 0.577 (0.062) *** 0.654 (0.017) *** 0.576 (0.032) *** 
Year 2011 0.476 (0.031) *** 0.407 (0.069) *** 0.457 (0.018) *** 0.417 (0.037) *** 
Year 2012 0.318 (0.027) *** 0.272 (0.080) *** 0.274 (0.018) *** 0.260 (0.040) *** 
Year 2013 0.195 (0.025) *** 0.173 (0.097) * 0.131 (0.020) *** 0.146 (0.046) *** 
Year 2014 0.077 (0.028) *** 0.089 (0.116)  0.009 (0.020)  0.059 (0.052)  
County fixed effects         
n (counties) 259  259  259  259  
n (observations) 2,331  2,331  2,331  2,331  
Log likelihood -7167.46  -7040.22  -6692.373  -6628.70  
χ2 1201.07  2063.86  3585.73  4050.59  
Notes: Regressions weighted using the CEM weights. Negative binominal models use OIM (Observed 
Information Matrix)-based standard errors. Poisson models use robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. 
 
Appendix A-5: Plots of the Lead and Lag Coefficients from the Leads/Lags Models (Table 5) 
 
Lead and Lag Coefficients (with 95% 
Confidence Intervals) from Leads/Lag Model: 
County-Year Matched Sample 
Lead and Lag Coefficients (with 95% 
Confidence Intervals) from Leads/Lag Model: 
State-Quarter Sample 
                                                 
observations than in the focal sample. The results of the analysis using this sample are consistent with those 
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Appendix A-6: IV Regressions for Bankruptcy Filings Per Capita: First-Stage Results  
 
Endogenous Variable Being Instrumented Outstanding Loans per Capita 
LC availability / maturity 0.002 (0.000) ***   
Debt-to-income policy change   0.010 (0.000) *** 
Population 0.032 (0.050)  0.036 (0.049)  
Number of employed individuals 0.115 (0.076)  0.096 (0.079)  
Average monthly earnings -0.063 (0.038) * -0.054 (0.040)  
Unemployment rate 0.007 (0.011)  0.013 (0.009)  
Median household income 0.035 (0.022)  0.037 (0.022) ** 
% age 60 & above 0.043 (0.060)  0.052 (0.062)  
% white -0.016 (0.027)  -0.014 (0.027)  
% below high school attainment 0.094 (0.052) * 0.106 (0.056) * 
% housing units rented 0.089 (0.047) * 0.117 (0.049) ** 
% housing units with mortgage 0.004 (0.046)  0.019 (0.048)  
State fixed effects     
Quarter fixed effects     
n (states) 51  51  
n (observations) 2,039  2,039  
R2 0.93  0.94  
Partial R2 0.37  0.49  
F 70.59  449.25  
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by state. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
Appendix A-7: Annual Individual Income of Lending Club Borrowers, Lending Club 
Borrowers who Default, and Residents of the 50 U.S. States plus District of Columbia 
 





Residents of the 50 
U.S. States and D.C. 
75th percentile  90,000 80,000 28,629 
50th percentile  65,000 58,560 25,631 
25th percentile 45,000 42,000 23,602 
Time period 2007-2015 2007-2015 2006-2015 
n (observations) 887,440 99,276 2,040 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 are calculated based on Lending Club borrowers’ self-reported income; 
approximately half of these values were verified by Lending Club. Column 3 is based on the median 
individual income of residents in each U.S. state, plus the District of Columbia, as measured by the U.S. 




APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR CHAPTER 4 
In Table B-1 we report results based on DID models within several subsamples. 
The focal specification is the treatment effect heterogeneity DID model, which is exactly 
the one used in Table 4-4. A subsample of the matched sample excluding California 
investors is used in Column 1 because California borrowers are treated. A subsample of 
the matched sample excluding all same-state pairs is used in Column 2 to remove “home 
bias” effect. Removing home bias weakens the average treatment effect, but the effect is 
still positive and the pattern of political distance is still consistent.  A subsample of the full 
sample including listings that have a final funding percentage over 0.09 is used in Column 
3 (to represent the top 25% listings in terms of funding percentage). A subsample of the 
full sample including listings that have a final funding percentage equaling to 1 is used in 
Column 4. The results are similar as our main findings: the investors holding similar 
political ideology increase bids after the treatment while the investors holding dissimilar 








Table B-1: Additional Robustness Checks on DID Models 


























































Time Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ 
State-Listing Dyad Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations 102,557 102,557 42,350 20,650 
# of Groups 14,651 14,651 6,050 2,950 
Adjusted R2 0.3457 0.4213 0.4134 0.4110 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-listing level. 
In Table B-2 we report results based on DID models with interaction terms of 
political distance to check the treatment effect heterogeneity approach (Table 4-4). 
“Political Distance” is defined as the absolute political distance between borrower state 
and investor state, so the term “Treated * Political Distance” reflects how political distance 
moderates the impact of treatment in the DID setting. “Treated” serves the baseline 
treatment effect, indicating the influence of same-sex marriage law passage on same state 
investors. Results in Columns 1 and 3 confirm that when investors have a dissimilar 
political ideology as the treated state, they tend to place less bids after the treatment than 
who have similar political ideology. Considering liberal investors and conservative 
investors seem to response to political distance differently (as suggested by Table 4-4 and 
Table 4-7), we further add “Treated * Political Distance * Investors More Liberal” into 
the specification used in Columns 1 and 3 as a formal check. The coefficient of “Treated * 
Political Distance” now denotes how political distance moderates the treatment effect 
when investors are more conservative than the treatment state. The sum of the coefficient 
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of “Treated * Political Distance” and the coefficient of “Treated * Political Distance * 
Investors More Liberal” denotes how political distance moderates the treatment effect 
when investors are more liberal than the treatment state. Columns 2 and 4 confirm that 
political distance has a stronger impact when investors are more conservative than 
borrowers.  
Table B-2: Additional Robustness Checks on The Impact of Political Distance 
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Time Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ 
State-Listing Dyad Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ 
# of Observations 104,650 104,650 39,550 39,550 
# of Groups 14,950 14,950 5,650 5,650 
Adjusted R2 0.4793 0.4793 0.0191 0.0190 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-listing level. 
a: p value = 0.159.  
One empirical concern of gravity models is that each pair of investor state and 
borrower state has the same weight, although in reality each pair represents different 
numbers of investors and borrowers. As one robustness check (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 
B-3), we use the production of the number of investors and the number of listings as the 
weight to check whether the results are influenced by small states. As another robustness 
check, we require the investor states to have more than 100 investors and the borrower state 
to have more than 100 listings (Column3). We also remove same-state pairs to avoid the 
confounding effect of home bias (Column 4). Across all models, the coefficients of 
Borrower Political Ideology are always positive and significant, indicating an overarching 
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preference on liberal borrowers. Political distance still exhibits a negative impact, making 
investors who hold dissimilar political ideology less likely to invest.  
Table B-3: Additional Robustness Checks on Gravity Models 








Sample Year 2008 2008 2008 2008 



















































































PoliticalDifference in Range (-10, 
10) 
Baseline 




























# of Observations 2,450 2,450 2,205 2,401 
Pseudo Log-likelihood -87555.022  -74299.167 -73387.42 
Adjusted R2  0.9707   
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
